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Summary 
This dissertation is based on eighteen months of field work in Amazonian Bolivia, and 
situated in the discourse around the construction of indigenous identity in a neoliberal state. It 
focusses on a lowland people and their historical and contemporary relationship to the state which 
is aligned to the contemporary indigenous movement. It does this through an ethnographic and 
historical study of Tacana people, members of an indigenous group who originate in the tropical 
piedmont of the Bolivian Andes. A central focus of the work is on the relationships which Tacana 
people have built with different ethnic, social and political groups in their territory. This focus helps 
to elucidate the overarching issue at the centre of the thesis: the tensions between the Tacana and 
other indigenous groups, namely highland Aymara and Quechua who have migrated into the region 
(colonos). 
The relationship between Tacana and colonos has become increasingly conflictive since the 
advent of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, which emphasizes its origins in Bolivia’s 
strong highland-lowland regionalism. This thesis therefore also examines the strong regionalist 
sentiments found in Bolivia, as expressed in the contrasting concepts of camba (lowland) and colla 
(highland) which are themselves further tied to more recent efforts to forge local identities, such as 
an Amazonian identity. The thesis shows how these efforts, which transgress local, historical and 
racial boundaries, entail an implicit criticism by lowland populations of the government in the 
Andes. A related point is that constructions of race and mestizaje have developed differently in the 
highlands and lowlands. Through a close analysis of such racial relationships the thesis shows how 
lowland groups such as the Tacana more readily align with lowland mestizo people than with other 
indigenous groups, especially those who originate in the highlands. Democratization processes and 
neoliberal policy changes have created spaces for tensions to take shape here and become clearer 
by discussions around identity, heritage and belonging, brought up by the indigenous movement 
and heavily informed by NGOs. 
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Introduction - Indigeneity in Contemporary Bolivia  
 
This thesis addresses the contextualization of indigeneity as it is constructed and employed 
in Bolivia with regard to members of an Amazonian lowland group, the Tacana people. In July and 
August 1990, Tacana were among the indigenous people from the Bolivian lowlands who marched 
to the highland capital of La Paz to demand rights to indigenous land tenure which would guarantee 
them access to local resources. Unusual for a Bolivian event, the march made international 
headlines and can today be understood as a turning point in the relationship between the Bolivian 
nation-state and its indigenous populations (Postero 2007; Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005). Over 80 
current indigenous land tenures (TCOs1) resulted from the 1994 land reforms which were 
themselves spurred by the 1990 march. In 2005 Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, 
typically referred to as ‘Evo’, was voted into office by an indigenous majority and a sympathetic 
mestizo (racially and culturally mixed) middle-class. In line with the ethnic renaissance underway in 
Latin America, he propagated a pro-indigenous policy which returned land to the landless and 
granted them rights to natural resources. 
In late 2011, just over twenty years after that initial protest, another important indigenous 
protest march was made from the Bolivian lowlands to the Andes. In what was dubbed the TIPNIS2 
march, indigenous lowlanders were protesting against a highway which was to be built by the 
government through their territory and a national nature reserve. Discussions on social media 
platforms such as Facebook mistook the conflict behind the TIPNIS march as being between the 
traditional colonial antagonists: the rich whites and mestizos, and indigenous groups, perhaps due 
to the impression that there was strong indigenous solidarity in Bolivia. In fact it was between 
indigenous groups themselves, specifically Aymara/Quechua highland migrants (termed colonos) 
and lowland groups from the Bolivian Amazon. The reference to ‘colonos’ may have contributed to 
the confusion, for in Bolivia, in contrast to other Latin American countries, the term colono always 
refers to indigenous highland migrants of Aymara/Quechua descent and never to white, mestizo or 
lowland indigenous peoples who have migrated. In Bolivia, colono has long been a racial category 
                                                          
1 Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen – TCO 
2 Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Securé – The Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro 
Securé is home to the Yuracaré People It is located in the south of the department of Beni and northern part 
of Cochabamba, also known as the Yungas. 
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and ‘colonos are always highland indians3 who migrate for labour, and there are no migrant colonos, 
who are not highland indians’ (Barragan 2011).  
The colonos in favour of the TIPNIS highway launched a counter-march and the two 
indigenous groups clashed in the Amazonian town of Yucumu. The police, who were accused of 
siding with the government and the colonos, fired tear-gas as lowland protestors fled into the 
forest.4 One child died and three men were hospitalized and the United Nations (UN) commission 
openly criticized President Morales as his national popularity plummeted. Meanwhile Morales, who 
makes a point of collaborating harmoniously with both representative highland and lowland 
indigenous organizations, thereby strategically linking himself to the indigenous movement, 
continued as normal his routine and reprimanded the lowland marchers for having brought children 
and the elderly on such an arduous undertaking.5 The march opposing the highway was led by the 
indigenous lowland umbrella organization CIDOP (La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de 
Bolivia), whose current president, Adolfo Chavez, is a Tacana from Tumupasa. Youths from the 
Tacana comunidad of Tumupasa, a key site in this research, could be spotted at the march with 
placards expressing their support for TIPNIS and opposition to the highway (see Image 3).  
 
Image 3: Tumupasa Youths at the TIPNIS March arriving in the Andes (October 2011) 
                                                          
33 As others before me, I choose to the term ‘indian’ in the lower case, stressing with this that they are not 
national but ethnic and regional terms (Wade 1997:121; also Canessa 2013). See also usage of terms in 
chapter 1. 
4 See for example media coverage: http://www.ntn24.com/noticias/indigenas-rompen-cerco-policial-y-se-
temen-choques-con-colonos-en-boli-022813 
5 See for example media coverage: http://www.aininoticias.org/2011/09/presidente-indigena-se-burla-de-
indigenas-marchistas-acusa-a-nnuu-de-apoyarlos/ 
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The 2011 indigenous march, like that of 1990, marks a turning point in indigenous politics in 
Bolivia. For while the 1990 march demonstrated indigenous solidarity and strength in numbers, the 
2011 TIPNIS march questioned these, demonstrating that the indigenous peoples of Bolivia are not 
a monolithic group and that Evo Morales does not represent them all. What, then, is happening in 
this state which, in late 2009, officially became ‘plurinational’ in recognition of all indigenous 
peoples? Why was the indigenous president, who travelled to UN meetings to defend the 
sacredness of the coca leaf and the importance of ‘Pachamama’ (Mother Earth), not standing beside 
his indigenous population, and why was a significant part of that population not standing by him? 
Questions such as these lie at the heart of this thesis and are situated within the constructions of 
indigeneity and indigenous identities in Bolivia. 
Tacana people, the focus of this study, do not find themselves represented by the 
indigeneity created by Morales and his MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo - Movement towards 
Socialism) government, which is situated in the Andes (see chapter 5). This does not mean that 
Tacana people don’t have representative organizations which are active in the contemporary 
indigenous movement (e.g. CIPTA – Consejo Indigena del Pueblo Tacana – The Indigenous Council 
of Tacana People) and have not made use of indigenous land-tenure projects (TCOs) themselves 
(see chapter 7). It also does not mean that they do not consider themselves members of other socio-
political groups in the Bolivian nation-state, such as the lowland ‘identity’ of camba (see chapter 3 
& 4), a collective self-identification which is deeply embedded in Bolivia’s conflictive highland-
lowland regionalism (see chapter 3 & 5). Nevertheless, ‘indigeneity’ as presented in the politics of 
Morales’ MAS party, and in part also by the indigenous movement, is rejected by those Tacana 
people studied here, who neither belong to the strong indigenous highland majority (Aymara & 
Quechua people) which brought Morales into power, nor figure among the few Tacana 
representatives active in the formal indigenous movement (see chapter 7). This thesis demonstrates 
how Tacana people situate themselves within key issues in Bolivia, which in turn highlights how their 
own sense of self and their indigeneity becomes constructed within the political and historical 
landscape of Bolivia. 
The main focus of this research is on Tacana people; however, this thesis is not an 
ethnography of the Tacana people. Rather it is a discussion of historical and contemporary 
indigenous identity construction and the broader issues of race and regionalism in Bolivia, of which 
the Tacana people offer a primary example. It is an anthropological inquiry into different tensions 
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between different socio-racial groups, whose main focus is on the Tacana people and who in Bolivia, 
represent an indigenous group. This introduction lays out the theoretical concepts and 
contemporary political issues that underpin and surround this study. While Chapter 1 will focus 
more closely on the particular Tacana people studied here, the paragraph below provides a brief 
introduction to the Tacana people in the Bolivian context.   
 
Image 4 - Location (approximate) of the languages of the Tacana family with neighbouring languages and peoples (in 
brackets). (Source: Guillaume, 2008; with adaptations/additions made). 
 
Tacana6 people have their origin in the foothills of the tropical Andes in the northern part of 
Bolivia between the Madre de Dios River and northern part of the Tuichi (Métraux 1942), in today’s 
                                                          
6 Since increasing involvement with the indigenous movement and coordination with NGOs, (e.g. The 
Wildlife Conservation Society), ‘Tacana’ is being spelled ‘Takana’ in pamphlets and other grey material. This 
is in line with the original linguistic spelling. This process of switching from a ‘c’ to a ‘k’ was underway during 
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departments of La Paz and Beni (see image 2 & 4).7 Tacana people of this study are based in the 
surrounding tropical area of the town Rurrenabaque located on the shores of the Beni River (see 
images 4 & 10). The Beni is part of the basin of the Amazon River further north. Tacana people 
typically reside in comunidades8 which house between three and 60 families, and have second 
homesteads in the surrounding municipal towns of Rurrenabaque, San Buenaventura and Ixiamas. 
The most recent Bolivian census (2013) numbered Tacana people at 11,1739. Besides fishing and 
hunting, Tacana people at the centre of this study practice swidden horticulture10, with men 
seasonally migrating to work in the local lumber, rubber and, more recently, tourist industries. 
Linguistically Tacana people are part of the Takanan-language family but today most are 
monolingual Spanish speakers (see chapter 1). The intention of this research is not to represent ‘the 
Tacana people’, and all aspects of their society and culture. This study acknowledges that there are 
many different kinds of Tacana people, of whom some only barely feel comfortable at being labelled 
‘Tacana’, while others, especially given the recent indigenous politics have come to fully embrace 
their ethnic identity. Though there may be Tacana people who follow ‘an old way of life,’ as one of 
my informants put it, the people studied for this research were very careful to set themselves apart 
from these ‘more traditional’ Tacana, who ‘still use tutumas11 to drink from’ (i.e. as opposed to mugs 
or glasses)12. Rather they see themselves as ‘civilized’ and first and foremost as Bolivian, though at 
the poor end of national society (‘somos gente pobre’), as demonstrated by expressions such as 
‘being of humble origin’ (‘somos gente humilde’) (see also Albro 2010, 2001); and then as camba 
(lowlanders), indicating that in any case they consider themselves as ‘belonging’ to the Bolivian 
nation-state. They do not, however, tie this sense of belonging to ideas of legal ‘citizenship’ (e.g. 
Lazar & Nuijten 2013; Postero 2007), which would imply an active claim to rights (Isin 2009), which 
the Tacana people in this study do not conceive of themselves as having. 
 
                                                          
my field-research and since at the time it was and continues to be contested, I maintain the spelling of 
‘Tacana’ throughout this thesis. 
7 There is also a large Tacana population in the department of Pando, largely as a result of the rubber boom 
during which many were brought, or migrated here, to work. 
8 Comunidades is the Bolivian term used for indigenous villages as more closely examined in the following 
chapter. 
9 National statistics from 2000 put Tacana people at 5,000 while the newest census from 2013 quotes the 
Tacana population at 11,173. 
10 Main crops include maize, yucca, banana, sugar cane, peanuts and rice 
11 A type of calabash which can be hollowed out  
12 Quote from one of my main informants, Berta, from the comunidad Carmen Florida. 
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Central Themes and Contributions 
Focusing on Amazonian lowland indigenous Tacana people, this thesis studies how the 
construction and continued reproduction of Tacana identity can be seen in relation to the social and 
political processes of the nation-state. The thesis thus contributes to ongoing debates around the 
construction of indigenous identities in Bolivia as well as in the wider Latin American and global 
context. Since the arrival of the Spanish in what is today the Bolivian Amazon, through the 
consolidation of the Bolivian nation-state and the most recent ethnic renaissance, Tacana identity 
has been continuously shaped, not only by Tacana people but also by the socio-political processes 
that have flowed from the construction of the Bolivian state. Tacana people both contribute to and 
are shaped by these processes, but importantly are never mere vessels. This thesis takes up issues 
in the context of indigenous identity construction which, though central in Bolivia, have largely been 
absent from the literature.  
 
 
Image 5: Map of Bolivia - Though 60% of Bolivia is made up by lowlands, it is considered an Andean country. (Source: 
http://www.explorebolivia.com/our-country/map-of-bolivia/) 
 
Although the lowlands comprise the largest part of Bolivia (see image 5 above), socio-
political processes are spearheaded by developments in the Andes, the historical seat of political 
power. In line with this, much scholarship on Bolivia has been the study of Andeanism, with focus 
on cultural orders such as the ayllu (Andean community) (Weismantel 2006; Starn, Harris; Nugent 
et al. 1994). Considering that Bolivia is an ‘Andean state’ (e.g. Orlove 1993; Klein 1992) with an 
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Aymara (i.e. highland) president, the relation to the state of Amazonian groups such as the Tacana 
raises particularly interesting questions. To what extent are they and have they been a part of the 
construction of indigenous identity in Bolivia since the ethnic renaissance of the late 1980s? What 
are the central socio-historical factors in their case? Social science literature has concentrated on 
the different ways in which the Bolivian state establishes indigeneity, and it has been identified as 
Andean-centric (Greene 2009, 2006; Toranzo Roca 2008). This opens the debate on ‘representation’ 
and ‘who speaks for whom’ (Greene 2006), something for which indigenous ‘authenticity’ must be 
created in order to then be claimed (Lucero 2006; Jackson & Warren 2001). With the adoption of 
linguistic concepts based on an Andean cosmology and philosophy, which heavily focus on ideas of 
‘protecting nature’, the pro-indigenous Morales government has focussed on ‘decolonizing’ the 
country, and making Bolivia an ‘indigenous state’.  
Indigeneity and Indigenous Identity 
 As Greene (2009) has observed, the term and concept ‘indigeneity’ have come to be ‘so 
overgeneralized and so abstracted that they become essentially indefinable, indeed, sublime’ (34). 
As with the term ‘culture’ (Kuper 1999), it has come to mean everything and nothing. Though on 
one level ‘indigeneity’ is a hyper-real, essentialized form of being which exists largely in the context 
of modernity and a ‘strategic essentialism’ (Greene 2009: 35; Warren & Jackson 2002; Ramos 1998) 
it remains a useful tool to demonstrate multiple layers of parallel meanings which pertain to 
indigenous peoples. Significant for this research is that in Bolivia, indigenous peoples are treated as 
a monolithic group, and to subsequently analyse how this affects Tacana people as an indigenous 
group and as individuals. 
Amazonian Bolivians and particularly Tacana people, though affected by the current state-
building processes and though having contributed to it, have remained largely ‘invisible’ both 
historically but also in their oppositions to its new politics. This research takes a relatively atypical 
‘angle’ on Bolivia the Andean state. It does not ‘remain’ in the Andes to study the Andes and its 
people, but rather follows a gaze from the Amazon up to the Andes. It considers predominantly 
Tacana people’s view which intends to make sense of the politics of ‘indigeneity’ represented and 
constructed here. This thesis thus explores indigeneity not as focused on political mobilizations as 
for example the Landless Peasants Movement (MST) and resulting policy in the Andes (Fabricant 
2012), which are important contributions, but rather explores how lowland people react to such 
mobilizations in which they only indirectly participate, yet which affect them fully.  
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It has been argued (Greene 2009, 2006) that literature on indigenous groups in ‘Andean states’ 
and their specific link and role in the nation-state and in nation-state construction has been focussed 
mainly on Andean peoples (e.g. Canessa 2012, 2006b, 2005a; Pape 2009; Lucero 2008; Spedding 
2008; Larson 2003, 1995; de la Cadena 2000; Weismantel 2001; etc.), and much less on the Bolivian 
lowlands, which in turn also predominantly focusses on Bolivia’s Eastern lowlands, the so-called 
Oriente (e.g. Weber 2013, 2012; Postero 2013, 2007; Sarreal 2013, 2009; Fabricant 2012, 2009; 
Bogado 2010; Gustafson 2009; Roca 2008; Boschetti & Peña 2008; Fifer 1972, 1970). Native groups 
of the Amazon who live in ‘Andean states’, in the literature have been treated as less ‘significant’ 
and ‘impactful’ on nation-state processes (Lucero 2006:35; also Greene 2009, 2006; Klein 1992). 
This has become reflected on literature focussing on Bolivia and the nation-state, but also on 
theories and models of the social sciences which intend to ‘understand’ Amazonian peoples (Greene 
2009).  
This may very well be an influence which goes back to the reign of the Incas. In colonial times 
the highland elite made a cult around the Inca nobles of Alto Peru (today Bolivia and Peru), a 
phenomenon which Greene terms the “Inca legacy” (ibid: 67). This ‘attitude’ permeated a multitude 
of levels. Not only that of the elite of Alto Peru, but it continued to influence future generations. 
Including the way history became written, not least influencing the discipline of Anthropology (ibid). 
At the same time Amazonianist authors have increasingly set literatures on the history and socio-
historical reality of people of in the Amazon with regard to the new indigenous politics which 
emerged especially from the 1990s onwards13 (e.g. Van Valen 2013; Dudley 2011, 2009; Alexiades 
2009; Greene 2009; Wenzel 2008; Bathurst 2005; Peluso 2005; Alexiades & Peluso 2005; Castillo 
Altamirano & eds. 2003; Garcia Altamirano 2003; Cusurichi Palacios 2003; Herrera Sarmiento 2003a, 
2003b; Balza 2001; Lehm 1999; Castillo 1988; et al), an aspect which is further elaborated in chapter 
one.  
Looking at indigeneity and avoiding essentialism means focusing on how it becomes constructed 
and reiterated in regard to specific historical conceptions and politics. A principal actor in the topic 
around indigenous identity is the global indigenous movement of indigenous peoples as 
represented at the United Nation forums. Importantly as observed by Niezen (2009), “the 
international movement of indigenous peoples (demonstrates) part of a transformation in the 
politics of culture, (…) in which the ability of the nation-state to be principal object of cultural 
                                                          
13 Taking the 1990 Bolivian indigenous march from the lowlands to the highlands as a starting point. 
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attachments and the sole custodian of constitutional rights and duties is being brought into 
question” (30). This has become especially interesting in the case of Bolivia which since 2006 has an 
indigenous president and whose government has aimed to make the ‘switch’ from being the colonial 
oppressor of indigenous peoples (i.e. a mestizo state), to being ‘on the same side’ and an ‘indigenous 
state’. The voting-in of Evo Morales (2006) brought indigeneity on to a whole new political level 
(Albro 2006) and the MAS (Movement towards Socialism) government, once in office announced its 
goal of ‘decolonizing’ Bolivia – a plan which became anchored in the 2009 constitution14.  
To borrow from Gotkowitz (2011), “indigenous identity is dynamic and multifaceted: it may 
be rural, urban, or transnational; proletarian, peasant, or professional; monolingual, bilingual or 
trilingual” (34; also Greene 2009; de la Cadena & Starn 2007). This view is quite a change to when 
the term first became declared a legal category to be utilized for achieving collective human rights 
reforms (Niezen 2003:11; also Bowen 2000) from which subsequently emerged international 
indigenous movements representing a “global network of those who share a consistent sense of 
self, a common sense of timelessness and fragility, and complimentary aspirations of self-
determination” (Niezen 2009:9). Indigenous identity is a process which constantly changes and 
reinvents itself and in this course, claiming an indigenous identity has provided vulnerable groups 
with the possibility of liberating themselves from an oppressing nation-state and international 
contexts which promote a new kind of capitalism (e.g. del Valle Escalante 2009; Escobar 2008; 
Postero 2007; Martinez Novo 2005; Brysk 2000; Niezen 2003; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Sieder 
2002; Nash 2001).  
The concept of ‘indigeneity’ arguably yields its strength from an implied ‘collectiveness’: the 
solidarity of ‘many’ into ‘one’ (Niezen 2010, 2009). Unlike ‘ethnicity’ which is individual, ‘’indigenous 
identity is necessarily based in the collective (Niezen 2003:10). A collective transnational ‘indigenous 
identity’ which has been “developed largely in response to oppression, usually at the hands of the 
state” (ibid: 10). Groups and indigenous social movements in Bolivia have increasingly utilized 
‘indigeneity’ to achieve specific rights and resources. Thus, the Andean indigenous group, 
Movimiento Sin Tierra (Landless peasants Movement - MST), has come to form a strong social 
                                                          
14 Although efforts leading to ‘decolonization’ were put into action previous to the 2009 constitution, it was 
also anchored here as stated in Article 9.1., referring to the aims of the Bolivian state to “Construct a just 
and harmonious society, founded in decolonization, without discrimination, exploitation and with social 
justice in order to consolidate the plurinational identities.” (República de Bolivia 2009) (Translation and 
emphasis mine).  
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movement based around land ownership and land redistribution. Placing himself closer to interests 
of indigenous groups, Evo Morales has adopted their tactics in his own policy-making (Fabricant 
2012). Interestingly, as demonstrated in this thesis, Tacana people of this study, employ their new 
‘indigenous identity’ to work against an ‘indigenous solidarity’, as a “collective agent of reform” 
(McIntosch, Bowen, Rosengren 2002: 23), for which it was defined in context of the United Nations 
and the Forum of Indigenous Issues (2002) (see chapter 5).  
Who defines ‘Indigenous’? – The Permitted Indian and the Ecological Indian 
The role of states in constructing indigenous identity may lead one to ask along what lines this 
‘indigeneity’ is being shaped. Who defines ‘indigenous’ and ‘indigeneity'? Indeed, while indigenous 
movements emerged as a positive force in the strengthening of democratic processes in Latin 
America, the fact they have become heavily defined through national and international policy must 
not be ignored (see Canessa 2007; Postero 2007; Martinez-Novo 2006; Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005; 
Sieder 2002). Focusing on the role of states, the construction of ‘the indian’ in the course of neo-
liberal reforms throughout Latin America has encouraged a prototype indian subject, a ‘permitted 
indian’ (indio permitodo). He/she fits the neoliberal model (Hale 2002, 2005) and complies with ‘the 
core of neoliberalism’s cultural project … (which aims for) the creation of subjects who govern 
themselves in accordance with the logic of globalized capitalism’ (Hale 2004:269; also Hale & 
Millaman 2005, 2002; Lee Van Cott 2000; Assies et al. 2000). The indio permitido is both a term and 
subject, a ‘negotiated space with prerogatives’ (Hale & Millaman 2005:284) which has clear limits 
within this neoliberal system, which, if disregarded, would render him/her ineligible for the 
privileges otherwise granted.  Leaders of indigenous movements, and pro-indigenous state 
representatives, not least Bolivia’s president, have adopted or inherited (or both) this neoliberal 
creation of the ‘permitted indian’. Indeed, as will be demonstrated (especially chapters 7 & 8), it can 
be argued that the Tacana people studied here can only participate in the realms of the indigenous 
movement if they fit and act the role of the ‘permitted indian’, which some people will find easier 
than others, depending on such aspects as their gender and social class.  
Academic studies have gradually moved beyond the construct of indigenous peoples 
according to the romantic notions of the Western Enlightenment to demonstrate the complexities 
involved in the formation of indigenous histories which in the process of history also become 
‘invented’ (see Zimmerer 2013; Niezen 2009, 2003). Meanwhile, Latin American governments, in a 
move of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak 1999), still play on post-colonial representations of the 
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indian, casting him/her in the role of ‘noble savage’, ‘ecological indian’ and ‘egalitarian hunter’ (ibid; 
Niezen 2003; Conklin & Graham 1995). These nostalgic and romantic notions provoke a greater and 
more immediate political impact. In this image, indigenous peoples are especially linked to their 
natural surroundings which ‘they can better protect’ than non-indigenous peoples. This is an image 
which has helped them achieve land rights and tenures. Environmental issues have become central 
to Bolivian social movements of which the TIPNIS March and the MSN (Movimiento Sin Tierra) are 
sound examples. These movements are viewed as spaces in which indigenous actors both 
demonstrate their agency and put indigeneity ‘in action’. They exhibit a ‘collective voice’ which 
signals a clear contrast to the historical silencing of indigenous peoples under the colonial order 
(Howard 2010). The fact that indigenous peoples are using ‘their own’ voice, indicates that the 
‘subaltern’ (Spivak 1993) majority in Bolivia15 is no longer oppressed but has risen to power (Howard 
2010).  
The image of the ‘ecological indian’ has gained a strong footing through, in particular, 
conservationist Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) which work closely with Latin American 
countries. Rights related to a healthy environment and access to land have been included in 
constitutional changes in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia (Canessa 
2012;  Gudynas 2011). The environment features prominently in politics here, having been adopted 
in line with multicultural neoliberal governance, in which actors and non-state institutions 
proactively take on the role of the state and perpetuate its policy (Hale 2002). NGOs working with 
indigenous groups have greatly encouraged relationships which link land policy to identity and 
livelihood and to the struggle to more agency (e.g. Latta & Wittman 2012; Nuijten & Lorenzo 2009; 
Postero 2007; Yashar 2005). In so doing, they encourage a form of ‘environmental governance’ 
(Zimmerer 2013: 2; Latta & Wittman 2012; Lemos & Agrawal 2006), which refers to “political 
interventions of environment-related knowledges, institutions, etc. … (in which key is) the different 
political economic relationships that institutions embody and how these relationships shape 
identities, actions, and outcomes“(Lemos & Agrawal 2006:2).  Indigenous peoples are attributed a 
close tie with spiritual beings often linked to ancestral forces tied to the Earth. In Bolivia this has 
attributed them with credibility in their fight for water and gas rights (Dangl 2007), both natural 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that while the 2001 census put the indigenous population at 62% in Bolivia the most 
recent 2012 census, done after this research had ended, indicates that the indigenous population dropped 
by 18% and with this is in a minority. The recent census has, however, also been criticized as faulty on the 
basis that indigenous comunidades difficult to reach were not included (personal communication). 
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resources which in light of neoliberal politics were being privatized to international companies. 
Thus, though indigeneity has at its root an injustice, it is also constructed to hold an authenticity 
exclusive to native peoples and which may give them a political vantage point for achieving rights 
and resources. 
Following the politics of Evo’s plurinationalism creates the impression that the MAS 
government is expanding the ‘permitted Indian’ concept, to do away with boundaries meant to 
construct a permitted type of Indian, towards one “articulat(ing) local ideas of peoplehood on the 
one hand, with regional or nationwide ideas about citizenship on the other” (Bowen 2000:14). 
Plurinationalism, a central theme in Bolivia, indicates harmonious living together of different 
peoples (pueblos). Through such policy the government signals that it is (becoming) an ‘indigenous 
state’ for more than just one indigenous peoples, indicating “explicit support for robust indigenous 
rights and forms of indigenous … ‘autonomy’” (Gustafson & Fabricant 2011:2; Gustafson 2009). 
However, has Evo really done away with a ‘permitted Indian’ in course of ‘decolonization’, as 
anchored in the 2009 constitution, to make room for ‘every kind of indian’? Especially chapter 7 
looks more closely at this question.  
‘Decolonization’ has been interpreted to indicate reversing the ‘colonial order’ (Howard 
2010) by the implementation of certain infrastructure, the provision of schooling, etc. as well an 
ideological process of ‘decolonizing the mind’ (ibid; Rivera 2011; Ticona Alejo 2011; Monasterios 
2007). Decolonizing is necessarily linked to a construction or reconstruction of ‘indigeneity’ and 
various literature have focused on the processes involved here (e.g. Zimmerer 2013; Postero 2013, 
2010, 2006; Weber 2012; Grisaffi 2010; Niezen 2009, 2004, 2003; Canessa 2007, 2006; Albro 2006, 
2005; Jackson & Warren 2005; Kuper 2003).  
In order to ‘decolonize’, it first became important for the government to change its own 
role, and to begin to adjust and ‘see’ (Scott 1998) and ‘speak’ (Zimmerer 2013; Chess et al. 2005) 
like an indigenous state. This is done by adopting certain indigenous concepts into the state’s 
rhetoric. An active usage of certain terms signal a being en par with ‘indigenous’ concepts by which 
the very “shifts in the use of language (…) constitute the very process of change of which they are 
part” (Howard 2010). Utilizing these, the government “speaks like an indigenous state” (Zimmerer 
2013:2; also Chess et al. 2005) and with these President Evo Morales demonstrates his promised 
politics of ‘decolonization’. This is continuously being done by incorporating symbols of indigeneity 
into everyday politics and long-term policies. However, might it rather be that the language and 
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imagery used to ‘speak’ like an indigenous state, foremost reconfirms the archetypal Andean Indian 
represented through Andean cosmology and symbols (Albro 2010; Greene 2009; Crabtree & 
Whitehead 2008)? 
Representation: Bolivian Indigeneity in Andean Concepts  
The definition of ‘the indian’ as Andean is no novelty; indeed it can be traced from pre-
colonial times to the writing of the Bolivian constitution of 2009. The Incas saw the peoples of the 
lowlands, whom they associated with ‘water’, as lesser to those in the Andes who were associated 
with the sun (Greene 2009, 2006). Taking this into consideration, the indian in the new colonial 
Bolivian republic (1825) was hegemonically Andean. As anthropologist, Orlove (2002, 1993) 
observers, geography played an important role in giving order in the new Colonies of Alto Peru. In 
the time of state formations, a “crucial link was … established between indianness and highlands: 
The Indians became the people of the highlands, the highlands the place of the Indians (…) and the 
indians directly absorbed the quality of the environment in which they lived,” (1993: 325) with their 
skin colour and personalities being likened to the brown and barren environment of the highlands. 
Indians were thus not defined along a certain casta (caste) but alongside a region. As a result the 
Amazonian indians became altogether invisible (ibid). Thus, Morales has not completely broken with 
the past: his government has utilized concepts align to an Andean cosmology in order to decolonize 
the country and become an indigenous state. He has taken the representation of the indian as 
constructed during the Enlightenment, colonialism and also neo-liberalism, not only building on the 
indian as Andean but also entering into a contradictory condition of ‘indigenous rights’, where the 
right to be different is synthesized through the Western Enlightenment formula based on equal, 
humanistic, and individual rights (Hokowhitu 2011:266 quoting Niezen 2009). 
Central Andean concepts have been key to demonstrating ‘indigeneity’ in Bolivia’s nation-
state politics but also in the indigenous movement; these are implemented both visually and 
linguistically (Zimmerer 2013; Howard 2010; Chess et al. 2005; et al). As with most concepts these 
are malleable and open to interpretation and manipulation (Burman 2011). To give one example, a 
central visual symbol utilized as an indigenous identity marker by the Morales government is the 
wiphala flag. The wiphala is a symbol of Andean cultures shared across country borders. The 
government has installed the rainbow-colored Andean banner as the second official national flag 
next to the Bolivian tricolored one. It has also become integrated into Bolivia’s police uniform, sewn 
into one badge with the tricolored national flag. Other visual markers include the usage of the 
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pollera (the Andean multi-layered skirt) by representatives in the Morale’s government and the 
representatives of the Constituent Assembly in 2010. Evo, too, has integrated Andean cloth woven 
in traditional patterns into his suit-jacket and shirt which he wears during official representations.  
Perhaps more potent still is the adoption into state rhetoric of Andean linguistic concepts 
which are based on entire philosophies. These include chacha warmi, a system of reciprocity based 
on the male and female gender roles (Maclean 2013; Burman 2011; Choque Quispe & Mendizabal 
2010); and the environmental philosophies of Pachamama (Mother Earth) and Vivir Bien (Living 
Well, translated from the Quechua expression of kawasay or allin kawasay or the Aymara sumaq 
qamaña (Salgado 2010; Albó 2009). To embrace such philosophies and make them more tangible 
Evo Morales may travel to Tiwanaku to celebrate the solstice and the Aymara New Year; or send 
state ministers to provinces to participate in Aymara New Year rituals (Canessa 2005). Certain 
indigenous concepts, particularly Vivir Bien, have been preserved in the constitutions of Ecuador (in 
2008) and Bolivia (in 2009), made unanimous for the indigenous peoples of Latin America, Bolivia’s 
included, and used to refer to human rights and a collective well-being (Zimmerer 2013, 2012).  
Principal among the linguistic concepts utilized in the construction of indigeneity are those 
applied to emphasize the special relationship with, and preservation of, the environment, which has 
been especially advocated and encouraged by NGOs. The idea of protecting the environment is 
framed by central Andean cosmology, in which the concepts of Pachamama and Vivir Bien are key. 
Both concepts were constructed in Andean colonial societies, most likely with a strong Inca influence 
(Zimmerer 2013, 2012; Mannheim 1991), and have become ‘enshrined as a conceptual centrepiece 
of ascendant indigenous movements and endogenous development’ (ibid 2012: 601; also Escobar 
2010; Salgado 2010). Policies which embody the path to ‘good living’ (Vivir Bien) include social 
initiatives financed by a share of a direct tax on hydrocarbons (the IDH - impuesto directo a los 
hidrocarburos) introduced by the Morales administration (see also chapter 5).  This tax finances 
programmes such as the Juancito Pinto16 (2006), which provides annual payments towards books 
and clothing to each registered school child; Juana Azurduy17 (2008), an annual payment to each 
                                                          
16 Annually 28 US$ 
17 Annually 29  US$ 
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pregnant woman to cover natal care; and Renta Dignidad (2008) a minimum pension for all 
registered old age citizens18.  
While Indigenous self-representation and international bodies such as the UN Work Group 
have been used to demonstrate that indigenous peoples now have a ‘voice’ on political platforms 
(Muehlenbach 2001; Ewen 1994) it still “raises the question of who is speaking for whom” (Greene 
2004: 211). The question of ‘representation’ is important for better understanding the complexities 
involved in the constructions of indigeneity in Bolivia as well as the relationship indigenous people 
are developing today towards the state. The issue of representation and ‘being represented by’ is 
not original in the history of indigenous peoples. Traditionally, however, this refers to a relationship 
based in race in which the white colonizer represents and speaks for the non-white colonized. Issues 
around contemporary representation and mediation as raised by indigenous mobilization and the 
international indigenous movements have been central to current anthropology (Greene 2006).  
In early colonial administrations of Spanish America indirect rule was the typical form for 
keeping control over the natives and the role of native kurakas was crucial for the Spanish 
administration in the Andes to control the Incas (Greene 2004 citing Rasnake 1988; Stern 1982; 
Comaroff & Comaroff 1991: 255; Wolf 1956). During the colonial period indians were legally 
considered minors and were represented by a designated mestizo in any official transactions 
(Guerrero 1994). As is the essence of chapter 7, mestizos in Tacana comunidades formerly held 
leading political positions (Corregidor) in which they played a type of mediator between the natives 
and the nation-state. This form of representation by state-designated mestizos has been labeled 
ventriloquism by Guerrero, and became a cultural aspect ingrained in Andean and Latin American 
culture beyond a legal domain19 (Martinez Novo 2013: 6). It was later utilized to justify the position 
of indigenistas who spoke for indigenous peoples. In Ecuador, and arguably in other Latin American 
countries, ventriloquism was only abandoned with the rise of indigenous movements in which 
indigenous peoples began representing themselves (ibid). 
There are a number of important representations of indigeneity officialised by the Morales 
government by which Tacana people of this study do not feel represented. This begins with symbols 
such as the nation-wide adoption of the Wiphala banner. The Wiphala before its official installation 
                                                          
18 Per individual this amounts to 340 US$ annually and it has been criticized as merely functioning as a 
supplement rather than being enough to live on.  
19 Indigenous peoples received the vote in Bolivia in 1952  
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was regarded much like a regional symbol for the highlands and Andes. During important events, 
the lowlanders (mestizos and indigenous peoples) hoisted the lowlander’s green-white flag, symbol 
for unending resources and freedom, next to the Bolivian tricolored one, in symbol of the lowlands 
and the cambas. Cambas is the term used for all lowlanders and has more recently been utilized to 
express identity factors (see chapters 3 & 4).  
Authenticity: The Right to Represent 
Morales follows a ‘highland politics’. He ties his form of governing to Andean philosophies 
and social movements instigated in the highlands predominantly by Andean indigenous peoples and 
social movements. ‘Authenticity’ here is key. In order to claim a right to ‘represent’ indigenous 
people, Evo must create his ‘authenticity’. One way to establish authenticity is by number (Lucero 
2006), as by number of supporters and participants. Evo demonstrates his authenticity through such 
numbers found in the multitude of supporters who demonstrate in favour of his policies or even his 
person. He reciprocates this by aligning himself to social movements signalling that he is working 
and governing ‘with’ and ‘for’ indigenous people. This is a concept of solidarity which was expressed 
in his slogan cried when first voted president: “we are all presidents” – a notion which echoes an 
Aymara concept of governing (Grisaffi 2013; Lucero 2010).  
Who is ‘most’ indian becomes determined by practices and discourses which designate 
certain subjects as more authentic and politically more influential than others (Lucero 2006; Jackson 
& Warren 2003). Signifiers such as language, dress, and other symbols expressing ‘tradition’ and 
‘culture’ demonstrate who is authentically indigenous. In Bolivia ‘authenticity’ is represented by 
indigenous groups, organizations and social movements. Morales utilizes social movements such as 
the Landless Peasant Movement (MST) to ‘mobiliz(e) cultural forms, narratives, and performances, 
to legitimize reforms’ (Fabricant 2012:27; also Aguirre & Cooper 2010); demonstrate that he works 
together with indigenous groups and movements, and give his person more ‘indigenous 
authenticity’. He has also used indigenous social movements as a guide for identifying the issues 
which are pertinent to the indigenous population of Bolivia and used these in policy-making. This 
has included land redistribution measures taken up with the MST in the mid-1990s (Fabricant 2012; 
Albó 2003), as well as the nationalisation of hydrocarbons and the issues circling around the Gas 
and Water Wars which become attributed to the indigenous collective right based of usos y 
costumbres (traditions and customs) (Gustafson & Fabricant 2011; Dangl 2007; Albro 2005; Olivera 
& Lewis 2004; Albó 2003). These are predominantly based in Andean concepts, indeed it is only 
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recently begun to be taken up by the literature that “the MAS project is deeply imprinted by Andean 
scholarship and discourse” (Gustafson & Fabricant 2012:10; also Postero 2010). 
For some time now intellectuals, non-intellectuals, indigenous groups and social movements, 
predominantly from the lowland regions of Bolivia, have all made harsh critiques of Morales’ 
Andean-centrism. The reception of these critiques has entered the debate around ‘who gets to 
speak for whom’ and ‘representation’ in which ‘authenticity’ has become a tool of measurement.20 
An article by the Argentinian journalist Pablo Stefanoni, for many years director of the newspaper 
Le Monde Diplomatique-Bolivia, set off a ripple of reactions in the Bolivian press. He scathingly 
labelled Morales’ Androcentrisms as romanticized ‘Pachamamismo’ (Stefanoni 2010a, 2010b) and 
criticized Western intellectual institutions for being blinded and fooled by the strategic essentialism 
which ‘decolonization’ served to cloak. The president’s projects, he claimed, were warmly approved 
far from Bolivian reality in the ‘workshops of NGOs, in the calm of (USA’s) Duke University … (or in 
the courses at) at the FLACSO (institute), Ecuador’21 (2010a). The MAS’s predominant integration of 
Andean cultural beliefs into Bolivian politics has come under particular scrutiny with the recent 
surge of the so-called ‘Camba Movement’, a pro-lowland initiative. This white-supremacist lowland 
movement initiated in Santa Cruz (Centellas 2010; Fabricant 2009) can only be fully understood in 
the context of Bolivia’s lowland-highland regionalism, which is central to this thesis.  
Highland-lowland Regionalism 
Indigeneity, a useful term in achieving political goals, needs to be customized and 
contextualized in order to be representative (Canessa 2012; Greene 2009; Niezen 2003). This thesis 
contextualizes Tacana indigeneity in the Bolivian nation state. The political terrain in which a people 
is located, as shaped by history, region, class and religion, plays a central role in the construction of 
their indigeneity (Lucero 2008), and constitutes a changing landscape which continuously ‘opens up 
spaces for particular types of cultural expression’ (Canessa 2012: 4). Current literature situates 
Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism as a predominantly economic tension (e.g. Fabricant 2012, 
                                                          
20 The issue of ‘representativity’ is equally controversial within the social-science disciplines in which 
anthropologists ‘represent’ indigenous groups. Certain depictions have led to wider-scale animosities, such 
as the (1999) critical reading of Guatemalan Rigoberta Menchu’s account by David Stoll, a non-indigenous, 
non-Guatemalan man (Greene 2004); or most recently the violent representations (2013) of the Yanomamö 
of Venezuela by US anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, which earned him the label ‘the most controversial 
anthropologist’ (Eakin 2013) in the New York Times. 
21 Translation my own. 
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2009; Centellas 2010; Peña 2010; Roca 2008; Soruco, Plata & Medeiros 2008; Boschetti & Peña 
2008; Gustafson 2006; Stearman 1985; Gill 1987; Painter 1988), and one which is entangled in 
historic socio-racial issues between the traditional white/mestizo elite and poor indigenous peoples 
(Gustafson 2010; Valdivia 2010). This thesis begins to redress the imbalance by bringing in 
perspectives by specifically lowland indigenous group, Tacana people, and how they situate 
themselves within this tension.  
 
Image 6: Map of Bolivia depicting the departments which make up the Media Luna in grey. Source: (accessed 
09.10.2013) http://upsidedownworld.org/main/bolivia-archives-31/1388-total-recall-in-bolivia-divided-nation-faces-
historic-vote  
 
When talking of the lowlands in Bolivia talk is also of the Media Luna (half moon), named 
for the shape which the lowland departments form (see image 6 above). Alterantely the lowlands 
are also called El Oriente (the East), and this includes the Amazonian region, though it in fact lies to 
the north of the country. The fact that it is included in the overarching term El Oriente, demonstrates 
Santa Cruz’ principal representative role in the lowlands as also in regionalism (for more see chapter 
3 & 4). Central to regionalism is the historical fact that state departments upon country formation 
(1825) had more power than the Bolivian government as a whole (Roca 2008). To date most 
publications on regionalism have focused on its economic aspect represented by a white/mestizo 
Santa Cruz elite as in line with the high media representation of President Morale’s first term. This 
media attention was largely spent on responding to the mobilization of mestizo groups from Santa 
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Cruz propagating more state autonomy, demanding a larger share of the tax revenues of the natural 
resources in ‘their’ department and protesting the policy which dictated that they be stripped of 
some of their land (Kirshner 2010; Kohl & Bresnahan 2010; Healy 1983). With the development and 
introduction of neoliberal multiculturalism the regional highland-lowland divide has been 
aggravated, and in light of this, the literature has almost exclusively attributed regionalism to an 
exacerbation of the classic indigenous-mestizo conflict.  
Indigenous mobilization is considered a positive if unexpected result of neoliberal 
multicultural reforms (Hale 2002). In this regard, McNeish (2008), points out that “a curious irony … 
of multiculturalism (is that) … one of the groups that has been most successful in manipulating its 
politics into a movement for autonomy is predominantly white and elite (…) the self-proclaimed 
‘Camba Nation’ (…). The cambas have mastered the rhetoric of historical disadvantage, ethnic 
difference and cultural self-determination to defend their interest in benefiting from the 
exploitation of local hydrocarbon resources and fostering a booming economy in the region” 
(McNeish 2008: 47; Lowrey 2006). The development of the Camba Movement and the Camba 
Nation represented by a traditional white oligarchy in the eastern lowlands have come to be known 
for their efforts to maintain the economic and social  foot-hold “lend(ing) support to the idea of sub-
state models of regional governance, a neo-neoliberal strategy for localizing and maintaining 
market-oriented resources extraction in articulation with transnational capital” (Gustafson & 
Fabricant 2011: 10; Gustafson & Fabricant 2012; Regalsky 2010; Escobar 2008; Gustafson 2006).  
More recently with aspirations for departmental autonomy by Bolivia’s eastern lowland states, 
in attempts to gain a greater grasp over the revenues of natural resources located in their 
department (e.g. Bebbington & Bebbington 2010; Pacheco 2004; Gustafson 2009). Here, for 
example, in line with discussions on the privatization of hydrocarbons, the department of Tarija 
“became the epicentre of national political struggles over political autonomy for lowland regions at 
odds with the Morales administration” (Bebbington & Bebbington 2010:14; Kohl & Bresnahan 
2010). However, as is central to this research, regionalism was not borne out of recent conflicts, but 
has rather resurfaced in reaction to land and resource redistribution policies passed by the 
government of president Evo Morales (see chapter 5). In the debate around regionalism indigenous 
voices, especially are ‘missing’, an aspect this research counters. 
Only very recently have authors begun to engage with the complexity of highland-lowland 
regionalism, recognizing that it goes “beyond an elite-driven response to the Morales programme” 
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(Kohl & Bresnahan 2010:13; Kirshner 2010; Roca 2008) and beyond topics pertaining to Bolivia’s 
natural resources. Significant is the recognition of the catch-all character of the rallying cry for 
autonomy, and that it is understood and interpreted very differently in the various regions and also 
according to class and ethnic positions (Kirshner 2010). While in Santa Cruz some falsely understand 
that this would mean needing passports to travel between state departments (ibid), people of 
Rurrenabaque, department of Beni, see autonomy as a long-awaited measure to finally have more 
influence on the social and political development of one’s immediate surroundings which 
historically have been managed from the Andes and with overt disregard to the wishes and needs 
of the local population - be they mestizo or indigenous (see chapter 5).  
To dismiss all critique of Evo Morales’ Andean-centrism as simply anti-indigenous, would be 
demonstrating a short-sightedness of regionalism (see chapters 3 & 4) but also of the magnitude of 
Andeanism in Bolivia’s national identity (Roca 2008). It can be argued that in his politics, Evo is 
continuing the ongoing project of shaping Bolivia as Andean, catering to what Greene has coined 
the “Inca slot”. Here the nobility around the Incas is celebrated as was adopted by Spanish creoles 
and elites after colonization.22 This becomes demonstrated by Morales’ government alignment with 
the contemporary indigenous movement which are defined through eco-conservationist politics23, 
then importing these to the Andes, to then insert them with Andean concepts linked to the 
environment (e.g. Vivir Bien, Pachamama as discussed earlier). For, while it is true that the ‘camba 
pride’ rhetoric is appropriated by a rich Cruzeño elite to disguise their efforts to gain economic 
power and maintain their class advantage (Gustafson 2008), this critique does not look at the 
context of camba-ness on a larger level, namely how it can be that poor indigenous people as the 
Tacana proudly identify as camba (see chapter 4). The limited focus on regionalism in the literature 
leaves one with the impression that lowland groups do not hold a position in their own right. In light 
of the currently strong ethnic renaissance, not examining the alliances forged in lowland regions 
between the mestizos and the local indigenous groups (see chapter 5) may bring up the 
uncomfortable suspicion that indigenous peoples are associating with the ‘wrong’ people: not the 
                                                          
22 Although Greene has his focus on Peru, the construction of a cult around the noble Incas is a project which 
began when Bolivia was not consolidated (1825), impulsed by the creole elite of Alto Peru (see Greene 
2006).  
23 The current indigenous movement born in the lowlands demonstrates strong parallels to Peru’s 
indigenous lowland movement initiated by Pan-Amazonian organisation, COICA (Coordinadora de las 
Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica) of which the Tacana organisation, CIPTA, is a member. 
COICA became ‘eco-tainted’ when it invited a wide range of environmental NGOs to sign the ‘Iquitos 
Declaration’ in 1990 (Greene 2006:343). 
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indigenous president, representing the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, but with the right-wing 
mestizos, infamous for anti-indigenous sentiments.  
The amount of credibility attributed to critiques of Evo’s form of ‘indigenous governing’ and his 
representations greatly depend on ‘who’ is bringing them forth. Thus, critiques brought forth by 
Tacana people are likely to be received more readily and viewed as more ‘authentic’, because they 
are coming from an indigenous group, than critique which comes from an Argentinian-born mestizo 
who lives in Bolivia, or a white-supremacists group from Santa Cruz such as Nación Camba. This was 
certainly the case for the TIPNIS protest, the example with which this thesis opens, and which 
received wide press coverage and credibility precisely for the fact that indigenous peoples were 
criticizing the indigenous president. The TIPNIS march was initially exclusively made up of 
indigenous lowland groups (headed by CIDOP). Literature which lays out contradictions in Evo’s pro-
indigenous politics tied to an Andean cosmology and environmental governance (e.g. Zimmerer 
2013; Kohl & Farthing 2012; Aguirre & Cooper 2010) though important, have yet to be sufficiently 
tied to lowland peoples’ reaction and agency, particularly in the case of Amazonian indigenous 
groups. This research contributes to bridging this gap. 
Evo propagates an Andean philosophy and indigenous values in his environmental governance, 
and the environment was central in his summit on climate change in Cochabamba in 201024 (e.g. 
Postero 2010). Morales projects Andean cosmology on to the Amazon region, without taking into 
consideration that peoples who originate from the region may have a distinct beliefs regarding the 
forest. It has been argued that in propagating environmental sensitivity in the name of Andean 
indigenous values such as Earth Mother and Living Well, in a region in which indigenous people 
rebuke his politics, Evo is engaging in reterritorialization (Zimmerer 2013). Flooding is frequent in 
the tropical foothills of the Andes in northern Bolivia. Evo highlights these areas at United Nation 
Summits on climate change25, using the climate change disasters to criticize the Global North. Yet 
his national programmes on exploiting the environment and international rhetoric of protecting 
Pachamama, stand in contradiction (e.g. Postero 2013). The MAS government plans to expand 
Bolivia’s mining sectors (Kohl & Farthing 2012), and to continue the projects of hydroelectric dams 
                                                          
24 The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (WPCC-RME) was held 
in Cochabamba between the 19th and 22nd of April 2010. Over 30,000 people, NGOs and other types of 
organizations from 135 countries participated. 
25 Specifically in his “Save the Planet” speech at the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Affairs, 21 Aril 
2008. 
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near Cochabamba and the Amazonian north near Rurrenabaque and at the border of Brazil 
(Zimmerer 2013; Postero 2013; Aguirre & Cooper 2010) - measures which Amazonian Indigenous 
groups such as Tacana people and their representative organisation, CIPTA, strongly oppose26. 
Amazonian groups such as the Tsimané, Moseten and Tacana peoples, do not see themselves 
represented by the politics of President Morales and welcome outside interventions (NGOs and 
REDD27 scheme advocates) to help them protect their forests and land tenures (TCOs) from 
exploitation by the government (see also chapter 6)28.  
Indigenous groups’ working relationships with NGOs can be seen as a product of ‘neoliberal 
multiculturalism’ (Hale 2005, 2002), where ‘disadvantaged cultural groups’ (ibid 2005), apply their 
‘new collective cultural rights’ to engage with the decentralized parts of the economy, in this case 
‘the climate’. NGOs29 also pay salaries and draft management plans for indigenous land-tenures, 
features which are usually the responsibility of states. President Morales reacts to this NGO-
influence by criticizing TIPNIS March leaders who are from lowland organisations such as CIPTA and 
CIDOP to having been ‘bought’ by Western NGOs, calling them “lideres ONGistas” (NGO-
sympathizing leaders). These criticisms imply that he is up against the old colonial imperialist enemy 
(mainly the USA via its aid institution, USAID) which, like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, functions through 
indigenous organizations.30 This attitude, importantly, allows him to question the credibility of 
lowland indigenous organizations.   
The fact that specifically lowland indigenous organisation are Evo’s main indigenous critics (and 
in turn come under fire from him), is not a demonstration of random inter-indigenous conflict, but 
highlights the far reaching impact of regionalism. One essential factor in regionalism which greatly 
influences the tensions, lies in the constructions of race which were distinct in the highlands and in 
the lowlands (chapter 4). In America, first colonialist constructions of race were based in ideas of 
                                                          
26 Personal communication with the President at the time (Celin Quenevo) of the Tacana organization, 
Consejo del Pueblo Tacana (CIPTA).The Bala Dam project was already topical in 2003 but had been dismissed 
by the Bolivian government of the time. It was taken up again by President Evo Morales.  
27 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) 
28 Personal communication with leaders from the Consejo Regional Tsimané-Moseten (CRTM) based in 
Rurrenabaque. 
29 Conservationists NGOs as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) have paid the salaries of indigenous 
leaders and park rangers of the national parks as the Madidi and Pilon Lajas which they support. They are 
also funders of important projects within the land-tenures. 
30 In consequence, President Evo Morales expelled USAID and all its funding from Bolivia in 2013.  
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purity and lineage tied to religion (de La Cadena 2000; Stepan 1991; Mörner 1967) while in modern 
times being indian is almost exclusively defined by one’s low socioeconomic status (Martinez Cobo 
1987; Friedlander 1975). Most literature pertaining to race-mixing and mestizaje in South America 
and specifically Bolivia focus on the Andes (e.g. Gutierrez Brockington 2006; Larson 2004; de la 
Cadena 2000).  
In the Andes during colonial times, being indian was often tied to a romantic notion of the noble 
Incas (Greene 2009; 2007), while in other parts of America, especially Central America, the idea of 
‘watering down’ the pure Indian ‘race’ and mixing it with white blood would produce a robust 
mestizo hybrid, a belief which made race-mixing attractive and desirable (Hale 2002; Gould 1998). 
This is significant in context of Bolivia’s strong regionalism, for the lowlands identified more with 
neighboring lowland countries and their socio-economic politics. Due to how the Amazon was ‘left 
on its own’ by the government in the highlands, racial relations between Indians and whites 
developed differently than in the highlands. This difference can be seen reflected today, arguably 
also in the ‘identities’ of camba (lowland) and colla (highland) (see chapter 4).  
It can be argued that in reaction to a specifically indigenous president, intent on 
representing the indigenous peoples of Bolivia as a monolithic group, differences between 
indigenous groups have become all the more visible, as individual (lowland) groups protest his 
politics. This thesis lays out some of these protests (Chapter 5). Amazonian groups have come to 
wider attention in Bolivia much like in Peru, where President Toledo’s promotion of pro-indigenous 
policies and dialogue, pulled indigeneity onto a new national level (Greene 2009). A central 
difference being that Evo, is accepted as being more authentically indigenous than Toledo, which in 
turn attributes him more credibility for linking himself with the indigenous movement. Lowland 
groups have become visible in Bolivia as a result of the tensions and conflicts which stand in 
contradiction to Evo’s politics but which are simultaneously a result of neo-liberalism. NGOs 
collaborate closely with lowland indigenous organisations in their objection to plans for building 
dams in the Amazon, for example. With the help of NGOs lowland indigenous organisations 
challenge Andean indigeneity to being the national indigeneity, contributing to the dismantling of 
Bolivia as an Andean project.  
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Chapter Set-Up 
The thesis begins, in Chapter One, with a discussion of my own journey with Tacana people, 
the contexts in which I worked with them and the methodology used as well as a clarification of the 
terms and labels used. In light of my comments above on the importance of context, the thesis then 
moves on to provide a historical background of Tacana people in Bolivia. This includes the history of 
their missionization and a discussion of the structure under which Tacana peoples were grouped 
together according to their language roots. This throws up the problematic of the reality of 
ethnogenesis. An issue which becomes relevant today in the context of indigenous politics and 
indigeneity, where distinguishing between different indigenous groups is key in the distribution of 
land-tenure. Another key aspect in Tacana history is that it has been continuously set in relation to 
the Andes, a situation which has heavily influenced their trajectory in the nation-state. At the same 
time, early documentations counter Tacana peoples’ established image as ‘docile’, an image 
congruent with the context of traditional Amazonian studies set predominantly in ‘cultural ecology’ 
and ‘environmental determinism’. Early anthropological work on Tacana people focussed especially 
on synthesizing their cosmology and less on their situation as a people part of a nation-state, as is 
of focus in this thesis. At the same time, Tacana cosmology is still be found today in the landscape 
and natural phenomenon typical of the area, though it does not take on the same significance to 
Tacana people of this study as it might have in the past.  
Continuing with the theme of geography and ‘belonging’, chapter two begins by focusing 
on concepts of ‘space’ and ‘belonging’, and how these are utilized in the nation-state to aid in the 
creation of socio-racial categories. This becomes demonstrated in the descriptions of the physical 
sites used in this research. These include one municipal town (Rurrenabaque) and three Tacana 
comunidades (Carmen Florida, Tumupasa, Buena Vista). Geographical space is closely tied to a 
Tacana sense of collective identity. This is reflected in the expressions and terms which Tacana 
people utilize when referring to themselves as a group. These expressions are tied to physical 
settlement (the comunidad) but also to the larger image of their people as set in the historical 
context of the Andean nation-state. This spacial identification is tied to being poor, Bolivian, from 
the country-side (el campo) and humble (humilde).  
The geographical context which has significantly shaped Tacana indigeneity is heavily based 
in their living in the Amazon, and these make up a significant part of Bolivia’s lowlands. Chapter 
three focuses on the emergence of Bolivia’s historic highland-lowland regionalism. This conflictive 
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regionalism created the regional identities of camba and colla, which more recently especially are 
experiencing popularity. Significant here is the form of relationships which racial groups (indians, 
whites, mestizos, etc.) developed towards one another in the highlands, the lowlands and in 
different sections of the lowlands. Though all lowlanders are camba, lowlanders distinguish 
between different kinds of cambas in accord to race, class and lowland region.  
As is of focus in chapter four, distinctive factors and not least blood-relations bound Tacana 
closely to local mestizos. Among other things, this provided the recent incentive for the creation of 
an Amazon ‘identity’. This Amazonian identity is part of Tacana people’s indigeneity. While the state 
regards the efforts to create an Amazonian identity as part of a lowland secessionist impulse, Tacana 
people, on the other hand, identify with this effort and see it as one in which their heritage is re-
evaluated positively. By identifying as lowlanders (camba) and specifically Amazonian cambas, 
Tacana historically situate themselves against the highlanders (collas). This includes the government 
(MAS party) situated in the Andes and which is pro-indigenous. An anti-highland positioning initially 
seems counter-productive considering Evo’s pro-indigenous politics.  
Chapter five demonstrates that the changing political landscape has opened up spaces in 
which indigenous groups utilize their ‘indigeneity’ as a political tool. This can be seen in the local 
politics of the municipality of Rurrenabaque. Tacana representatives in Rurrenabaque utilize their 
‘indigeneity’, to annunciate a regional camba affiliation. They do so in applying it against highland 
colonos. They engage with their indigenous identity as defined within the boundaries of the 
indigenous movement (see Brightman 2008), but outside of this context. In this they demonstrate 
an indigenous opposition to the indigenous movement, highlighting that it is not a monolithic 
unified movement. The indigenous movement has become associated with the pro-indigenous MAS 
government. At the same time, Tacana people are also strong actors within its politics via the Tacana 
organisations, CIPTA, and the lowland indigenous umbrella organisation CIDOB. Yet, as tensions 
over land-allocation intensify, Tacana indigeneity as represented locally in comunidades, is 
increasingly positioned in relation to colonos and with suspicion towards the government. This may 
stand at odds with how Tacana leaders in indigenous organisations associate with the government. 
This in turn raises the questions as to Tacana people’s involvement with Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement.   
How Tacana people relate to the indigenous movement is affected by their historical social-
class standing within their comunidad. Chapter six, focusses on the construction and impact of social 
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class within a Tacana comunidad. This is an aspect which the politics around the most recent 
indigenous movement continues to ‘overlook’. Efforts to become involved with the indigenous 
lowland movement in the late 1980s were initiated members of elite families of Tumupasa. The 
issue of social class in a Tacana comunidad is closely tied to race and mestizaje (race mixing). 
Significant for Tacana people’s trajectory in Bolivia, race and beliefs around race-mixing (or 
mestizaje), were constructed differently in the Amazon than in the Andes. Some Tacana people of 
this study share a blood-link with their former patrones (land-owners) for whom they worked as 
peons.  
Chapter seven turns to focus more directly on Tacana people’s involvement with the 
indigenous movement- Tacana representatives play no insignificant role in Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement. Importantly, this time-period marks a shift in power on the political landscape of Bolivia. 
This greatly impacts Tacana people’s self-perception and how they will now situate themselves in 
Bolivia. While previously in the comunidad a white blood-link (mestizaje) was essential for 
‘belonging’ to the nation-state system (as corregidor31, teacher, etc.), henceforth people’s ‘indian-
ness’ (ethnicity) becomes the key link for access to central resources (land, lumber, etc.).  
Coming back to the limitations which the construction of the ‘permitted indian’ entails, 
chapter eight focusses on women Tacana leaders. Tacana indigeneity, reinforced within the 
boundaries of indigenous land-tenures and management plans, is constructed along guide-lines 
which are reflected, among other things, in gender-relations and the regulation of gender 
behaviour. Tacana women underlie more stringent ‘regulations’ when moving within the realms of 
the indigenous movement (e.g. as leaders) than men. At the same time, women from elite families 
underlie less stringent regulation than women from non-elite families. Constructed as essential for 
the reinforcement of Tacana tradition and values, these values are in fact measures for reinforcing 
existing and new power constellations as introduced with the context of the indigenous movement. 
As a result, Tacana women of this study seek platforms outside of the indigenous movement to 
achieve their goals.  
  
                                                          
31 The corregidor is the leader and political representative of a comunidad – see chapter 6. 
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Chapter 1 - Locating Tacana People in the Amazon 
 
Methodology 
I came to know Tacana people when I worked as an aid worker in 2003 with the national 
German aid organisation, Deutscher Entwicklungs Dienst (DED)32. The DED (today GIZ33) dispatches 
aid workers to work locally with vulnerable social groups. Here I worked with the national Tacana 
organizations CIPTA and CIMTA until 2006 in context of their consolidation of a five-year land-tenure 
(Tierra Comunitaria de Origen - TCO) management plan. The Tacana of the department of La Paz put 
in their claim for land-tenure (TCO) in 1997 on behalf of 20 comunidades34 and received it in (TCO) 
in 2002. During my time with the DED I lived in the municipal town of Rurrenabaque as well as in 
the comunidad35 of Tumupasa. Having come at a time in which the TCO had just been consolidated 
and the first five year management plan (WCS & CIPTA 2002) was being executed, I came to 
experience the dichotomy between the political representation of Tacana people by NGOs (as the 
Wildlife Conservation Society) and Tacana leaders in the indigenous movement and the actual life 
in the comunidades. The largest impact this time had on me was the realization that although the 
Tacana people now had legal representation that aimed to bring about a higher standard of living, 
many Tacana people did not ‘feel’ a change or many did not speak of the change positively. There 
were many complaints that funds were being redirected into personal pockets and much suspicion 
about the new Tacana leaders36.  
Working and living for a number of years in these contexts I was eager to understand more 
about Tacana people separate from the international aid context. I realized that the international 
aid arena often did not have the structure necessary to ‘listen’ to Tacana people it was working with. 
Even if the intension of the professionals who worked with Tacana people were very apt and willing 
people, they were caught up in the system and rules of the NGO they worked for and had little 
                                                          
32 Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst - German Development Agency 
33 Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – German Agency for International Cooperation 
34 In all 621 families and 2,849 inhabitants (see WCS Webpage http://www.wcsbolivia.org/en-
us/globalinitiatives/territorialmanagement/tacanaindigenouspeople.aspx) 
35 I utilize the Spanish term comunidad when speaking of the physical indigenous communities/villages thus 
adopting the original terminology and way of referencing which the Tacana and Bolivians at large use. This 
term derives back to the way comunidades were consolidated, for they are not a traditionally Tacana 
structure who rather lived semi-nomadically, but one which came about in the process of missionization.  
36 The role of leaders is examined in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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influence on changing things ‘on the ground’ (i.e. in the comunidad with the Tacana people). This is 
something I experienced as well and found very frustrating. It is the main reason I decided to pursue 
study on Tacana people and gain an understanding of their context apart from development which 
was so tightly tied to achieving certain agendas and management plans. I wanted to get to know 
Tacana people for what they were and all the implications involved.  
This research is based on 17 months of multi-sited research conducted between August 
2008 and December 2009. At this time I chose my central field-sites aware of the charged politics 
surrounding the formal indigenous movement which I had experienced especially in the comunidad 
Tumupasa during my time as an aid worker a few years earlier. When I returned to Bolivia in late 
2008 to launch on field-research I took care to remain independent of any NGO affiliation and a 
direct affiliation with the national Tacana organisation, CIPTA, so as to remain as neutral as possible 
when interacting with comunidad members. Wanting to enter a TCO to do research has become a 
complex undertaking as Tacana organisations (mainly CIPTA) assess the research proposal and often 
in what appears to be random and unjustified turn it down especially if the “contraparte” (a 
collaborative return service) is not lucrative enough. The contraparte can be anything from teaching 
English classes, to a laptop. Especially for individual researchers with no strong financial backing 
these requirements become impossible to carry out. Though it is only right that Tacana people have 
an influence over the research in their area, there is also much internal disagreement within the 
realms of the TCO as to who makes this decision and comunidades have complained that a 
researcher they would have welcomed had been turned away by CIPTA without them being 
informed. The political structure of an overbearing authority (CIPTA) who takes on decisions for 
comunidades which they traditionally made themselves, is still foreign.   
 While my field-work was done in Tacana comunidades and surrounding municipalities of 
Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura as also to some extent Ixiamas. All these places are in the 
departments of La Paz (province Iturralde) and Beni (province Ballivián). Research was also 
conducted in the cities and towns of Riberalta, Trinidad, Sucre, Cochabamba, El Alto and La Paz, 
where in all I spent five months doing research at the archives, libraries, NGOs, ministries and 
interviewing people here. It must be noted that I took care to maintain the anonymity of my friends 
and informants, and have changed all their names in the text, except in the instances in which they 
are being interviewed as professional experts or as national political leaders or figures. I have also 
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anonymized some places as a restaurants and at times even comunidades when in connection with 
a specific event and person which could possibly negatively affect them.  
Two weeks of archival work was also spent in the smaller town of Trinidad, the capital of 
the department of Beni, which has an extensive collection on documents, maps and books on the 
Beni area and which is run by an enthusiastic retired history teacher.  In La Paz, Santa Cruz and 
Cochabamba I spent time with representatives of the indigenous movement, government officials 
and NGO workers, working in one area or other pertaining to the Amazon or indigenous groups as 
biologists, linguists, anthropologists, sociologists and feminists activists as well-known, Julietta 
Paredes, who tried to involve Tacana women into a feminist movement. Specifically, I interviewed 
people from bilateral aid organisations who have worked with the Tacana people as the German 
GTZ (für Technische Zusammenarbeit) and DED based in La Paz, as also government organisations 
as INRA (Insituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria) responsible for land-rights and distribution issues 
in Bolivia. In Santa Cruz I interviewed, Jürgen Riester, the founder of APCOP (Apoyo para el 
Campesino-Indigena del Oriente Boliviano) who was involved in the start-up of lowland indigenous 
groups’ organizing legally. I conducted both semi-structured interviews as also casual conversations 
to acquire information on what they do and how they organize their every-day (Faubion & Marcus 
2009; Bernard 2002). To aid me in this endeavour I resorted to either jotting down notes on paper 
as I spoke to people or afterwards; depending on the situation I would tape record interviews.  The 
latter was especially the case with NGO workers and government officials and more rarely Tacana 
people in comunidades. I also tape recorded thorough conversations with my main informants, all 
of which were women, and with whom I conducted life histories. This usually entailed setting up 
specific meeting times in the evening after the given person had finished the day’s load of work and 
for them was also a way to kick-back and relax and reminisce about their life.  
Conversations and interviews were accompanied by participant observation to perceive the 
difference between what people said they did and what the actually did. People often claimed 
participation or engagement with certain practices, which they in fact did not participate in but 
obviously identified with. This was the case for participation in the monthly comunidad meetings in 
which all adults are obligated to take part. People told me that they attend every month, when in 
reality many skipped these meetings regularly.  
While I gathered information with Tacana people, I also interacted with Tsimané, Moseten, 
Ese-Eja people as well as highland migrants (colonos) of Quechua/Aymara affiliation in both Tacana 
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comunidades where they lived and outlying municipalities as of Rurrenabaque and San 
Buenaventura. I participated in numerous monthly meetings in various Tacana comunidades, and 
bigger general municipal meetings of Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura. I interviewed the 
mayors and staff of the municipality, the mayor of Rurrenabaque to the secretary who was in charge 
of the photo-copying machine and the daughter of a main Tacana informant. I conversed with the 
mestizo population in Rurrenabaque who are very proud of their Japanese, German or Swiss 
heritage and happily unpacked old photographs of themselves as former mayors. I participated in 
local festivities which included a number of Miss Contests, town anniversary festivals, Easter 
processions, and Carnivals but also in private fiestas in people’s home’s as Easter vigils and children’s 
birthdays.  
Tacana people who did not associate with the indigenous movement or who did not work 
in NGO contexts were the most difficult to approach. They would assume that I was studying ‘the 
Tacana’, as the new indigenous movement had introduced or was some kind of NGO representative 
looking to implement ‘projects’ in their comunidad to improve their lives. In this context I was often 
waved away from a household compound by women associating me with this new era of ‘helping 
indigenous people’ and who cooking or washing laundry would call clarifying, “there is no one here” 
(no hay nadie!) and then a bit more desperate “my son is working in the fields” (mi hijo esta en el 
chaco) and finally "el Corregidor” (the comunidad representative). They are the people who gave 
me blank looks when approached with terms such as  "culture" and "language", until l adjusted my 
wording to ”raices” (roots) and ”dialecto" (diaIect), terms which referred back to pre-land reform 
(1952) times.   
The Usage of Terms and Labels 
Before turning to past studies of Tacana people, something should be said about the usage 
of terms labels in this thesis. Labels are power signifiers of ‘identity’ for they become utilized to 
demonstrate a ‘way of being’, and a shared history. While the word ‘indian’ resonates with a history 
of injustice, the term ‘indigenous’ indicates the arrival of a new time, it represents a cleansed of 
discrimination era, and an effort to put ‘indian’ to the past and welcome something better. Critics 
have pointed out that adopting new terms to replace former baggage-laden ones, is running the risk 
of ignoring old power relations which are still intact (Canessa 2012; Weismantel 2001). Indeed, 
‘indigenous’ is almost history-free in contrast to ‘indian’ and it is precisely for its unsettling 
connotations that intellectuals choose to maintain the usage of the term ‘indian’ in their work (e.g. 
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Canessa 2012; De la Cadena 2000). Throughout this thesis I choose to primarily utilize the rather 
professional term ‘indigenous’, adopted especially in the context of the indigenous movement, 
precisely because the term is what has given indians a new position in Bolivian society. It is with 
‘indigenous’ on their tongues that researchers and NGO representatives now approach Tacana 
comunidades, asking about their ‘traditions’ and ‘culture and importantly their opinion. In this, they 
avoid ‘indian’ which would be an insult to the Tacana people. If at all, it is because of ‘indigenous’ 
that being ‘indian’ is suddenly ok and because of ‘indigenous’ that Tacana are ‘visible’ and can 
participate in local politics. However, Tacana people would not typically refer to themselves as 
indigenous outside of a professional context, as the indigenous movement. Thus, in line with the 
new political development of being indigenous, I predominantly utilize the term ‘indigenous’ when 
referring to native peoples and as others before me, I write the word ‘indian’ as also white, mestizo 
camba and colla, in the lower case, stressing with this that they are not national but ethnic and 
regional terms (Wade 1997:121; also Canessa 2012). 
The Tacana People of this Study – History, Location and Contexts 
This study is not intended as a complete ‘ethnography of the Tacana people’, in part because 
of the relative heterogeneity of Tacana people, but also because the primary interest of this 
research is specifically Tacana people’s interactions with the nation-state and indigenous politics. 
There are two main Tacana communities in Bolivia, one in the departments of La Paz and Beni and 
the other in the department of Pando. From my limited experience of Pando Tacana people 
(Bathurst 2005) it was clear that the community there differs considerably to the one in which I 
worked in the La Paz and Beni, especially because of its divergent trajectories in context of the the 
rubber industries (ibid, see below).  
The Tacana people of concentration live in the departments of La Paz and Beni. All of them 
have homesteads in Tacana comunidades and some in addition second homesteads in the town of 
Rurrenabauqe. Many Tacana comunidades of La Paz and Beni are members of indigenous land-
tenures (TCOs). A central one is the TCO Tacana I, which is located in the province of Iturralde in La 
Paz, surrounded by the Madidi National Park. In 1997 the national Tacana organisation, CIPTA, which 
at the time represented 20 Tacana comunidades (621 families and 2,849 inhabitants) supported by 
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the NGO WCS37, submitted a land claim to INRA38 to title in all 389,303 ha of land of which 39.430 
ha overlap with the Madidi. 39 The claim was successful in 2001. Since then some Tacana 
comunidades have left the TCO while others have joined. Overall it is difficult to say exactly how 
many Tacana comunidades exist in the vicinity of Iturralde, as some are registered by the 
municipality while others are not. Depending on their exact location they either pertain to the 
municipality or San Buenaventura or Ixiamas. In all, however, there are perhaps around 30 Tacana 
comunidades in Iturralde of which most fall under the legal jurisdiction of the TCO Tacana I, and in 
addition under the legal jurisdiction of either San Buenaventura or Ixiamas.  
The situation is different across the Beni River in La Paz, province Ballivián which holds the 
municipality of Rurrenabaque and which also belongs to this study’s focus (see image 10). In this 
area there are 6 Tacana comunidades which are part of the municipality of Rurrenabaque. While all 
of them legally lie under the jurisdiction of the Rurrenabaque, only three of these are also members 
of an indigenous land tenure, namely the TCO Tsimané/Moseten. The fact that they are part of this 
TCO is due purely to logistic reasons, as they are located within the territory which was claimed by 
the Tsimané/Moseten organisation, CRTM40 (see also chapter 2). The TCO Tsimané/Moseten is 
composed of 22 comunidades and received its legal title in 1997.  
It should be stressed that even within the area that I worked the people from the comunidad 
Carmen Florida (Beni) differ considerably from people in Tumupasa (La Paz) even as many 
individuals are connected through kinship. In fact, even Tacana people from the same comunidad 
will differ significantly from one another, as in line with their social-class, gender, etc. situations. For 
this reason I find it difficult to present my work as an exhaustive ethnography of Tacana culture. 
Further, given the relative limitations of space within the thesis it is not my intention to present a 
holistic view of all aspects of society and culture, instead I have chosen particular issues to focus on 
and elucidate, namely the construction of indigenous identity and Tacana people’s relation to the 
Bolivian nation state. 
The contemporary Tacana people, numbering 11,1735 according to the most recent national 
                                                          
37 Wildlife Conservation Society 
38 Insituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria – National Insitut of Agrarian Reform 
39 Source see the WCS website http://www.wcsbolivia.org/en-
us/globalinitiatives/territorialmanagement/tacanaindigenouspeople.aspx (accessed 9.10.2013) 
40 Consejo Regional Tsimané/Moseten – Regional Council oft he Tsimané/Mosten 
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statistics, belong to the Tacanan (also spelled Takanan) language family, which is sometimes also 
linked to the Panoan, was first classified by Créqui-Montfort & Rivet (1921-22, vol. 13: 91-100). It 
consists of the five languages which despite sharing a language-root were and to a large part still 
are, treated as separate groups: Cavineña (or Kavineña), Tacana Proper (or Takana), Ese Eja (also 
called Chama), Araona and Reyesano (Guillaume 2008; Aikhenvald & Dixon 1999: 364; Métraux 
1942). The original territory of Tacana-speaking groups as was classified in accord with the Tacanan 
language-root is in the continuous region between the Aquiry and Madre de Dios Rivers to the north 
(between 67 and 68 35´ W. long) including its tributaries, the Tambopata and Heath Rivers to the 
west, and the Beni River (between 12 to 15 S. lat.) to and tributaries to the east, and the Madidi and 
Tuichi Rivers to the south (Métraux 1942:30) (see image 4).  
The Tacana-proper speaking people, specifically, inhabited the area “north of the Tuichi 
River, a tributary of the Beni River” (Métraux 1942:32), which is a tropical foot-hill area of the Andes. 
Early colonial documents (ibid; Armentia 1887) mention that the name Tacana-proper was a one 
applied to a great number of “tribes” and “sub-tribes” which inhabited the area. To demonstrate 
the great variety, these included the Babyana, Beyuma, Buda, Cahoco, Camaya, Camaray, Capa, 
Capanary, Capu, Chiliuvo, Chumu, Cuesi, Curupi, Dejabai, Ecuary, Eno, Giry, Guagima, Habuvi, 
Hamapu, Huary, Huarymodo, ino, Isebene, Jicho, Machuvi, Manipo, Mapumary, Marani, Marakani, 
Maru, Masatibu, Mayupi, Moyana, Odoary, Sabatini, Sara, Tade, Taranu, Toromona, Tuama, Tuno, 
Uaui, Uranico, Yuma, Yubamano, Pamaino, Yabapura, Pasaramona, Uchupiamona, Saparuna, 
Siliama, Ydiama. A survey from the early twentieth century reveals that there was a very strong 
Andean influence among peoples from this region, as can be taken from some of the names of the 
groups listed. Thus Sarapuna in Aymara literally means ‘the people of the Inca’ and the Marcani 
means ‘the people of the Marka’ which is a type of Aymara community (Vallve 2010: 329; Saignes 
1985: 21-26).  
Situated strategically in the tropical foothills marking the entrance to the Amazon from the 
Andes, Tacana-speaking peoples established themselves in the pre-Hispanic era as go-betweens, 
linking highland and lowland cultures and enhancing trade activity in the regions (Vallvé 2010; 
Steward 1963). This situation was not unique to Tacana-speaking people, being one they shared 
with a number of groups occupying the region such as the Leco peoples from the piedmont of 
Apolobamba further west (Dudley 2011, 2009). The specific ethnic composition in the area at this 
time is described by accounts of early Spanish explorers. These generically labelled the different 
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ethnic groups of the foothills of the Andes as chuncho tribes in the Area of the Chunchos, expressions 
which were later adopted by the Spanish (Vallvé 2010; Steward 1948; Métraux 1948). Nineteenth 
and 20th century travel writers and explorers mention Inca ruins and archetypal Inca roads leading 
from the eastern Andes of what is now Peru, towards what was to become the Franciscan mission 
town Apolobamba (now Apolo). These then led into the foothills and Tacana territory, past the 
former mission of Ixiamas towards the plains of today’s department of Beni (Bibra 2007; Renard 
Casevitz, Saignes, & Taylor, 1988; Saignes 1985n; Evans 1903). Tacana people mention these paths 
today, especially those between the former mission comunidades of San José de Uchupiomonas, 
Ixiamas and Tumupasa, which have survived to the present. Tacana peoples’ relationships with the 
Inca are interesting in that they pose the earliest highland-lowland region relationship documented, 
and it has been pointed out that the ambivalently negative attitude of the Andes towards the 
Amazon is one which the Spanish adopted from the Incas (Greene 2009, 2006). Jungle dwellers were 
regarded as lesser by the Inca, who were sun-worshippers. The lowlanders were associated with 
water (Vallvé 2010; Greene 2006).  
Spanish explorers, such as Juan Alvarez Maldonado, first descended into the foothills of the 
Alto Peruvian Amazon region in the 1500s to find the treasure of Paititi41, which to this day remains 
undiscovered? Many failed attempts were made to enter the tropical foothills of the “Tacana 
Nation” (Ballesteros 1899) from different points: south from the Madre de Dios River, east from the 
Valleys of Apolobamba, and lastly north from the town of Cochabamba in the south-east of La Paz 
(Saignes 1985; Steward 1963). In addition to looking for gold, explorers established white 
settlements, and organized an indian labour force. The failure of this endeavour is demonstrated 
by, among other things, the four settlements in the province of the Toromona, (Baez, Avila, 
Achidona, Vierso and Nuevo Salamanca) which, although established successfully, were short lived 
because of rebellion by Tacana peoples’ (Chávez Suárez 1944; Castillo 1988). By initially forging 
alliances with the Spanish some Tacana people looked to fulfil their own agendas of conquering 
neighbouring enemy peoples. Thus, although initially Tacana groups formed peaceful alliances with 
Spanish captains in order to aid them in discovering the treasure of Paititi and in return receive help 
in war against enemy groups, it was at some point agreed between Tacana groups that the Spanish 
were not to be trusted. Indeed, Spanish military men actively sought to ruin each other’s credibility 
                                                          
41 alternatively called Maldonado, El Dorado, Mojo, Sevilla de Oro, Gran Pará, Beni, and the Kingdom of 
Omaguas and Paititi 
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among the indians in the pursuit of political motives which would aid their relationship to the 
Spanish Crown, Captain Gomez de Tordoya, for example, setting himself against Alvarez Maldonado, 
purposely mistreated the locals in order to ruin the peaceful relations which Maldonado had 
laboriously established to aid collaboration (Castillo 1988). In 1551 Tacana groups organized an 
alliance headed by the Araona Ecue (chief of war), Taramo and mobilized the “Tacana Nation”, 
setting it against Maldonado’s expeditionaries. By 1568 the Tacana peoples’ collaboration had won 
the confrontation (ibid). These wars, in combination with detrimental diseases introduced by the 
Europeans, eventually led to a break-down of friendly relations between the Spanish and the 
peoples of “Tacana Nation”.  
The Tacana people of this study are located in the department of La Paz and Beni in 
comunidades around the Town of Rurrenabaque as mentioned above (see image 10). Their parents 
and grandparents originated mainly from the historical comunidades of Tumupasa and San José de 
Uchupiomonas, both of which were mission comunidades. Some of their grandparents, however, 
also migrated into the lowlands and settled in Tacana comunidades from the town Apolo which 
holds a large Quechua-speaking community. Apolo is located in the highlands on the other side of 
what today is the Madidi National Park and is the historic entry route from the highlands into the 
lowlands. Indeed, the Tacana people of this study cohabit the region with a number of other ethnic 
groups besides mestizos. While the following chapter elaborates on the three comunidades and 
town which are of focus of this study, something should be said here about the different groups 
which cohabit the immediate and proximate vicinity of Tacana people of this study, as these 
different groups influence each other and bring up important aspects about the construction of 
ethnicity and indigeneity. This becomes especially relevant today with contemporary indigenous 
politics.  
Socio-ethnic groups which today share or neighbour the Tacana territory in the province of 
Ballivián and around the town of Rurrenabaque include the Tsiman- Mosetén peoples, who have a 
TCO in the immediate vicinity (see images 3a, 3c). The Tsiman (or Chimán) (numbered at 6,464)42 
and Mosetén (numbered at 1,989)43 are distinct peoples but related in that they share the 
Mosetenen language (Sakel 2007, 2004) and a TCO in the territory around Rurrenabaque. 
                                                          
42 INRA 2012 
43 INRA 2012 
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Mosetenen is a small language family which is sometimes also described as an isolate (ibid)44. By 
this definition, the Tsiman/ Mosetén are not related to the Tacana people. The TCO 
Tsiman/Mosetén is located across the Beni River from the Tacana I TCO and has its central 
headquarters in Rurrenabaque, as represented by the Regional Council of the Tsimane/Moseten 
(Consejo Regional Tsiman/ Mosetén - CRTM) founded in 1997. It overlaps a protected area, the Pilon 
Lajas Biosphere Reserve (400,000 hectares) formed in 1992 (see also Chumacero 2009). Many 
Tsiman and Mosetén people do not speak Spanish and I was told that this was especially the case 
for the Tsiman. Of all the local indigenous people in and around Rurrenabaque, the Tacana people 
are considered the most “adapted”. According to CIPTA, all Tacana people speak Spanish and only 
a handful know Tacana (see also chapter 6). In my research I only came across one person who 
spoke Tacana.   
Besides the Tsiman/Mosetén, the third local indigenous group which frequents 
Rurrenabaque and lives in the area is the Ese Eja (see also Alexiades and Peluso 2003). According to 
statistics the Ese Eja in Bolivia amount to 69545 people. They are related to Tacana people by the 
Takanan language root. While Tacana people know them as an ancestral enemy which used to raid 
their comunidades, there is no such animosity between the two groups today (see also below). The 
Leco people are also quite familiar to Tacana people but live further from Rurrenabaque. National 
statistics (INRA 2012) puts the number of Lecos in Bolivia at 9,006. They have their origin in the area 
around Apolo, at the intersection between the Andes and the Amazon and the entrance to today’s 
National Madidi Park (Dudley 2011). I was told that the Lecos were the “Vikings of the Rio Beni” and 
used to be famous for their skill at travelling the dangerous rapids of the Beni and its tributaries on 
balsa-rafts (also Métraux 1948). “You used to always know who the Lecos were,” I was told one 
afternoon by Roberto from Carmen Florida; “they had this thing with their skin – manchas (skin 
pigmentation). The more manchas, the more beautiful a woman. One day a youth was crying 
because the girl he liked had left him and he said: ‘oh, she had such beautiful manchitas’!” Upon 
asking Roberto if this was something genetic he shook his head: “No! It was a beauty thing. They 
drank something, or ate something which gave them the manchas…who knows.”  
                                                          
44 “Mosetén (Mosetenan) is spoken by approximately 800 people in the foothills of the Bolivian Andes” 
(Sakel 2007:25). 
45 INRA 2012 
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Further indigenous groups who share the region around Rurrenabaque, are the so-called 
colonos: the highland migrants of Aymara and Quechua descent who typically construct their 
comunidades by the main road (la carretera). This is why colonos are also called “people of the 
carretera” (see image 10). Some colonos also live in Tacana comunidades (chapter 2). Another group 
which originates in the region is the Araona people, also related by language root to the Tacana, 
though I personally only met one Araona during the course of my research, in Rurrenabaque. He 
told me, that the Araona people who live in and around Rurrenabaque today generally say that they 
are Tacana, as this group is better known. So, typically, do the Reyesano people, who are also part 
of the Takanan language family (see also Guillaume 2008). During my research I met one Reyesano 
woman who lived in Carmen Florida. (Reyes is a former mission town to the north of Rurrenabaque. 
The fact that different ethnic groups share one area and even cohabit in comunidades has been 
attributed new importance with the rise of contemporary indigenous politics. Within this context, 
inter-ethnic connections of Amazonian peoples and the implications of these are being re-assessed. 
Amazonian Studies and Contemporary Indigenous Politics 
Julian Steward’s influential volume three South American Handbook (1948c:883-899), 
builds and consolidates the theoretical framework of ‘cultural ecology’, attractive to Western 
Amazonian anthropologists at this time and generally known as the “standard model” (Viveiros de 
Castro 1996:180). This model significantly contributed to shaping Western representation of 
Amazonian peoples. Explanations on the socio-political organizing of indigenous groups in the 
Amazon are based in the adaption to the local ecology and “environmental determinism” (Roosevelt 
1991: 134). Inadvertently, this “reduc(ed) complex cultural phenomena (of Amazonian peoples) to 
environmental variables” (Eriksen 2011: 14; also Roosevelt 1991). These become utilized in 
indigenous politics today, by indigenous organisations themselves and fit the Enlightenment model 
of the romantic ‘nobel savage’ who is close to nature.  
An ‘ecological view’ of Amazonian peoples, at least in academic settings, only changed at 
the end of the 1990s. This was largely a result of archaeological projects in Amazonia which 
demonstrated a complex culture via ecological artefacts such as ‘dark earth’ (Kawa and Oyuela-
Caycedo 2011; Lehmann and Kern 2003) or man-made flood-dams (Balée and Erickson 2006). This 
research, and more which has come since (Eriksen 2011; Alexiades 2009; Dudley 2009), proves that 
rather than being shaped by their environments, native peoples tended to shape the environment 
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to fit their goals. Meanwhile, Tacana people and non-indigenous inhabitants of the Bolivian Amazon 
partly use these ‘upgraded’ versions of written history to help establish a positive heritage for 
themselves (see chapter 5).  
The body of literature on Amazonian peoples is receiving new meaning and prominence at 
a time in which it is difficult not to set it in relation to these new indigenous politics represented by 
powerful national and international indigenous umbrella organisations. In setting them in the 
context of current indigenous politics, they not only receive new significance but also help shape 
indigenous politics. If omitted, the subsequent voids would support the impression of the 
homogenous Western-style Enlightenment indian subject, the prototype indian which the neo-
liberal model has created and requires (see also chapter 7). Amazonianist literature provides 
important ethnographies of Amazonian peoples which lay out their distinctive ways-of-being within 
the context of their immediate surroundings. Many Amazonian peoples are similar in how they 
organize space and construct their cosmology.  
Studies situated around typical Amazonian institutions continue to provide relevant 
contributions and these institutions, in line with the study of Levi-Strauss (1969), continue to be 
important tools for understanding the construction of ‘community’. As Viveiros de Castro (1996) 
notes, since the publication of the immense Handbook of South American indian (Steward 1948) 
anthropological Amazonianist literature has benefitted from approaches which he divides into three 
styles of synthesis: “the political economy of control” (leading authors Terence Turner and Peter 
Riviere); the “moral economy of intimacy” (led by Joanna Overing); and lastly “the symbolic 
economy of alterity” (led by Bruce Albert). All these approaches focus on the interpretation of the 
everyday life in a culture found in processes such as that of symbolic exchange (war, cannibalism, 
hunting shamanism, funerary rites) (Viveiros de Castro 1969:190; Oakdale 2007). These approaches 
have helped lay out and understand the socio-cosmological regimes of the Amazon in “the 
construction(s) of collective identities” (Rosengren 2003:221) and community.  
Though the contemporary Tacana of this study do not demonstrate such tendencies, 
previous studies of Tacana people demonstrate forms of organizing and constructing community 
which show similarities to Amazonian groups in an approximate vicinity. This is very roughly from 
the Madre de Dios basin to the north of today’s Bolivian departments of Beni and La Paz, to the Beni 
River further south in the department of La Paz. Without going into the details of different groups 
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which originate here, the significant point is that they often have a similar history of sustenance 
economies, of exploiting the forest and rivers for game and fish, and practicing horticulture; as well 
as a similar manner of organizing their surroundings and constructing community (eg Dudley 2011, 
2009; Alexiades and Peluso 2003; Moore 2003; Shepard & 2003; Smith Bisso 2003). Tacana people 
made up a part of this. 
 
Tacana People in Amazonian Research 
The most recent anthropological studies on Tacana people is situated at a time in which the 
contemporary indigenous movements were gaining a foot-hold in Bolivia (Wentzel 2009, 1989; 
Bathurst 2005; Herrera 2005, 2003, 2002; Wentzel) and focuses predominantly on the Tacana 
community which resides in the department of Pando, specifically people of the comunidad of Santa 
Rosa. These Tacana people settled here as a result of migration during their enslavement in the 
rubber industry in the late 1800s and lasted with varying intensity until the crash of the rubber 
industry in the late 1980s (Bathurst 2005:50). In accord their historical trajectory differes somewhat 
to the Tacana people of Iturralde who were not incorporated into the rubber market as intensely 
(Bathurst 2005, Herrera 2003, 2002).  
The most extensive anthropological study on Tacana people in the 20th century is situated 
in the tradition of Amazonian studies and was conducted by the German anthropologist Karin 
Hissink, with the accompaniment and help of her sketcher and life-companion, Albert Hahn, who 
provided the drawings which accompany the two central Hissink volumes46 (Hissink and Hahn 1984, 
1962 1961). One might say that Hissink’s studies were conducted in the era (1930s – 1950s) when 
the bulk of Tacana peoples’ missionization had taken its course. Tacana people she lived with and 
studied were one in a string of generations which had already associated with post-mission 
comunidades, these being a concept introduced by Spanish missionaries (see chapter 2). Hissink’s 
work focusses on the people in the former mission comunidad of Tumupasa and to a lesser extent 
Ixiamas. Indeed, Hissink’s ground-breaking work is not a representation of ‘the Tacana’, but a 
monograph on Tacana-speaking peoples of different ethnic groups who became grouped together 
in these two mission comunidades  
                                                          
 To date Hissink’s first volume (1961) has not been translated into another language from German. The second 
Hissink volume on Tacana people (1984) was translated into Spanish in 2000, in the framework of the Tacana 
land-tenure management plan and with the main objective being to generate an income for CIMTA46.  
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Hissink created what is probably the most extensive literature on Tacana people, 
elaborating on a number of native institutions among Tacana people which Amazonian groups 
typically share. These are based on communication and kinship (Anderson 1991), as can be created 
by common beliefs expressed through myths (Peluso 2003; Killick 2007) and which have at their 
base the construction of community. Hissink and Hahn resided in the comunidad of Tumupasa for a 
number of months at a time47. Hissink divides her research of Tacana cosmology into different native 
institutions, situating Tacana people within the cult of semi-nomadic hunter and gatherer societies. 
She engages with the socio-cosmological order (Viveiros de Castro 1996) and synthesis of Tacana 
life ordering myths as they reveal and pertain to central Tacana institutions typical to Amazonian 
societies (death, birth, shamanism, kinship relations) and as in line with anthropological discourses 
over kinship (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940).  Dividing the myths into 
reoccurring themes, Hissink brings out how spirits, animals and humans share minds (see Turner 
2009) focusing especially on “the development and order of the present world, gods and godlike 
beings, spirits of the wild and the bush, spirits, animals, animals and Man, plant and Man, object 
and Man, contests, disputes, historical traditions, traditions which have been superimposed since 
Columbus and history” (Hissink and Hahn 1961: X). She demonstrates how Tacana people conceive 
a hybrid relationship between the entities of humans, animals, landscape, weather phenomena and 
celestial bodies, and tie them to historical contexts such as the time of the Inca Empire (Hissink and 
Hahn 1961).  
Thus, as these past studies show, Tacana people demonstrate Amazonianist tendencies 
towards a belief in a hybrid world, which is very similar to that of groups of their language root with 
whom they shared, and still share, a geographical area. One such group is the Ese Eja. Indeed, in 
more recent studies, Peluso (2003) synthesizes Ese Eja institutions and myths by laying out the 
relationships and interactions between Ese Eja people from the frontier region of the department 
of Pando and spirits which often take the shape of central animals. She demonstrates that Ese Eja 
people live in a hybrid world, one part represented by the Ese Eja community and the other existing 
in spiritual form. Shamans act as go-betweens to mediate between the two worlds. As with Tacana 
myths concerning the anaconda and the south wind, certain animals and natural forces are central 
                                                          
47 The couple lived with the Tacana of Alto Beni in the department of La Paz, province Iturralde, between the 
1930’s and 50’s, residing in the former mission comunidad Tumupasa and to some extent Ixiamas. When I was 
in Tumupasa doing research, the Hissink couple was still well remembered and some of my informants are 
the by now elderly grandchildren of people with whom the Hissink couple interacted.  
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in these worlds. Peluso focusses especially on ideas of alterity as the basis for Ese Eja identity 
construction (also Lepri 2006). This includes an engagement with creating new traditions in the 
context of already existing structures such as kinship, agriculture, naming etc. Of central importance 
here is the creation of identity as primarily based in the distinction between one’s own group (eg 
Ese Eja) and the Other, in this case the white person. These positionings and re-positionings of a 
group come to define a collective personhood which can be recognized as being the sum of the 
group’s culture.  
Something which significantly distinguishes the Tacana people of this study from Ese Eja 
people who are (at least linguistically) related to Tacana people as an ethnic group, is that Ese Eja 
people continue to demonstrate an extensive engagement with Amazonian natives’ cosmological 
institutions, (see Peluso 2003; Lepri 2003). Although Hissink found traces of this engagement among 
the Tacana, as did the German anthropologist Sondra Wentzel, to a lesser extent, in the late 1980s, 
when I arrived as an aid-worker in 2003, I found that Tacana people of Tumupasa and surrounding 
comunidades showed no strong associations with typical Amazonian institutions, though some 
aspects have survived. Rather, the everyday for Tacana people of this study was much more geared 
towards actively positioning themselves in relation to, and engaging in a relationship with, local 
political institutions such as the municipality and, more remotely, the indigenous movement, in 
efforts to generate a cash income for themselves or engage with socio-political networking which 
could lead one’s family members to generating an income in the future.  
Yet there is still also present an understanding and naturalness of certain relationships 
which are typical Amazonianist, in which Tacana people demonstrated a context of animism (Costa 
and Fausto 2010) as mirrored in their myths. These only became overt very subtly in the way Tacana 
people talked about and related to their surroundings, usually very off-handedly: “oh no, I never go 
fishing in this spot since the anaconda surfaced and floated.” After time I came to understand that 
not just any anaconda was meant, but the deity which is simultaneously the Beni River itself, as well 
as a gigantic anaconda which reigns here and is never sighted, but heard by the sound it makes when 
it floats. Indeed, upon close observation, the municipal town of Rurrenabaque where many Tacana 
people reside reveals the presence of a very vibrant Tacana cosmological world (also Gareca Arzabe 
2007). 
Tacana Cosmology in Geography - Rurrenabaque Holds up the Sky  
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Rurrenabaque, with about 15,000 inhabitants, is a historic jungle town situated on the banks 
of the Beni River in today’s department of Beni, Ballivián province and is loosely considered a 
mestizo town as discussed in the following chapter. However, human activity here dates back to 
before the arrival of the Spanish. Ceramic shards and rock tools recently excavated support the 
thesis that the region has been inhabited long before the arrival of the Spanish (Tyuleneva 2008).  
 
Image 7: View onto the town Rurrenabaque from the sacred Macuti Mountain and view across the Beni River to San 
Buenaventura. 
Rurrenabaque is located at the foot of two sacred mountains - the Matuci (Tacana word for 
‘Hill with a Gorge’) and the Cerro Brujo (Witch Mountain) which mark the start of the Andes to the 
west, and the flat wetlands (llanos) to the east. Local inhabitants will easily tell you that 
Rurrenabaque derives its Tacana name from two principal streams which formerly marked the 
borders of the town, although today they run through its centre. One of these is the Enabaque while 
the other is the Susse (see also Gamez Mendez 2002). A principal deity in Tacana cosmology is the 
great Beni River48 on whose banks Rurrenabaque and numerous Tacana comunidades are situated. 
                                                          
48 The Beni River is 67.030 metres long and an average of 274 metres wide with an average temperature of 
29 degrees Celsius (Gamez Mendez 2002). Its most important tributaries are the Madre de Dios River to the 
north of Rurrenabaque and the Tuichi River to the South of Rurrenabaque. 
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As the largest representative body of water in the region which has continuously been important in 
transportation, it takes a central role in many Tacana myths (see Hissink and Hahn 1961). ‘Beni’ in 
the Tacana language means ‘south’ or, more specifically, as I have been told, ‘south wind’. The south 
wind, also called the ‘sur’ in Spanish, is a famous cold front which enters the region especially in 
June and July from the coast of Chile and induces a sharp drop in temperature of up to 20 degrees. 
Thus, the Beni River is named after the famous ‘sur’, one of the principal deities of Tacana myths 
(ibid). An elderly Tacana man in Rurrenabaque, whose mother had been Araona (of the Tacana 
language family) and whose two sons now run a tourist agency, told me that the principal local deity 
is the great anaconda (in the Tacana language bacua), which lives in the Beni River and 
simultaneously is the Beni River.  
The great anaconda holds up the sky, except for when it rains which is when it descends 
into the Beni River, its home. The anaconda devours people which it sucks down with whirl-pools - 
famous in the region. The fact that the bodies never reappear is the indicator for the fact that they 
have been devoured. Non-indigenous explanations have attributed the fact that bodies really do 
not reappear after drowning to the numerous underwater caves which line the mountains, the same 
ones which are said to be the cause of the strong whirl-pools. After a rain shower the great anaconda 
is briefly seen as it ascends back into the sky. It is a rainbow.  Rainbows are a bad omen. One day 
standing in front of the kitchen compound in a Tacana comunidad I was visiting near Riberalta, up 
north from Rurrenabaque, talking with Charo who lived here, about the need of a fence to keep the 
domestic pigs from wandering into the vicinity, we were told by her husband that a rainbow had 
appeared in the sky.  To my surprise everything became quite hectic as people seemed to know 
what to do. Children were called into the house, and before I knew it the adults had gathered onto 
the porch and the men lit up cigarettes. I was encouraged to do the same. The rainbow, I was now 
to learn, “takes away” weak individuals; children especially. To ward off the bad spirit, tobacco 
smoke is blown in to the air. I had heard of a similar application of tobacco smoke when a shaman 
intoxicated with the hallucinogenant vine ayahuasca, is visited by evil spirits.  
‘Suse’ is the Tacana language signifies ‘duck’ (of which originally there were supposed to 
have been many in the region) and the original Tacana pronunciation and spelling of Rurrenabaque 
is in fact Sussenaibacua, which entails the words ‘duck’ and ‘anaconda’. More precisely in accord 
with the Tacana language it is spelled S’us’e Enabaki (Quenevo Cartagena & Alcoba García 2009). 
There is a strong subterranean river named Susse, which flows through Rurrenabaque and 
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subterraneanly out of the sacred Macuti Mountain, into the Beni River. It is the interplay of the Beni 
and Susse River which creates the tumulus water and subsequent whirl-pools during the rainy 
season, when the Beni River swells.  
The subterranean Susse River, in turn, derives its name from the fact that it flows into the 
Beni at the point where a large boulder ‘sits’ in the river where it debouches from the Macuti 
mountain. When the river is high the boulder appears to be swimming on top of the water, like a 
duck. Furthermore, I was told that the boulder has the shape of a gigantic duck and spent months 
trying to discern one in its smooth contours until Alejandro, from Carmen Florida, casually pointed 
out one day that many years ago the rock was overturned. The duck was upside down. But when it 
was still the right way up and had looked like a proper duck, it had mimicked sounds of warning - 
“peep, peep, peep” - on the arrival of: the surazo, or sur which, according to early ethnographic 
writing (Nordenskiöld 1924), is a famous inducer of illness and death among jungle inhabitants, since 
they did not have much bodily protection from the cold. All this might lead one to deduce that the 
name of the town of Rurrenabaque is an indicator of the local and powerful Tacana deities which 
reside here: the south wind and the great anaconda.   
Close to the duck-boulder, on the other side of the Beni River, there is another famous 
boulder which holds historic petroglyphs, already pointed out by early anthropologists (e.g. Hissink 
1961). They depict a large snake (anaconda) and two sun-like symbols which mimic whirlpools (see 
image 8 below). It is believed that these carvings are ancient markers for the water-level, to indicate 
the navigability of the river here during the rainy season. Whirlpools in this location are said to have 
sucked down even huge rafts loaded with lumber in the 1980’s, when logging was at a high-point. 
More recently the petroglyphs have become a historical relic which people in Rurrenabaque will 
mention with pride, when talking about early historic importance of the region and the presence of 
former advanced civilizations.   
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Image 8: Petroglyphs of an anaconda and whirlpools or suns in the Beni River by Rurrenabaque (2009) 
 
These contexts demonstrate Tacana people’s historic connection to the geographical area. 
At the same time, Tacana people of this study do not consciously recognize these contexts as a 
history in any collective ‘Tacana’ sense; to them it is simply ‘the’ history and ‘the’ context of the 
area. In contrast, the mestizo inhabitants of Rurrenabaque do not attribute the obviously ancient 
and tangible relics of the past to the Tacana (or other native peoples) of the area. In fact, talking to 
mestizo Rurreños, and as mirrored in the local literature (see eg Gamez Mendez 2002) reference is 
made to seemingly anonymous “ancient civilizations” which must have lived here in earlier times. 
Upon suggesting that these must be the ancestors of the Tacana peoples, I encountered obvious 
unease, and was told, among other things, “well no, perhaps not the Tacana. Perhaps the Incas, they 
were very intelligent.”  
Amazonian groups not only share similar tendencies to organize their world and create 
community, they also have in common historical mile-stones events which altered their way of life. 
They have in common the history of colonization by the Spaniards. From here followed 
missionization and the enslavement into different economies as quinine, lumber, Brazil nut and 
most significantly rubber, which lead to a new form of migration, resettlement and ethnogenesis 
(Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005). In context of these industries, displacements from one 
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territory to another further enhanced the separation and re-grouping of different peoples (e.g. 
Valen 2013; Greene 2011; Alexiades 2009; Dudley 2011; Garcia Altamirano 2003; Huertas Castillo & 
Altamirano 2003; Gow 2001, 1991). Some of these aspect which they have in common, affect how 
they situate themselves in the context of today’s indigenous politics and how indigenous politics 
affect them. A principal topic here is that of the reality of ethnogenesis, which was enhanced in the 
missionization of Amazonian groups and again with their relocation in to the barracas49 of the rubber 
industry in the late 1800s. Significant for this research and the Tacana people of Iturralde especially, 
is their early history of missionization set the grounds for how they are situated in indigenous politics 
of Bolivia today.   
Migration, Missionization and Ethnogenesis of Tacana Groups 
The Missions of Apolobamba 
After the arrival of the Spanish, Tacana-speaking groups were recruited into Franciscan 
missions in the 1600s. The seven Missions of Apolobamba were Concepción de Cobendo, Santa Ana, 
San Miguel de Muchanes, San Antonio de Tumupasa, San José de Uchupiamonas, Nuestra Señora 
Del Carmen de Ixiamas and Jesus de Cavinas (Hissink and Hahn 1961; Métraux 1942; Armentia 
1905). The name ‘the missions of Apolobamba’ denotes the vast region in which the missions were 
established - directly north of the Bolivian Andes, in their tropical foothills, a region which was 
alternatively called Caupolicán. Adding to the complexity of the territorial battles of the first Spanish 
infiltration of the 1530s was the great competition between the two main religious congregations 
(Jesuits and Franciscans) who ultimately gained the right from the Spanish Crown to establish 
themselves in the Amazon region of what is today Bolivia. The Beni River became the dividing line: 
the Franciscans worked west and north of it, and the Jesuits took control of the region east and 
south of what is today Mojos and the Chiquitanía (Hissink 1961; Bandelier 1907).  
Ethnic groups living alongside the Tuichi, Beni and Madidi Rivers and its tributaries, the 
Tambota and Heath Rivers, were recruited for the missions of Apolobamba (Steward 1963). All the 
missions moved their locations at various times due to epidemics such as measles, or fires which 
destroyed the settlements. This explains the variety in foundation dates in different sources (see for 
                                                          
49 so-called rubber barracas which were concessions of forest contracted for rubber extraction onto which rubber-
tappers where relocated. 
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example Cardus 188650). With the rise of the rubber boom at the end of the 19th century, in 
particular, for lowland peoples an affiliation with missions was the greatest guarantor against being 
enslaved by so-called engancheros – head-hunters who specialized in raiding indian villages for 
young men who would be sold to the rubber industry (Nordenskiöld, 1924). Affiliation with a mission 
meant that indians were baptized. Baptism, in turn, attributed to them a soul, which was important 
in that it distinguished them from animals. Slave-hunters did not have the same leeway to raid 
indigenous peoples who were baptized and affiliated with a mission.  
Tacana missions were composed of more than one group of recruited native peoples.   
Tumupasa and Ixiamas housed various Tacana-speaking peoples who were then labelled according 
to ‘their’ mission (eg Tumupasa indians). Hissink stresses that due to the distance between Tacana 
missions, the socio-cultural development of Tacana people differed from one to another. She 
demonstrates this by comparing myths collected in Tumupasa and Ixiamas (Hissink 1961), with 
myths collected by the anthropologist Erland Nordenskiöld, who principally studied Tacana people 
from the Cavinas mission, located at the lower end of the Madidi River (1924, 1922). Indeed, the 
Tacana ‘culture’ which developed in Tumupasa differs significantly to that of Tacana groups in other 
missions and other regions, such as Pando where there is a large Tacana settlement (see Bathurst 
2005; Herrera 2003, Herrera et al 2002).  
Around, the time that the Bolivian nation-state was formed in 1825, Franciscan Friar, Nicolás 
Armentia, Bishop of La Paz, was assigned to overseeing the missions of the Eastern Andean area 
(called Caupolicán and/or Apolobamba). His documentations on Tacana peoples have been a central 
source for anthropologists (see Armentia 1887, 1902, 1905). He speaks of the “Tacana Nation” giving 
an idea of the vastness of the landscape and different groups involved: “(t)he Tacana nation is 
subdivided into various tribes, some of these wild and the other reduced in missions”51 (Armentia 
1902:3). Importantly, Armentia elaborates sympathetically on Tacana-speaking groups. His writings 
provide an important background to the relationships between native groups in proximate vicinity 
of each other, as well as their reaction to white outsiders, and efforts to missionize the different 
                                                          
50The seven missions of Apolobamba when Friar Cardus sought them out likened their date of establishment 
to the date in which they had resettled in their current location. These, with their newest dates, are 
Concepcion de Cobendo (1842), Santa Ana (1815), San Miguel de Muchanes (1804), San Antonio de Tumupasa, 
San José de Uchupiamonas (1854), Nuestra Señora del Carmen de Ixiamas and Jesus de Cavinas (Cardus 
1886:159).  
51 “La nacion Tacana se subdivide en varias tribus, las unas silvestres y las otras reducidas en Misiones.” 
Translation from the original Spanish my own.  
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Tacana-speaking groups. Armentia also documented what was probably the first comprehensive 
compilation of Tacana dictionary. 
The vastness of the Tacana-speaking area, and also the multitude of different ethnic groups 
it contained, is reflected in the words of Sixto Ballesteros, political representative of the department 
of La Paz and the secretary general of the Geographic Society in the late 1800s. In a speech of 1899, 
he declared that ‘Tacana’ had been endorsed as the mission language for the Missions of 
Apolobamba in Caupolicán (today department of La Paz)52. 
(F)rom all the dialects which are spoken in the different tribes which populate the vast 
region situated between the rivers of Guanay, Beni, Madre de Dios and Madera, there are 
Tacana words which pertained and still pertain, without question, to the general language, 
nationalized (emphasis original) and thus well known in the vast and wonderful region 
which covers the Amazon. For this, in our opinion, it was Tacana which was spoken in the 
great Nation of the glades and woods, and which gave consistency and unity to the race, 
which spread out with time to different climates, tribes and latitudes. Another proof we 
have of the unity of the Tacana race is the perfect identity which exists among the 
inscriptions and hieroglyphs found in the rocks of their mountains and rivers; inscriptions 
which Humboldt also encountered in his travels in Orinoco. (Ballesteros 1899: 65) 
[Translation my own.]53  
  
As documented by Armentia (1887), certain groups and individuals were willing to be 
recruited into missions, but it was equally frequent that others from the same native group refused 
mission life. These were subsequently documented as barbaros (savages). Documents thus 
disregard their distinct ethnic affiliation they are simply ‘savages’. Though some peaceful trading 
went on, these ‘savages’ were greatly feared for their raids and attacks by both missionized indians 
and white/mestizo travellers in the region (Armentia 1887). Significantly, documents may speak of 
Tumupasa indians and barbaros, and be referring to members of the same people, the former being 
associated with a mission and the latter not. In this way, Tacana-speaking groups became re-divided 
                                                          
52 For a map of Caupolicán-Apolobamba see Image 4 
53 “Así en todos los dialectos que se habla en las diversas tribus que pueblan la vasta región comprendida 
entre los ríos del Guanay, el Beni, Madre de Dios y Madera, hay palabras tacanas, que han pertenecido y 
pertenecen sin duda al idioma general, nacionalizado y conocido entonces en la vasta y maravillosa región 
que abarca el Amazonas. Por esto, a nuestro juicio, fue el Tacana, el Idioma oficial y popular al mismo tiempo, 
que se hablaba en la gran Nación de las florestas y los bosques, y que prestaba consistencia a la unidad de la 
raza, distribuida con el tiempo, en distintos climas, tribus y latitudes. Otra de las pruebas que tenemos a favor 
de la unidad de la raza Tacana, es la perfecta identidad que hay entre las inscripciones y que aparecen en las 
rocas de sus montañas y sus ríos; inscripciones que también encontró Humboldt, en sus viajes por el Orinoco” 
(Ballesteros 1899:65). 
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into ‘mission’ and ‘non-mission’ indians. Missionization divided people belonging to the same group 
(Tacana and ‘savages’) and unified different native peoples into one living space (the mission). 
Missionization thus greatly affected ethnogenesis.  
 
Image 9: Excerpt from a map of Bolivia (1931) depicting the area Caupolicán / Apolobamba with notation of local 
indigenous groups (Vivien Schrader St. Martin, Source: David Rumseys Map Collection). 
 
This is a situation which Tacana people share with peoples in their closer proximity, such as 
the Leco people briefly mentioned earlier. The Leco people,54 whose language is Rik’a, a linguistic 
isolate (Montaño Aragón 1987, 1989), live at the intersection of the Andes and the Amazon, which 
is the piedmont region of Apolo (Dudley 2011). In a slow and continually interrupted process, Leco 
and other native peoples in the vicinity were recruited into the mission of Apolo (1615) which 
eventually became the centre of the expansive Missions of Apolobamba (ibid). This mission context 
enhanced ethnogenesis between different groups, creating the new ethnic category of the Apolistas 
(ibid). In the Mission of Apolobamba Quechua was officialised as a mission language. Missionization 
of different groups in the area of Apolobamba and Caupolicán functioned in a similar manner as 
with Tacana peoples, pulling together related and non-related groups and ‘making’ them one group 
                                                          
54 In early literature also mentioned together with the Aguachile people (Dudley 2011) 
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(Dudley 2011, 2009). This new ethnic category was called after the mission. These forms of 
missionization were not uniform to Tacana and Leco groups, but typical of the wider region (ibid; 
also Vallvé 2010).   
This historical trajectory which many Amazonian groups have in common demonstrates the 
extent to which today’s indigenous groups have been created by missions as is also emphasized by 
the fluid, rather than static, nature of indigeneity (Alexiades 2009; Dudley 2009; Balza Alarcón 2001). 
While missionization was one milestone on the road along which Amazonian groups would develop, 
regrouping them and shaping their socio-political structure, the next for the wider Tacana 
community was brought by the rubber industry in the late 1800s, which lasted until rubber markets 
crashed in the late 1980s (Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005). Involvement in the rubber 
industry, located Tacana people within the global economic system (Bathurst 2005). It also brought 
about a central split in the wider Tacana community, as a great number of Tacana people from the 
missions of Tumupasa, Ixiamas and San José de Uchupiumonas in the Iturralde Province were 
transported to work as rubber-tappers (siringueros – the word adopted from Brazilian Portuguese) 
in Pando, and remained there after the rubber boom came to an end (ibid).  
The two Tacana groups from Iturralde underwent distinct historical trajectories after their 
separation as a result of the ‘rubber diaspora’. Some Tacana people from Iturralde remained in the 
comunidades of Tumupasa and Buena Vista, where they were predominantly incorporated into the 
hacienda-system (cattle ranching). As with employment in the rubber market, this system included 
a type of debt-peonage55. In the hacienda system Tacana people took on the role of peons, a 
situation which continued until the land reform (1953) (see chapter 6). The Tacana people who 
remained in Iturralde were thus better able to retain a way of life tied to customs developed in the 
missions than were those who were resettled in Pando (Vallvé 2010). Tacana people in Pando 
became part of the new wave of ethnogenesis which came from Amazonian peoples being grouped 
together on rubber barracas. Regrouping meant of a great number of indigenous groups 
disappeared and “by the end of the rubber boom, most of Bolivia‘s rubber areas were considered 
Spanish-speaking and mestizo” (ibid:22).  
                                                          
55 A cash or goods-advancement system which covers up a form of slavery. A person pledges his/her work 
for an advance in cash or goods, which are typically overpriced and can never be paid off. This debt can be 
passed on from one generation to the next 
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The situation of Bolivian Amazonian siringueros has been compared to that of Brazilian 
Amazonian siringueros of whom many were also indigenous groups who, having been placed 
together in barracas, emerged as part of the caboclo culture, a form of mestizaje exclusive to Brazil 
(Nugent 1993). Caboclos are persons of Amazonian indigenous and European descent56. Bolivian 
rubber-tappers had more in common with their neighbours in Brazil than with their own 
compatriots in the Andes, even adopting Brazilian language and custom, and frequently crossing the 
border back and forth (Vallvé 2010; Cleary 1998; Weinstein 1985). It is probable that Tacana people 
who were resettled in the north underwent a quicker and stronger process of ‘acculturation’ to a 
more general national mestizo culture (Vallvé 2010). The Tacana people in Pando thus entirely lost 
the sense of ethnic affiliation which remained a distinctive feature of the Tacana people of Iturralde. 
While Tacana rubber-workers worked exclusively for the rubber industry (Bathurst 2005), Tacana 
people who remained in Iturralde were able to cultivate produce on the chacos which they could 
retain for their own consumption as well as working for a patrón. The act of cultivating the chaco 
was tied to a certain Tacana ‘culture’ and routines (Hissink and Hahn 1961) which were lost in the 
barracas of the rubber industry. Bathurst (2005) notes that Tacana people in Pando were only able 
to regain some independent use of their time and labour with the collapse of the rubber industry in 
the mid-1980s, at which time the local economy switched to the collection of the Brazil nut. As this 
work was seasonal, the rest of the year could be spent on cultivating private fields which allowed 
some independence from a patrón (ibid).  
This split between the Tacana communities is reflected in the indigenous political 
organization of the late 1980s, when the Tacana community in Pando established a separate 
indigenous organization (OITA57) from the one in Iturralde (CIPTA58) (Wentzel 2009; Bathurst 2005; 
Herrera 2003a). The late 1980s produced a type of sudden “irruption” (Wentzel 2009; Herrera 2003) 
of Tacana political organizing on the basis of ethnicity, in line with the pro-indigenous political 
climate of the time (see chapter 7). Tied to these overarching politics, Amazonianists have 
increasingly begun to assess Amazonian groups in context of nation-state politics and policies.  
 
                                                          
56 The word caboclo probably comes from the Tupi language (kaa’boc) and literally means a person with 
copper-coloured skin (Nugent 1993). 
57 Organización Indígena Tacana 
58 Consejo Indígena del Pueblo Tacana 
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Indigenous Politics and its Incompatibility with the Reality of Amazonian Groups 
Recent literature on Amazonian peoples includes important critical observations as to how 
new pro-indigenous policy either limits indigenous people’s possibilities, or contributes to the 
falsification of their history, especially where this is tied to their geographical region of origin. Thus, 
though it seems contradictory, pro-indigenous state policy retrospectively perpetuates a faulty 
representation and image of a native group’s history. Nowhere is this more apparent than in matter 
of landscape management and the domestication of nature. Central to the politics around 
indigeneity is the theory that indigenous people are in harmony with nature and ‘protect’ it. This is 
in line with the ecological rhetoric about the importance of the conservation of a ‘pristine forest’. 
However, rather than being controlled by and ‘in harmony’ with nature, studies have proven that 
indigenous groups continuously changed and domesticated their environment in accordance with 
their needs (Eriksen 2011; Denevan 2011, 1992, 1966; Lehman and Kern 2003). This has significant 
implications in the context of indigenous politics, especially to conservationist NGOs which heavily 
support indigenous groups so that they may sustainably manage their surroundings. Strictly 
speaking, this means the image created around the ecological indian which they help to establish 
would need to be revised (see chapter 7). It is also central to the TCO system which gives the 
impression that lowland groups and indigenous groups more widely were static (Dudley 2009; 
Alexiades 2009; Balza Alarcon 2001). The whole concept of indigenous land-tenure disregards the 
intense migration patterns and histories which actually took place (Alexiades 2009) and which are 
central to contemporary Tacana people’s history. 
As indigenous politics emerged in the 1980s and 90s, national indigenous organizations 
were established by distinct groups, but also by different members of the same indigenous group. 
The Tacana community in Pando created a distinct national Tacana organisation, the Tacana 
Indigenous Organization (OITA - Organisacion Indigena Tacana) (ibid), from the Tacana community 
in La Paz (Iturralde province) from which CIPTA evolved. While Peruvian anthropologist Enrique 
Herrera Sarmiento (2003, 2002) notes that the Santa Rosa comunidad in Pando was one of the first 
comunidades to be registered as Tacana and ‘indigenous’, and become part of the Bolivian 
indigenous lowland movement, German anthropologist Sondra Wentzel (2009) claims the same for 
people from the Tumupasa comunidad (see also chapter 7). Indeed, this confusion, which at first 
suggests lack of organization, communication and professionalism among indigenous groups, is in 
fact an accurate historical reflection of indigenous groups’ history in the Amazon region: they were 
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not static, but underwent continuous migration and thus a constant process of ethnogenesis. ‘Old’ 
groups split into new ones, or merged with existing ones. Furthermore, the Tacana community at 
large became divided between those which were engaged in the rubber economy up north (Pando) 
and those which remained in Iturralde (La Paz). Rather than suggesting the disorganization of 
indigenous groups, the Western style system of land-tenure exposes the artificiality of ‘organizing’ 
the Amazonian groups of one vast region into neat and tidy distinct groups (Alexiades 2009; Balza 
2001).  
To be part of the nation-state project and receive territory, indigenous individuals need to 
affiliate with one single ethnic group in order then, as a group, to start defining what is ‘specific’ 
them in terms of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘indigeneity’. This is usually done with the establishment of a land-
tenure management plan, together with an NGO which oversees the project. This process squarely 
fits into the neo-liberal model. It involves a number of indigenous and non-indigenous actors (NGOS 
etc) and is customized to neoliberal nation-state dimensions. It situates Tacana indigeneity in 
nation-state terms so that it may function within its socio-political system. This may, in fact, have 
only remotely to do with the on-the-ground reality of how Tacana people are living (see eg chapter 
8), but it is in this process that ‘indigeneity’ is re-constructed and customized for each group (see 
chapter 8). In fact, as Tacana people pointed out, while one parent may be Tacana, the other may 
be of a different ethnic group, such as Araona or Leco, or even mestizo (see chapter 6). The 
formation of indigenous organizations and the requirement to be aligned to one single ethnic group 
have left little room for the reality of the ethnogenesis which has been ongoing for centuries.  
Tensions are bound to arise in this artificial model which sets boundaries between one 
people’s ‘indigeneity’ and the next, making indigeneity less fluid than it is and was in reality. In this 
situation, different groups may lay claim to land-tenure on the same territory, which at some point 
in history they co-inhabited, or perhaps even inhabited as one group. Today this results in a political 
tug-of-war in which the best organized indigenous group has the best chance of attaining the most 
territory. As required by the neoliberal model, the ‘strongest group’ is the one which receives most 
support from outside bodies such as NGOs and other Western political actors. There is presently 
tension over land claims between national Tacana and Ese Eja organizations, where proving 
geographical heritage and place of origin is of prominent importance.59 There is dispute over Tacana 
                                                          
59 While the indigenous organizations are in conflict over land claims, this does not mean that the majority 
of the ordinary TCO members are in any way necessarily involved. 
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land (TCO Tacana II) in the department of Pando, which CIPTA acquired in 2006. Yet the Ese Eja 
‘Organisation of Indigenous Leaders of the Ese Eja People of the Amazon’ (la Capitanía Indígena del 
Pueblo Ese Eja de la Amazonía - CIPEA) now claims this location, asserting that it constitutes the 
heart of Ese Eja ancestral territory (Alexiades, and Monje Machuqi 2009). Indeed, many Tacana 
people live in Pando due to resettlement as a result of migration during the rubber boom (see Vallvé 
2010; Bathurst 2005). The fact that the Tacana, via CIPTA, have successfully acquired two TCOs is a 
demonstration of their strength in the contemporary indigenous movement (see also chapter 7).  
Tacana people’s strong political representation within the contemporary indigenous 
movement distinguishes them from other indigenous groups who cohabit or border their territory. 
One might ask why it is that they were able to become such strong members of the indigenous 
movement in Bolivia (see also chapter 7).  Understanding the construction of indigeneity in Bolivia 
reveals that the resources offered by pro-indigenous policies can only be accessed by those willing 
to play the role of the ‘permitted indian’. As this chapter demonstrates, Tacana people of Iturralde 
are the product of the early nation-state. They have been formed by missions which regrouped and 
moulded them into a new ethnic group; one which accepted and came to perpetuate the comunidad 
as the model of organizing living space (see chapter 2) and one which learned Spanish, eventually 
refraining altogether from speaking Tacana. Indeed, Tacana people of Iturralde in comparison to 
other local indigenous groups seem to have had a continuously close association with mestizos from 
surrounding towns, as they have with the whites and mestizos within their own comunidades (see 
chapter 6). The continual desire of Tacana people to ‘modernize’ their comunidades (see chapters 6 
and 7) was what initially brought them into contact with indigenous movements. 
While this chapter has focused on how I came to know Tacana people, and on situating 
Tacana people in the Amazon and in Amazonian studies by drawing on past research, the following 
chapter asks how Tacana people of today see themselves. The answer is intricately tied to their 
geographical location and residence in the comunidad and municipal town. In the following chapter, 
I lay out the sites of research (three comunidades and one town) like snap-shot views of the wider 
area of study. Physical location demonstrates how Tacana people understand ‘being Tacana’ today 
as shaped by Tacana people’s history in an Andean-oriented state. 
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Chapter 2 - Where Tacana People Locate Themselves 
 
Decentralization and neo-liberal politics in Bolivia have facilitated the reaching of the 
Amazon from the capital in the highlands. Lumber companies have created new roads, making way 
for a new surge of small-scale migrants (colonos), but also for social scientists, government and NGO 
affiliates, highland indigenous and mestizo migrants looking for land. Decentralization processes, a 
part of neo-liberal politics, and specifically the LPP of 1995, permitted lumber companies to access 
the Amazon region. The LPP also gave remote areas more political decision-making power and 
granted indigenous comunidades TCOs. This in turn made it possible for indigenous people from 
indigenous comunidades to participate on the municipal councils as specifically ‘indigenous’ 
representatives. The list goes on. These developments and turns of events are what makes ‘picking 
out’ the ‘Tacana people’ from ‘the others’ so complex; or, at any rate, reveals the complexity which 
has, in reality, always existed. Tacana people are no longer (and arguably never were) from one 
geographical location, the Tacana comunidades in the Bolivian Amazon. Tacana people are also 
found residing in towns such as Rurrenabaque, and in cities as La Paz or even Barcelona, Spain where 
they work and from where they send remittances to Bolivia every month. Their place of residence 
and the work they do only in part defines them and their racial category (indigenous, mestizo, white) 
(also Barragán 2011). In Barcelona, Tacana people may be poor Bolivian immigrant domestic 
workers, while in La Paz they are university students, the offspring of wealthy indigenous leaders.  
In Bolivia the popular and political view of the Amazonian indian has always been from the 
highlands to the lowlands. Although Bolivia is considered Andean, the lowlands make up 60% of its 
territory (see image 5). The fact that the state constructs it to being Andean  has had no little impact 
on Tacana people, as it means ‘being made and actively making oneself Andean' (67). To be part of 
the country, one had to construct oneself through Andean processes. This is a situation shared by 
many Amazonian groups who live in an ‘Andean country’, such as the Aguaruna people of 
Amazonian Peru (Greene 2009).  
A part of establishing oneself within this system as an Amazonian people was to ‘take on’ 
and even help ‘develop’ the self-image of the ‘less noble’ indian people; to accept the role of the 
weakened and the docile, in contrast to the descendants of the proud and noble ‘Inca Nation’ 
(Greene 2009). Indeed, in an act of governmentality (Foucault et al 1991) Tacana people have 
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actively taken on the role of the ‘passive’ and ‘lesser’ indian peoples in contrast to those of the 
Andes. Tacana people have embraced the ‘invisible’ (Amazonian lowland) and ‘unimportant’ role 
they have been attributed in Bolivian history. This becomes demonstrated in their terms for self-
referral – poor (pobre), peasant (campesino) and especially ‘humble’ (humilde). 
Settlement and Identity: ‘Being’ Tacana  
Tacana people of this study tie ‘being Tacana’ to specific abstract factors which cannot be 
attained by simply asking them ‘what is Tacana?’, but which become apparent in expressions and 
stories which distinguish an ‘us’ from a ‘them’. These are closely linked to geographical surroundings 
and familiar settlements. Though ‘being Tacana’ is not tied to one geography and location, speaking 
to Tacana people of this study reveals that ‘location’ plays a central point of reference in the creation 
of a sense of self which is distinctly Tacana. Location is utilized to establish boundaries for unity with 
others who are ‘like us’. The idea of a shared geography (Bolivia), a shared area (the Amazon) and a 
shared location (the comunidad) for a given period of time sums up ‘community’.  
Geographical settlements, assigned certain nomenclature (comunidad, pueblo, ciudad)60, 
held distinctive roles in the process of Spanish colonization, which continued after independence 
from Spain (Orlove 1993). These were based on administrative functions (ibid). Like a spider’s web, 
the different settlements knit together the nation-state – the fragility of the web increasing the 
greater the distance was between a settlement and the Andes, and the deeper it was located in the 
Amazon. This settlement-based administrative mechanism was a way to order the new Latin 
American nations. Importantly, this included the organisation of the indians and ‘(t)he spatialization 
of the indian became a way to speak safely of race in an era of citizenship’ (ibid:328; also Barragán 
2011; Cadena 2000). In these constellations comunidades are a sites of the indians and pueblos are 
places for and of mestizos. In Rurrenabaque in particular, the underlying attitude is clearly 
perceptible that while mestizos ‘pertain’ to the town, local indigenous people ‘pertain’ to 
comunidades.  
The image of the indigenous as the care-taker of the forest, around which the modern eco-
ethnic movement has organized itself (Greene 2006), underscores this construct. This situation also 
becomes especially interesting in light of the trend in the Amazon region for an increased 
                                                          
60 The comunidad would be the equivalent of a village, a pueblo a small town and a ciudad a city. 
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‘indigenous urbanization’ (Alexiades and Peluso 2005), in which traditionally highly mobile 
Amazonian societies (ibid, also Alexiades 2009), such as the Ese Eja in the department of Pando, 
have become ‘increasingly sedentary, largely as a result of the broader social and political changes 
that have resulted from the penetration of a market economy into the region’ (Alexiades & Peluso 
2005:8). As also for Tacana people, this includes missionization in the first half of the twentieth 
century and the subsequent establishments of comunidades based on the mission model, both of 
which required and persuaded inhabitants to perpetuate and maintain links with the market and 
nation state (ibid). However, because ‘indigenous urbanization’ is not congruent with the colonial 
logistics of how the nation is divided spatially, indigenous people in urban settings such as the Ese 
Eja people in Puerto Maldonado, or the Tacana people in Rurrenabaque, have become invisible as 
specifically indigenous people.  
Tacana people will most often refer to a comunidad as a place to where they are ‘from’, or, 
if they were not born here but in a town, I have heard the explanation “I was born here (in town) 
but my mother is from Tumupasa”. Though Tacana people will refer to a certain comunidad as their 
birth-place and where they grew up, it is very likely that they move to other comunidades in the 
course of their lives, and equally likely that they may have second homesteads in a nearby municipal 
town. Different geographical locations take on different roles in each person’s life. While the 
comunidad may be where the field (chaco) is located, the town may be where one resides during 
the week together with one’s children and partner. To adequately understand Tacana people and 
gain a realistic impression of Tacana life, I moved between geographical places, much as Tacana 
people of this study do, visiting comunidades and municipal towns for different occasions and goals.  
Focussing on ‘space’ provides a sound demonstration of the influence which ‘colonial 
geography’ (Orlove 1993) has had on Tacana people’s sense of self. This chapter provides brief 
descriptions of the four main settlements of this research to provide snapshot views of the physical 
sites of Tacana interaction. These include three Tacana comunidades (Tumupasa, Buena Vista & 
Carmen Florida) and one municipal town (Rurrenabaque) which are important to Tacana people and 
their history for different reasons. A Tacana collective self (identity) becomes demonstrated in 
certain expressions of self-referral which are elaborated in the second half of the chapter, and which 
reveal how much Tacana people have come to embody the image of the lowland Amazonian as 
docile in contrast to (and perhaps precisely to contrast) the highlanders. Although indian uprisings 
are considered a feature of the highlanders, for example, early documentation reveals Tacana-
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speaking people’s uprisings and successful wars against Spanish infiltrators (Castillo 1988b) which 
belie the passive and complacent role allotted them in the history of Spanish colonization. 
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Image 10: Map of central area of study locating Rurrenabaque, Buena Vista and Carmen Florida (Tumupasa is not 
included and lies further north of Buen Vista) 
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The Town of Rurrenabaque 
Picking up from the last chapter, I continue with the pueblo Rurrenabaque, moving from its 
significance in Tacana cosmology to a brief description not only of its foundation and inhabitants, 
but its role for Tacana people and in the creation of the socio-racial categories of the Bolivian nation-
state.  
The town of Rurrenabaque (typically called ‘Rurre’ among inhabitants) is home to about 
15,000 inhabitants and situated in the tropical foothills which gradually slope westwards into the 
Andes. Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura are the main local municipalities and towns in the 
region and are situated opposite each other on the shores of the Beni River (see image 10). The Beni 
River marks the political divide between the two pueblos; to its east begin the vast plains and 
swamps of the historic region of Mojos, today the department of Beni. Thus, San Buenaventura lies 
in the department of La Paz, in the province of Iturralde; and Rurrenabaque lies in the department 
of Beni, in the province of Ballivián.  
It is significant to the history of both Rurre and San Buenaventura (San Buena to its 
inhabitants) that upon Spanish colonization the Jesuits were granted jurisdiction over the territory 
east of the Beni River while the Franciscans received jurisdiction of the territory to its west. 
Subsequently, San Buenaventura was founded by the Franciscans while Rurrenabaque was a Jesuit 
foundation. Older inhabitants of Rurre will acknowledge, not without nostalgia, the Jesuits’ 
introduction of cattle into the great plains of the department of Beni (formerly Mojos), and do not 
shy away from calling it the area’s ‘golden age’ (Gamez Mendez 2002:25; also Van Valen 2013). 
Many mestizo inhabitants of Rurre are small-scale cattle ranchers, farmers and merchants of local 
produce such as Brazil nuts. Formerly, many were the patrónes of the surrounding land which 
Tacana people worked as peons (see also Chapter 5). Today Rurre lives mainly off the flourishing 
tourist industry.  
There are disagreements over the official foundation of Rurrenabaque. Written sources lean 
heavily on the oral testimonies of elderly mestizos whose family members were among its first non-
indigenous settlers. Sources cite the first  foundation as having been in 1706 by the Jesuit priest 
Padre José Vincente Duran, who held this area within his duties and adopted the indigenous name 
of Sucenabaque (original spelling of today’s Rurrenabaque), and registered the town in 1720 
(ibid:39). A better-known foundation date among the people of Rurre is February 2nd 1844, when 
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Manuel Mendez Abrego, on the occasion of the immigration of a handful of white/mestizo settlers, 
gave it the name ‘Cruz’ (Cross) (ibid:38). Indeed, to date Rurrenabaque annually celebrates its 
patrón (Christian protector) and foundation festival on 2nd February (see image 11). On March 31st, 
1862 Rurrenabaque’s foundation was made official by governmental authorization and it was 
acknowledged as a town of the province of Caupolicán.  
 
Image 11: Festival of Rurrenabaque demonstrating the folkloric dance, “el balsero”, to celebrate the manner of 
travelling the Rio Beni on rafts made of balsa-wood (balseros). The green scarves symbolize the lowlands. (2010)  
Both San Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque were settled by white and mestizo farmers, and 
merchants of European and Asian descent, who came here predominantly in the last century. At the 
turn of the twentieth century Rurrenabaque was a place to let the cattle rest and fatten as boats 
made their passage from Bolivia’s eastern lowlands or the highlands towards Pando on the Beni 
River. During the rubber booms of the late 19th century and mid 1980s cattle and other foodstuffs 
were sent downriver to feed those working in the industry. Since the early 1980s Rurrenabaque has 
become a growing international tourist destination to which backpackers travel to launch on jungle 
and pampa tours. Rurrenabaque was made famous internationally by a bestselling Israeli book title 
(Ghinsberg 1985). Since its first publication in the 1980s in Israel, the book has spurred young Israeli 
adults in particular to travel to Rurre after their military service, and seek adventure.  
Besides the Tacana people, and to a lesser extent other local indigenous peoples 
(mentioned in chapter one) and the mestizos, there is a third principal group which makes up a 
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central part of Rurrenabaque: the colonos or indigenous highland migrants. For Tacana people, the 
colonos are the ‘better off’ indigenous, a sentiment shared by the town. While the local Ese Eja are 
considered the poorest indigenous group in Rurre, the highland colonos are viewed as the 
wealthiest. Their involvement with local markets and ability to control the rise and fall in local prices 
contributes to this. Tacana people, especially those who participate in its weekly market such as 
those from Carmen Florida, come into contact with colonos as principal buyers of their produce 
which they then re-sell in the market-hall of Rurrenabaque (see image 12 below). The colonos are 
the small-scale and, to an extent, large-scale merchants of Rurrenabaque. The wealthiest families in 
town are rumoured to be not mestizos, as one would assume, but colonos.  
 
 
Image 12: Tacana from nearby comunidades sell plantains to colonos at the beach of Rurrenabaque. (2005) 
 
Colonos control the main turnover of merchandise in town and are the principal group to 
order and receive merchandise coming down from the highlands of La Paz.  Transport  between the 
highlands and the lowlands is often managed by family members ; an uncle or a brother-in-law will 
own one of the many trucks which make their way from the Andes to the Amazonian north, bringing 
in goods. This includes everything from gasoline and refrigerators to second-hand clothing and 
chewing gum. The colonos also tend to buy produce directly from the surrounding comunidades, 
not bothering to wait until the next Sunday market: “bring me all of your bananas, here to the shore 
on Wednesday. I will buy them.” Indeed, the shops which line the main roads in Rurrenabaque are 
mostly colla (i.e. highlander) and there is a certain colla style which distinguishes these from the 
local camba (i.e. lowlander) style61. This includes the Andean music which blasts from the stereos 
and the fact that the collas are considered ‘stingy’ (see chapter 3). 
                                                          
61 The terms colla and colono are used interchangeably in Rurrenabaque and among Tacana people. 
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The roles which pueblos play in the creation of racial categories is aptly characterized in a 
small publication (1958) by the local mestizo school-teacher, Arminda Herrera de Antelo in which 
she lauds Rurrenabaque.62 Her publication asserts that the town strives to be a ‘civilized’ and 
‘modern’ settlement within the Bolivian nation. It depicts indians dwelling in the town as poor, 
wretched, even crazy souls living as outcasts on the muddy shore. Here, indian in of itself stands in 
contrast to urban life. However, those indians who invest true effort in living and being part of the 
town ‘shed’ their ‘indianess’. Herrera de Antelo ‘excuses’ the fact that 50% of Rurrenabaque’s 
inhabitants are, in fact, Tacana people with the assertion that all of them speak Spanish and are 
quick to ‘acculturate and adapt to the manners of the common Bolivian person’ 63(16) (emphasis 
mine).  
Herrera de Antelo’s attitude chimes with the mid- to late 20th century state ideology of 
mestizaje, more popular at the time in Central America than in the Andes. She writes:  
only about half a dozen elderly (Tacana) women dress in the old way. They use a tipoy (a 
type of long shirt with decorations of ribbons and ruffles), have their hair in long braids 
adorned with colorful ribbons (…) and perfumed with flower fragrances. (…) As opposed to 
them, however, the younger generation takes part in the common Bolivian life (la vida 
nacional) and one hears the Tacana dialect less and less. 64(ibid: 16-17). 
In writing this de Herrera de Antelo acknowledges that to be ‘Bolivian’ (i.e. a nation-state citizen) 
does not entail being white or even having a white blood link, as in line with required by early 
eugenics (see chapter 6) but is possible through the adoption of certain non-native behaviours and 
customs.  
Tacana comunarios (people from comunidades) view Rurrenabaque as both a place which 
connects them with the wider Bolivia and a dangerous place of ‘degeneration’ – much as European 
cities were viewed during industrialization: a  place to drink away hard-earned money and buy over-
priced goods, and one where teenage children and husbands go, not to return for days on end. It is 
a place which provokes ‘laziness’ (flojera) and the leaving of comunidad-responsibilities to those 
who stay behind; a place where one is sucked into a sparse yet blinding night-life of karaoke bars, 
                                                          
62 The author, a sociologist and schoolteacher, was a central leading female figure in Rurrenabaque and 
today is remembered as a heroine for her engagement and efforts to ‘modernize’ the town. One of her 
highlights was bringing about the community-effort construction of the central water supply, which, while 
underway, was even made into a movie (‘La Vertiente’ 1958). 
63 Translation from Spanish my own. 
64 Translation from Spanish my own. 
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dancing and drinking. In all, however, Rurrenabaque is also an important place of interaction; a 
crossroads to which people will travel from their comunidad to sell goods at the market, but also to 
offer their manual labour, buy certain products, meet municipal officials or set off on larger trips via 
buses and airplanes.  
Tacana Comunidades – Infrastructure and Organisation and Activities 
 
Image 13: A school-house (right) and meeting house with solar panel (left), in front the foot-ball field (Carmen Florida 
2009) 
 
While this research focused on three comunidades especially, most Tacana comunidades 
have in common basic infrastructure and routines which are considered ‘typical’ of comunidades. 
These include tangible infrastructures as well as routines such as festivities aligned to Catholic saints. 
The comunidad – a village-like structure in which the basic infrastructure usually amounts to a 
meeting-house, a church, a football field and a schoolhouse – was introduced at the time of Spanish 
missionization in the 1700s. Even though comunidades were not ‘native’ to Tacana people, however, 
they have through the centuries become ‘native’ and for some time have been regarded as a 
representation of ‘indigeneity’ by the state and other political arenas (see chapter 7). Here again 
geography creates identity and people who move to settle in a comunidad are considered 
‘indigenous’, and statistically will count as ‘indigenous’, unless they are church affiliates, 
schoolteachers or medical personnel.  
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A comunidad, whether ‘originally’ Tacana or not gave and today still gives the inhabitants a 
sense of togetherness which goes beyond actual residence As Tacana people were heavily 
missionized, and the descendants of Tacana people of this study are mainly descendants of the 
missions of San José de Uchupiomonas and Tumupasa, they are Catholics. Mission life was organized 
around Catholic celebration of different saints, year round (Hissink and Hahn 1984). However, 
importantly, although Tacana people were aligned with a mission they did not necessarily live year-
round within its boundaries. Instead, families often lived at a considerable distance from the 
comunidad of Tumupasa, for example, where they had a central homestead. These families only 
returned to participate in the Christian festivities instigated by the church affiliates living as in 
Tumupasa and – ideally, from the perspective of the priest - on Sundays to attend church service 
(see Wentzel 1989; Hissink and Hahn 1984). Until recently it was also not uncommon for a single 
family to settle on the banks of a river, where there is an abundance of land and enough space for 
a field and a garden, and to let domestic animals roam. As one informant, Berta, aptly put it, placing 
the situation in the current problematic context of land rights, which includes indigenous land 
tenures, private property and national parks: 
before there was land all over! It was worthless and no one wanted it. It was there for 
anyone. If you needed more land to cultivate, you just moved a bit downriver and set up 
your field there, your house. It is different now. There is no more land. Before, you just 
moved anywhere….you with your family. Just you and your family on the banks of the river. 
 
Tacana people from the comunidades are mainly subsistence farmers. Most families live off 
the yield of their chacos (fields), which lie outside of the comunidad. A chaco can be between one 
and five hectares in size, with parts of it lying fallow. Main crops also depend somewhat on the 
location of the chaco and the quality of earth65. Another important factor in the production of crops 
is whether the comunidad is close to the towns of Rurrenabaque or San Buenaventura where it can 
sell produce. However, as a loose rule typical crops include rice, plantains, yucca, peanuts (if there 
is a sandy shore) and sugar-cane. In smaller gardens by the household compounds papaya, ají 
(capsicum baccatum), coffee and coca bushes and other small vegetables are planted or sown. An 
important part of the diet are the palms and fruit trees which bear coconuts, dates, cocoa, oranges, 
                                                          
65 For a detailed discussion on Tacana chaco organization and selection, as also types of soil see Wentzel 
1989: 158. 
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mandarins, lemons, limas, pacay (Inga feuilleei), avocado, copazu and cherimoya, to name a few of 
the principal ones.  
It should be stressed that coca leaves are an important product for Tacana people and each 
family will have a numberof coca leave bushes around their living area. Chewing coca for its 
stimulating effects, aids in the work of hard physical labor. For its nutritional value it is also used for 
illnesses. The practice of chewing coca after lunch, as a way to relax, or in the evening after a hard 
days of work, is something Tacana people identify with stongly. This is similar to another custom, 
that of drinking chicha – a fermented brew based on maize or yucca. Chicha has a significant 
symbolic value in the lives of Tacana people. A festivity is no real festivity without chica.  
To Tacana people, chicha is the common alcoholic beverage and of all who live in the 
country side. ‘Understanding’ (saber) how to drink chicha means one understands life in the country 
side but also that one is ‘poor’ (see elaboration below). I was able to experience this when I invited 
Sandra from Carmen Florida to a fiesta I was having in Rurrenabaque and asked her if she could not 
make chicha for the event. While I thought my idea was good, I soon saw that the request 
embarrassed her. Showing up at my party in town at which a mix of people would be, many not 
from a comunidad, bringing chicha would expose her as ‘indigenous’. It would expose her class-
standing and make clear that she was ‘from the country side’. She had been regarding my fiesta as 
an opportunity to mix in with other social-classes and drink beer, perhaps even wine. These 
beverages symbolized a more urban life-style connected to a different socio-racial class. Indeed, 
sugar cane liquor, beer and to a much lesser extent wine (in this order) are considered more 
lucrative alcoholic beverages to people in the area. One cannot make them at home (except maybe 
sugar cane liquor) and especially beer needs to be cold, which involves owning a refrigerator, an 
object difficult to get a hold of and impossible to keep in a comunidad without electricity. Quickly 
realizing Sandra’s unease we both laughed at my ridiculous request and settled that Sandra would 
contribute ‘pan de arroz’ (bread made of rice), which she was infamous for and which she also often 
sold at the town’s Sunday market.  
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Image 14: The Trapiche (sugar mill) is worked by a family in Carmen Florida to produce sugar cane juice to be sold at the 
market in Rurrenabaque. (2009) 
 
 
Image 15: Harvesting aji and other produce in Carmen Florida for selling at the Sunday market in Rurrenabaque.(2009) 
 
In addition to farming and collecting fruit, Tacana people in comunidades also keep 
domestic animals, most typically chicken, ducks, pigs and, for some protection and to aid in hunting, 
dogs. Cattle and horses, are by far the most desirable domestic animals to have, and are a symbol 
of status. Tacana people also fish, and hunt which, however, is today predominantly considered as 
a leisure activity, because the outcome is uncertain, or at least more so than that of farming. Hunting 
has also become more uncertain in the past 20 years as there are less animals due to over-hunting. 
Popular meats to hunt include that of the spider and howler monkies, tapir, ant-eater, armadillo, 
capybara and caiman. Being in the position to eat meat is a clear sign of ‘doing well’ and status.  
Since as long as Tacana people of this study can remember they have also seasonally 
migrated to one of the large industries of the region: quinine, rubber, lumber, Brazil nuts. It is 
predominantly young single men who migrate although married women (and their children) may 
accompany them to serve as cooks. People may also typically hire out their labour at a daily or half-
daily rate which at the time of research was about 40 Bolivianos (7 Dollars). This can include people 
from the same comunidad, though more typical would be being hired by better situated people in 
the towns of Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura, when they need help harvesting their fields or 
any unskilled labour to be done. The tourist industry in Rurrenabaque and surrounding 
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comunidades, and the realms of the indigenous movement have offered more recent possibilities 
of occupation. This last platform has brought Tacana people into contact with the international aid 
arena and provided possibilities for short- or long-term income (see chapter 7 & 8). 
Tacana comunidades are still roughly modelled around the Franciscan mission model 
described above in which houses and household compounds were grouped together as they were 
in Europe. A household compound is typically composed of one or more sleeping houses and a 
cooking-house. Cooking-houses usually hold a hearth, which is an elevated wooden platform packed 
with clay and on which stones are placed around the borders (see image 16 below).  
 
Image 16: Lunch in Carmen Florida, as cooked on a typical elevated cookng hearth of stones (2010) 
 
Houses in Tacana comunidades traditionally used charo (a type of bamboo) for the walls 
and a woven ensemble of the jatata palm-leaf for the roof. Inside, houses were not divided by walls, 
but left as one large space, although this has begun to change as people divide the space into rooms 
with wooden planks. Before wooden planks were introduced by the lumber industry and the more 
recent availability of brick, better-off families used to construct the walls of their houses with a 
mixture of charo and clay which, when dried in the sun, would be white-washed. Today the jatata-
roofs are giving way to corrugated iron sheets, which, though insect- and rodent-resistant as 
opposed to jatata, capture the heat.  
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While the aspects described above are a very general model of a Tacana comunidad, 
obviously each comunidad differs somewhat from the next, depending on its foundation date, 
history and location.  
The Comunidad Carmen Florida 
Carmen Florida, the comunidad in which I mainly resided, was officially established (i.e. 
registered by the municipality) in the 1940s shortly before the land reform of 1953. It is located 
about forty minutes upriver by boat from Rurrenabaque. This proximity made the comunidad 
especially interesting, as its inhabitants closely relate to the municipal town, thus providing a clear 
example of how Tacana people interact and relate to local politics. Carmen Florida emerged from 
the typical situation of one family living along the banks of a river to make use of its fertile land for 
farming. If enough families shared an area, the group might opt to create a comunidad and baptize 
the settlement after a biblical saint to assure its protection, following the tradition of mission 
settlements. The principal founders of Carmen Florida had come from the former Tacana mission 
comunidad San José de Uchupiomonas but also from the Apolo towards the Andes. Though among 
Tacana people Apolo is considered a Quechua town, studies show that it is home to a large 
community of Leco people and was the centre of Leco missions which, as with the Tacana people, 
regrouped different peoples an in this course creating a new ethnic catagory (Dudley 2011, 2009). 
The historic main route leading from the highlands into the lowlands starts in Apolo and leads 
through San José de Uchupiomonas and on to Ixiamas and Tumupasa, from where travellers could 
continue to San Buenaventura and lastly Rurrenabaque. The Apolo route is said to predate Inca 
times, with Inca stone paths and ruins still intact. Upon asking inhabitants of Carmen Florida why 
their grandfathers had come to settle here, the reply was usually an unenthused shrug: “why not, 
it’s pretty here! There was so much land! So my father stayed. Found a wife. It’s very pretty here!” 
Indeed, I heard a number of times that men from Apolo had come to the Amazonian lowlands to 
look for wives.   
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Image 17: Father with his children in front of the sleeping house in Carmen Florida (2010) 
 
Today Carmen Florida is made up of 37 families of predominantly Tacana and Quechua 
decent and comes under the administrative jurisdiction of the municipality of Rurrenabaque. As 
typical of smaller comunidades in particular, its inhabitants rotate in their responsibility to keep 
communal areas free of brush and tall grass, cutting it away with the machete. While principal 
families such as the Cubes and Colques have private land titles, other families must fall back on 
communal TCO land to make their fields. The fact the comunidad encompasses both private and 
communal land causes tensions among the inhabitants, an issue addressed in chapter 8. As opposed 
to the typical comunidad set-up in which houses are clustered together by the church, school and 
obligatory football field, the inhabitants of Carmen Florida have set up their homes by their fields 
and stretched out along the Beni River. Walking from one end to the comunidad to the other easily 
takes over two hours. Inhabitants choose their field on the shores of the Beni River, where frequent 
inundations loosen and replenish the soil Soil further inland, in contrast, is hard and packed and 
needs to lie fallow for seven years in order to replenish. Thus, despite living in the same comunidad, 
the inhabitants of Carmen Florida rarely see each other during the week, as household compounds 
are widespread and all are busy working on the fields, gathering the produce for the Sunday market 
in Rurrenabaque.  
Carmen Florida was founded by two families, the Cubos and the Colques, who still live there 
today and who, in addition to having claim to the land-tenure (TCO), also own private land-titles. 
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Berta Cubo’s father was the founder of the comunidad. He had travelled into the region from San 
José de Uchupiomonas, a former Tacana mission located by the Tuichi River. 
He himself was born and raised in the early mission comunidad of San José de 
Uchuipomonas from where he travelled downriver by boat, settling close to San 
Buenaventura until he finally stayed in what was to become Carmen Florida.  
He was a merchant, a very respected man! He travelled to San Buenaventura and 
Rurrenabaque to sell local products. Sugar cane was very popular. When we would come in 
our boats loaded with the sugar cane product (chancaca) people used to wade out into the 
river to be the first to buy. People were crazy for sugar cane and there was always a 
shortage! My father was a very strict man! He would give whasca (leather whip) to all of us 
(children). We had to work hard, rise early in the morning at 2 a.m. to start working the 
trapiche (sugar mill). My father was a well-respected man in all this area and everyone knew 
him!   
 
Before the Sunday market people from the comunidad may take their boats out to remoter 
shores on the river and harvest the fruit trees and palms found here, then sell the goods at market 
and generate more income. The Sunday market in Rurrenabaque is central to the weekly routine. 
Each family has a fixed spot where they set up chairs and sometimes a table, to set out vegetables, 
fruits (e.g. banana, papaya, avocado, cucumbers, oranges, pacay, ají) derivatives of sugar cane 
(chankaka) and more seldom dried meat (charque) and fish. People of Carmen Florida come to 
Rurrenabaque not only to sell what their fields yield but also to find employment, most typically in 
the flourishing tourist industry. Here they rent out their services as cooks in restaurants or as guides 
in the jungle and pampa, or in the larger infrastructure as motor-bike taxi drivers, or labourers in 
housing construction or the saw-mill industry. 
Many people from Carmen Florida have over the past years attained land in Rurrenabaque 
and built a house here. Thus, a whole section of Rurrenabaque is inhabited by people from Carmen 
Florida, forming a sort of Carmen Florida neighbourhood. This situation is typical, as other outlying 
comunidades, too, have bought land in Rurrenabaque from the municipality and live together in 
houses to form one neighbourhood. In this manner Tacana people are both members of an 
indigenous comunidad and inhabitants of the municipal town.  
Carmen Florida is registered as a Tacana comunidad. However, some inhabitants are in fact 
Quechua. Though Carmen Florida is a Tacana comunidad, importantly it is not part of the TCO 
Tacana as are Tumupasa and Buena Vista. The TCO Tacana lies exclusively in the department of La 
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Paz, which begins across the river where the comunidades Vila Alcira and San Miguel are located. 
For logistical reasons Carmen Florida became part of the TCO Tsimané/Mosetén in the department 
of Beni. The TCO Tsimané/Mosetén is interlinked with the national bio-reserve Pilon Lajas, 
established here in 1995. The inhabitants of Carmen Florida do not have a strong affiliation with 
‘their’ TCO Tsimané/Mosetén due to the vast cultural differences which include a language barrier.  
 
 
Image 18: People from Carmen Florida at the Sunday market in Rurrenabaque selling their produce. (2009) 
 
For this reason, the comunidad falls back on the nearby municipal authorities in 
Rurrenabaque when looking to help with conflicts between comunidad members or natural 
disasters as inundations. Carmen Florida, being so close to Rurrenabaque, has always been able to 
take advantage of its infrastructure and this has given the members of Carmen Florida the sense 
that they are more ‘modern’ and ‘mestizo’, and less ‘ethnic’ than other comunidades located further 
from municipal towns. ‘We are not very Tacana anymore,’ Alejandro Cubo said apologetically to me 
when I told him that I would like to stay in the comunidad to learn about Tacana people. He pointed 
to the comunidad San Miguel, part of the TCO Tacana and located on the other side of the Beni River 
in the department of La Paz: ‘the Tacana are over there, across the river. Or if you want to meet 
Tacana, ask CIPTA in Tumupasa. Here in Carmen Florida we are not Tacana anymore.’ 
The Comunidad Tumupasa 
Tumupasa is one of the oldest surviving Tacana comunidades to have made up one of the 
seven Missions of Apolobamba established in the early 1700s. It was originally established in 1713 
on the site of a failed white settlement on one of the tributaries of the Tuichi River (Chávez Suárez 
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1944) from where it twice moved due to the outbreak of disease and fires (ibid). Today it is nestled 
closer to the Beni River, at the bottom of a sacred mountain marked by the whiteness of its rock, 
which plays a prominent role in Tacana myths as documented by Hissink and Hahn (1961). Indeed, 
the Tacana word ‘Tumupasa’ means ‘white rock’. The Tacana people of this research are 
predominantly descendants of those who associated with two of the Franciscan missions of 
Apolobamba, specifically Tumupasa and San José de Uchupiomonas which were both originally 
located in the region by the Tuichi River66.  
Tumupasa, being one of the original Tacana comunidades, served as a ‘model’ in the 
establishment of subsequent non-mission comunidades.67 Today, Tumupasa is composed of about 
900 families and has the infrastructure of a pueblo (small town). It is the main and the representative 
Tacana comunidad in the region and the seat of the national Tacana organisation, CIPTA. Due to an 
intense focus from the international development arena, Tumupasa has for some time been 
experiencing a certain NGO and project ‘fatigue’. During the time I worked with Tacana people and 
CIPTA between 2003 and 2006 there were more than twenty NGOs and other types of organizations 
collaborating with the TCO Tacana I, especially Tumupasa itself. When I returned to do research in 
2008, there was an expectation that outsiders come to learn about ‘the Tacana’ for a small cash 
payent.  
Tumupasa is not only a registered comunidad indigena but a canton and belongs to the 
Province of Abel Iturralde in the department of La Paz. Being a canton it has its own mayor in 
addition to other authorities typical of indigenous comunidades (see chapter 6). The road leading 
north from the municipal town of San Buenaventura to Ixiamas passes through Tumupasa, which 
lies half-way between them. This is no coincidence. In the 1980s the inhabitants of Tumupasa 
contributed substantially towards the construction of this road to tie Tumupasa into the surrounding 
infrastructure (see chapter 5). Plans have been afoot for years that the road be extended to a major 
highway and be asphalted, not unlike the TIPNIS project. The highway would lead to the Peruvian 
border which lies behind Ixiamas and a border-crossing to Peru would be opened. The Tacana 
organisation CIPTA openly opposes this construction, for building a major road poses new 
possibilities for illegal loggers and would increase the settlement of colonos.  
                                                          
66 San José de Uchupiomonas is still located by the Tuichi River today. 
67 The last priest, Swiss father Pedro Diego, settled here in 1971 and remained until his death in 2009. 
88 
 
The Comunidad Buena Vista  
The third comunidad I frequented repeatedly for this research is Buena Vista. Like 
Tumupasa, Buena Vista is located in La Paz, in the province of Iturralde, and is located somewhat 
off the road when travelling from San Buenaventura to Tumupasa. It is close to the shores of the 
Beni River and was officially founded in the early 1940s. I am told that the settlement itself is much 
older, however, and was previously called ‘Pueblo Viejo’ (Old Town). Buena Vista is a very large 
comunidad, comprised of over 100 families and today, along with Tumupasa and unlike Carmen 
Florida, belongs to the TCO Tacana. Some claim that it was the second Tacana comunidad created 
after Tumupasa after mission times. Indeed, its social/political set-up is much like that of Tumupasa, 
being a very close replica of a mission comunidad. Rosa explains. 
My father moved to Buena Vista when measles broke out and all the youths in Tumupasa 
died. Many left and settled in Buena Vista. There was a huge measles epidemic in the 1940s 
in Tumupasa. It was terrible. 
While Tumupasa is a former mission comunidad and Carmen Florida as one which evolved 
without the impulse of white/mestizo authorities (i.e. patrón or priest), Buena Vista is what people 
call a patrón68 comunidad. Buena Vista was established by a white landowner previous to the 1953 
land reform, in 1940. Buena Vista’s patrón, looking for peons to work his fields, had come to 
Tumupasa to encourage people to move to his land and live there. Today descendants of the former 
patrón still live in the comunidad and are considered Tacana (see chapter 6; see image 21). 
According to the inhabitants of Buena Vista, the comunidad changed hands (patrónes) a few times 
before the land reform and at some point belonged to more than one landowner. In the early and 
mid-1900s Buena Vista played an important role during the area’s rubber boom. Today many people 
in Buena Vista have family living in the north, in the department of Pando, as a result of out-
migration during the rubber boom. Rosa explains. 
People from the surrounding comunidades came to Buena Vista where they would be picked 
up by the boats passing up north to work in rubber. They came here to Buena Vista, as it lay 
close to the river. This is where the boat stopped and picked them up. Here. The Patrón 
would be paid to hire out his people to work in the rubber industry. 
 
 
                                                          
68 ‘Here, patrón can refer to the owner of a larger business as well as a landowner’. 
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Geography and Collective Identity in Linguistic Terms 
The significance between geographical place and identity is perhaps best demonstrated by 
a set of expressions used by Tacana people to refer to themselves collectively, each of which hold a 
history and is tied to ‘place`. A term for self-referral among Tacana people of this study is not 
typically ‘Tacana’, as one might assume (see also Bathurst 2005; Wentzel 1989). Indeed, the closest 
term to the word ‘Tacana’ used by Tacana people before the rise of the modern indigenous 
movement would have been the word ‘Tacanista’. However, this term is a direct reference to the 
language ‘Tacana’. A Tacanista is a monolingual Tacana speaker and, importantly, it is a derogatory 
term (also Wentzel 1989), signalling that someone is ‘backward’ and has not managed to learn 
Spanish. It belongs to the era (pre-1980s) when Tacana children were punished in school for 
speaking Tacana instead of Spanish (see also chapter 6) and to a time in which parents preferred 
their children to learn Spanish exclusively, in order to have a better chance in the future. This 
strategy seems to have been successful, for all the Tacana people of this study are monolingual 
Spanish speakers. Today, in line with the land tenure management and pro-indigenous state policy, 
schools in Tacana comunidades offer bilingual (Spanish-Tacana) education. As observed by 
anthropologists before me (Bathurst 2005; Wentzel 1989), Tacana people prior to the 1980s the 
term ‘Tacana’ was exclusively utilized by outsiders as church associates, travellers, etc. Prior to the 
1930s, Tacana people were divided into two catagories by outsiders, the Tacananistas and the 
‘civilizados’ (civilized, i.e. ‘adapted’) (Wentzel 1989).  Tacana people having a close association with 
their mission (in the case of Tumupasa) would refer to themselves as “Cristianucuana”, the word 
mixing Spanish and Tacana to signify a Christianized person (Wentzel 1989).  
The People of the Comunidades 
When referring to themselves as a group, for example when they need to distinguish 
themselves from other local socio-racial groups such as mestizos or colonos, Tacana people will 
typically use the expression ‘the people of the comunidades’ (la gente de las comunidades) or ‘gente 
de los chacos’ (people of the fields). In contrast, local mestizos will be referred to as ‘people from 
the town’ (gente del pueblo) (see for example chapter 6). This is the case even if the Tacana person 
speaking is herself or himself in fact living in a town, such as Rurrenabaque.  
Tacana people of this study do not refer to themselves as indian, a term which due to its 
colonial baggage continues to be an insult. Nor do they refer to themselves as ‘indigenous’, as one 
would might think today, unless they are part of the formal indigenous movement, or have worked 
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in this context, for example as Tacana leaders. The term ‘indigenous’ is viewed as an empty and 
‘professional term’, reserved for political representations. The tendency to eschew this term has 
also been observed of other lowland groups, such as the Chiquitanos of eastern Bolivia (Weber 
2012). The fact the Tacana people avoid these new terms, made modern with indigenous politics, is 
telling as to their foreignness and lack of history, in contrast to the term ‘indian’ which has negative 
connotations, or ‘gente de las comunidades’ which, importantly, directly contrasts ‘indian’. The 
expression ‘gente de las comunidades’ signals respect and that one recognizes this social group as 
distinct within its own right and without negative connotations.  
Since the 1990s, being ‘gente de las comunidades’ has become tied to ‘being indigenous’ 
and ‘indigeneity’ via land-tenure policy (TCOs). Living in comunidades Tacana people are granted 
‘indigenous status’ which in turn gives them the right to communal ownership of the surrounding 
land. Tacana people of this study are very aware of the fact that by living in comunidades, they are 
identifiable as ‘indigenous’, a situation they have only very recently begun to utilize to their benefit 
(see chapters 6 and 7). TCO-status has made being from the comunidades more attractive, and 
attributed new value to it. However, importantly, and often overlooked from outside, this does not 
mean that Tacana people who live in comunidades all identify with the indigenous movement. To 
many Tacana people, the realms of the indigenous movement and their own indigenous 
organisations such as CIPTA are an exclusive luxury, even something of a VIP club, to which entry is 
difficult and only to be attained by ‘connections’. Scholars who have observed similar situations 
within other indigenous groups have coined these well-connected individuals as ‘the new 
indigenous elite’ (Soruco Sologuren 2011; Varese 2006; Hale 2006) (see chapter 6).  
Yet, to the outsiders of Bolivia Tacana people of this study will proudly claim that they are 
Bolivian, but a certain type of Bolivian: members of a poor Bolivian group. This membership is not 
only tied to financial means but to ‘power’ and ‘influence’, and their distinct lack of these. They are 
also specifically lowland Bolivian – or camba (chapter 4). Tacana people see themselves as sharing 
a camba history with local mestizos and all lowlanders at large. Important here is that certain camba 
‘ways’ of being overlap with Tacana ‘ways’ of being, and these both contrast an Andean way of being 
and are set in relation to it (see chapter 3). Notably, camba-ness historically incorporates the entire 
racial spectrum, though on this racial continuum indian is ‘lesser’ than white (Argandoña, et al 2008). 
Regional identities as such being camba include a ‘racial’ component but are not entirely built on 
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ethnicity, as is the indigenous movement and indigeneity. Rather they are built on geography (see 
Orlove 1993).  
Being Humble  
Perhaps the most overt collective identity of Tacana people of this study, and one which is 
indirectly also tied to geography, is the concept of ‘being humble’ (humilde). Being humble is tied to 
various factors. One is typically ‘humble’ when one lives in the countryside. Being ‘from the 
countryside’ (del campo) and more specifically from the comunidades is associated with being 
‘poor’, and also implies a certain backwardness due to the difficulty involved in attaining resources 
such as education and services. Being ‘from the countryside’ signals that one is excluded from 
markets which in turn are tied to hard cash, for these are also rare in the countryside, where barter 
was until recently the main form of exchange and payment.  
Tacana people will also utilize ‘being humble’ to contrast themselves with other social 
groups, such as local mestizo Bolivians who are not as ‘humble’ as Tacana people. Being 
white/mestizo has a natural affiliation with being ‘better off’. Beyond poverty, ‘humbleness’ 
incorporates a non-aggressive and complacent manner. Humble people avoid conflict, a trait which 
more recently, in particular, has been attributed to colonos. Indeed, colonos or collas are considered 
more ‘aggressive’ and ‘assertive’ and due to this have more ‘power’ and ‘influence’ than Tacana 
people of this study. Colonos are considered the better-off indigenous, who are better-educated, 
can read and count and who readily trick Tacana people when buying their products. In 
Rurrenabaque and Tumupasa in particular, they are usually the merchants.  
Tacana people of this study do not emphasize their ethnicity (see also Rosengren 2003), 
which historically has always been something negative and to be avoided. They emphasize 
geography (Amazon, comunidad, rural, lowland, etc.). Indirectly this entails occupation, namely 
farming: ‘gente de los chacos’, campesinos. The concepts ‘gente de las comunidades’ and ‘being 
humble’ are a self-placement on the socio-economic scale of the nation-state: impoverished. In 
referring to themselves as ‘humble’, Tacana people may be continuing the policy of the MNR party 
after 1952, which sought to create a homogenous national middle class (Albro 2001, 2010b; Klein 
1892; Stroebele-Gregor et al 1994; Malloy 1970).  
The mechanism of measuring someone’s wealth and social class by knowledge of whether 
they come from an urban or rural background was used on me personally when Tacana people 
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wanted to find out something about me. One day, for example, a Tacana woman asked “do you 
have family who live in the country-side?” It took me a moment to recognize that she was trying to 
understand my social class status: was I poor, rich, middle-class? She had obviously already come to 
the conclusion that though I might be ‘poor’ in my own country, I was still ‘better-off’ than anyone 
from the countryside here in Bolivia. Yet, if I had relatives in el campo, then there was no doubt that 
I came from a poor background, whatever this might mean in my country. That this was indeed her 
assumption was reaffirmed by her subsequent question, asking if in el campo in my country we still 
cooked with wood (con leña) or had by now acquired the means to cook with gas. Throughout this 
entire conversation, she stood firmly next to her own gas stove whose shiny white enamel was in 
impressive contrast to the surroundings of jungle brush, the red packed clay and four red-bricks it 
sat on, and the corrugated tin roof under which we and it stood, not to mention the kitchen house 
build of wood planks and a jatata-roof next to us. For the entire time I was in awe at how she had 
managed to transport the large Western kitchen gadget out here to Carmen Florida in the jungle. 
Undoubtedly it must have been transported in a peque-peque boat (carved from a single tree trunk) 
from Rurrenabaque, against the current. She was demonstrating that while she was from ‘el campo’, 
she was better off than others in the comunidad.  
Besides signifying poverty, being from el campo (specifically comunidades) is also associated 
with certain ways of understanding and knowing (saber) which are specifically Tacana. The focus 
here is on understanding the hardship involved in living in the jungle and ‘knowing’ to value this.  It 
is understood that not all Tacana people ‘know’ how to live in the comunidades. Marie-Luz living in 
Rurrenabaque with her children told me that her daughter, still a toddler, “did not like” (no le gusta) 
staying in the comunidad of Carmen Florida, because she did not ‘know’ how to live there.  
She prefers to stay in the pueblo. In the comunidad …she cries a lot – there are mosquitos, 
bugs which bite. She does not like it. She doesn’t know (laughs). She does not know how to 
live there. 
Being from el campo means one ‘knows’ certain essential things associated with this sort of 
life. One knows how to drink chicha and chew coca leaves; one knows that the standard of living 
here is higher because it is less hectic, simpler and prettier (mas bonito); and one eats a higher 
quality food (comida criollo). It also means that one ‘understands’ how to work (se sabe trabajar). 
Living in comunidades signals harsh and difficult physical labour on the fields. Working the land is 
the only real ‘work’ (trabajo) there is and any sort of alternative occupation is not regarded as work. 
Alejandro from Carmen Florida told me that his son “does not work”. This puzzled me for a while as 
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I saw him frequently helping out on the field on the weekends and working as a motor-taxi driver69 
during the week in Rurrenabaque. “He has a bad back,” Alejandro explained to me one day, “so I 
saved and bought him a motorcycle so he could live in Rurrenabaque”.  
This chapter has focussed on what it means to be ‘Tacana’ to Tacana people, although they 
do not themselves label this collective identity as ‘Tacana’. Indeed, picking out or establishing 
‘Tacana indigeneity’ from that which is not ‘Tacana’, may be impossible. Tacana people of this study 
sense a strong affiliation with being cambas and to making up part of Bolivia’s highland-lowland 
regionalism. To better understand this, the following chapter concentrates on the trajectory of 
highland-lowland regionalism in Bolivia and situates Tacana people within that context.   
 
 
                                                          
69 The majority of taxis in Rurrenabaque are motorbikes 
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Chapter 3 - The Crude Camba of the Amazon and the Genteel 
Camba of Santa Cruz– Setting the Grounds for Regionalisms 
 
When Rolando, Silvia’s husband, visits his parents and siblings in his birth-place, the Tacana 
comunidad of Villa Alcira, he not only crosses the Beni River - a five-minute journey by boat - but 
also the line dividing the department of Beni from that of La Paz. To many Tacana this legal boundary 
has only begun to become significant recently, with the legal formation of indigenous land-tenures 
(TCOs) and the increasingly charged regional relations between highland and lowland departments 
under President Evo Morales.  
Though it reaches far into the Amazonian lowlands, La Paz is considered a highland 
department, with the department of Beni being its long-time lowland rival. It is significant that the 
department of La Paz, houses the seat of government and thus funding for infrastructural and social 
projects is heavily concentrated here. Importantly for Tacana people, this funding spreads into the 
rural peripheries and the province of Iturralde, where Tacana people reside and where the TCO 
Tacana I is located. When Evo Morales fought his first successful presidential election, he won in the 
department of La Paz but lost on the other side of the Beni River in the department of Beni. Similarly, 
while President Morales MAS party lost in the municipal elections of Rurrenabaque (which is in the 
department of Beni), it won a two-minute boat-ride away across the river in San Buenaventura (in 
the department of La Paz). Given that both towns share the same type of population these voting 
outcomes demonstrate how political parties cater to vulnerable groups such as Tacana people in 
comunidades, to secure their votes. Economically and politically weak groups, such as indigenous 
groups, have always been pulled into regional politics and solicited to collaborate with political 
bodies such as the state, municipalities and, more recently, the platform of the indigenous 
movement. In Bolivia’s case these voting outcomes are an indicator of highland-lowland regionalism 
and the stark divide which exists between highland and lowland departments.  
This chapter sketches the historical roots of highland-lowland regionalism in Bolivia, which 
go back to the first Spanish settlements predating the formation of Bolivia as a nation-state in 1825. 
It highlights key moments in Bolivia’s history which laid the grounds for highland-lowland 
regionalism. To this end, it first traces Bolivia’s departmental formations, marked by the conflictive 
power-struggles between the La Paz and Santa Cruz elites; and then the different lowland 
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departments’ ongoing aspirations for more state autonomy. It then describes how these 
circumstances have brought about the creation of a distinct lowland ‘identity’ (camba), which is 
rooted in the various constellations and relationships between the different settlers and inhabitants 
of the lowlands. Camba-ness is re-divided in accordance with lowland region (Amazon and Plains), 
which is linked to class situations. Tacana people have been included in the colonial socio-racial class 
system in a new way since the Chaco War, which brought about a Bolivian middle-class. In the 
representation of what it means to be camba, the Amazon region takes a back seat in relation to 
Santa Cruz, which functions as spokesperson. This perpetuates the position which the Amazon has 
played in the history of Bolivia, as less important and ‘forgotten’.  
 ‘El Oriente’ - Santa Cruz as the Representative of the Bolivian lowlands  
Santa Cruz is often referred to as El Oriente (the East) due to its geographical location in 
relation to La Paz. It is usually taken as representative of all the lowlands, even those not located in 
the east but in the north, such as Beni, the other Amazonian department of Pando and the province 
of Iturralde. This allusion demonstrates not only the extent of Santa Cruz’ political and social power 
but also the traditional disregard for Bolivia’s other lowland departments. However, the historical 
and social trajectories of Santa Cruz and the Amazon departments vary significantly. They were 
influenced in particular by the types of white people who settled in the different regions and the 
relations these built with each other, with indigenous groups and with the state, eventually 
contributing to the formation of a common regional camba identity and particular social classes. 
While laying out this social history, this chapter will explore the position of local indigenous groups 
and, in particular, the Tacana whose origins lay in the ‘empty’ Amazon regions. Understanding these 
social dynamics will lead to an understanding of how and why regionalist animosities are 
increasingly channelled towards Aymara/Quechua migrants (colonos) who settle in the lowlands.  
The political and economic focus of the lowlands is usually on the wetlands and prairies 
(llanos) of the Beni region, and thus often disregards people who live in its forested areas. The plains 
encompass the region’s main economic activity, cattle-ranching, which is traditionally dominated by 
a strong mestizo minority. In the context of regionalism, Santa Cruz and its white/mestizo élite is 
usually taken as representative of all the Bolivian lowlands (e.g. Fabricant and Gustafson 2011; 
Kirshner 2010; Van Cott 2005 et al). This is particularly the case for the campaign on state autonomy, 
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brought to the forefront in two referendums in January 2005 and January 200870 which were 
initiated by Santa Cruz’ Civic Committee (Assies 2006).  
Santa Cruz, as one of the earliest criollo71 settlements in South America, has been one of the 
main locations for government resettlement programmes throughout the centuries. Resettlement 
was intense after the 1953 land revolution and specifically in the early 1980s, when groups from the 
highlands were encouraged by USA-planned and -financed settlement programmes to resettle in 
the lowlands (Fifer 1982; Painter 1988; Stearman 1985). Santa Cruz’ growing mestizo middle class, 
in particular, has seen these programmes as government encroachment and imposition of 
indigenous highland culture on their territory and culture, in an act of colonization and 
demonstration of power (see Waldmann 2008). Santa Cruz groups speak of ‘internal colonialism’, 
while treating their own political movement as an ethnic one (Centellas 2010; Soruco, Plata and 
Medeiros 2008). Though a particular issue at present, Santa Cruz’ modern autonomy movement 
dates to 2003, when the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (Comité pro Santa Cruz - CPSC) put forward a 
manifesto which proposed to ‘reorganize’ the country in line with issues relevant to the Bolivian 
lowlands (ibid). Since then these groups demanding autonomy (as the CPCS) have staged a series of 
events and ‘celebrations’ of the region’s own camba and more specifically Cruzeño (Peña Claros 
2010) ‘way of being’, looking to set themselves apart from that which is colla (see ibid; Fabricant 
2012, 2009). In their demands for autonomy, Cruzeños petition for more control over immigration 
into their department, more influence on land redistribution measures and more departmental 
revenue from their natural resources, particularly their gas reserves (Assies 2006).  
The debate around autonomy can be traced back to 1825, when Bolivia was formed, and is 
connected to how Santa Cruz was incorporated into the new state at that date. Though most visible 
in the call for more autonomy, Santa Cruz is neither the only department to want this, nor 
necessarily representative of other departments. In the literature on the autonomy debate, the 
importance of the initial settlement patterns of the different groups and class distinctions between 
different white/mestizo groups in different lowland areas of Bolivia is widely overlooked (see for 
example Soruco, Plata, Mendeiros 2008; Painter 1988; Stearman 1985). Differences between the 
Amazon region and Santa Cruz are rooted in the affiliations which white/mestizo social-class groups 
                                                          
70 Though planned for 4th May 2008 the referendum was held on 25th January 2009, after it had been 
postponed several times due to conflicts. 
71 Criollos is the term for people of Spanish decent who were born in Latin America 
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have had with the natives. The impact of these distinctions gained particular visibility during key 
historical moments. Such are the rubber boom (beginning with the late 1800s) and the contexts of 
rubber barracas which shaped a relationship between mestizos and indians unique to the Amazon 
(Vallve 2010). The Chaco War (1932) which brought about the formation of a middle class; and, 
more recently, as a result of key decentralization changes as the 1994 Popular Participation Law 
(LPP – Ley de Participación Popular) which granted rural municipalities democratic political 
participation which pro-actively included indigenous groups. Historically, economic growth and 
class-formation did not take the same route in the Amazon region as it did in Santa Cruz or La Paz. 
The Establishment of Provinces and Departments in Bolivia 
The origin of Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism lies in the struggle for power between 
two politically independent and geographically separate settlements of Spanish/criollo élite groups. 
While the highlander oligarchy came from a mining élite, the lowland élite were landed gentry who 
had their base in agriculture and cattle farming, and whose economic fortunes had been 
reinvigorated by the 19th century rubber boom (Molina et al. 2008; Painter 1988). Many of Bolivia’s 
state departments already existed as independent provinces and political entities long before the 
country was created in 1825. This was the case for both Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz de la Sierra), 
established in 1561, and La Paz (Nuestra Señora de La Paz) established in 154872. Other Bolivian 
areas which are state departments today were originally the unexplored backlands of these two 
main departments, which were the country’s political hubs. The Amazonian departments of Pando, 
Beni and the provinces of northern La Paz were insignificant in the political landscape of Bolivia. 
Upon the founding of Bolivia as an independent nation, provinces were tailored into state 
departments and received ‘updated’ foundation dates. In all, this creates the confusing situation of 
towns and departments having numerous dates of foundation depending on which time-era one is 
looking at.  
Retracing the history of different Bolivian regions is confusing as vast provinces which were 
established upon arrival of the Spanish, were, after Bolivia was reformed as a nation state, resized 
with only some parts retaining the original name. The Amazonian part of Bolivia was named Mojos 
(or Moxos) by the first Spaniards73 and initially included the vast plains between the Amazon and 
                                                          
72 Today Santa Cruz still only celebrates its original date of foundation, February 26, 1561.  
73 For an elaboration on possible origins of the term ‘Mojos’, see Chávez Suárez 1944 
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Pilcomayo Rivers which are today divided between Brazil (Acre State) and Paraguay. Under the 
Audiencia of Charcas (1559), a political division was made between Mojos and the ‘Land of the 
Chunchos’74 (Van Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010; Machicao Gámez 1990; Chávez Suárez 1944)75. In 1825, 
Chunchos came to be known as Apolobamba or Caupolicán76 (see Ballesteros 1901). Though 
reduced in size Mojos was initially kept as a region name after 1825 with Santa Cruz as its capital. In 
1842, in an effort to undercut Santa Cruz’ political power, Mojos was consolidated into a separate 
department named Beni. The new department was named after the Beni River which also served as 
its western boundary with the area of Apolobamba or Caupolicán. Today the term ‘Mojos’ is still 
used to refer to the Great Plains within the department of Beni.  
As part of Bolivia’s regionalist debate, there has been ongoing discussion over whether to 
re-divide the state departments so that their constituent regions are more closely related in terms 
of their geography, climate, culture and state of development (Roca 2008). Though the province of 
Iturralde,77 which encompasses Tacana territory, is part of the department of La Paz, culturally and 
historically its people have more in common with the departments of Beni and Pando. The first 
phase of departmental re-division went hand in hand with the introduction of the highland-lowland 
conflict shortly after the nation was formed in 1825.     
Upon the formation of the Bolivian nation-state there was an official understanding that no 
department should gain so much power as to vastly overshadow others (Ballesteros 1899b). Yet the 
regional political élites, faithful to their specific regions, continually sought for territory to be added 
to their department or, if this was not possible, to stymie the other departments’ own attempts to 
annex land. Motives needed to be convincingly argued before parliament in which possible private 
interests, for which the criollo élite was notorious, were omitted in favour of eloquent 
proclamations of the ‘good of the nation’ (Klein 1969; Ballesteros 1899b). The fate of Caupolicán, 
home of the ‘Tacana Nation’, was decided during one particular parliamentary session in which the 
La Paz and Santa Cruz élites struggled to gain power over the region’s rich resources. Sixto 
                                                          
74 Chunchos is a Quechua term coined by the Incas and adopted by the Spaniards. It is a derogatory word for 
Amazonian peoples; the Amazonian area at the foothills of the Andes was also termed ‘the Nation of the 
Chunchos’. 
75 Also see previous chapter. 
76 While Apolobamba refers to the Missions of Apolobamba and is a term introduced by the church 
authorities who first settled in the region, the name Caupolicán is coined by the state as personified by 
Simon Bolívar upon the formation of the state in 1825. 
77 According to a national census the population of Iturralde in 2007 was 15,000. 
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Ballesteros, a highland representative and the influential mayor of La Paz, aiming to weaken the 
reactionary Santa Cruz élite, successfully argued that the region should switch from the jurisdiction 
of Santa Cruz to that of La Paz. Once this switch became official in 1856, goods from the area came 
through the capital rather than Santa Cruz (ibid). Today the region is still part of La Paz and forms 
the province Iturralde.  
Although Santa Cruz does not represent the opinion or history of the entire lowland region, 
most lowland departments want more state autonomy. Across the river from San Buenaventura (La 
Paz) the inhabitants of Rurrenabaque (Beni), harbour an emotional longing for more state 
recognition which they believe they would gain from departmental autonomy. Antonio Takussi of 
Rurrenabaque, whose grandfather immigrated to the Amazon region from Japan at the turn of the 
century, voices his political stance, revealing an attitude towards the current government that is 
representative of many inhabitants of the region. 
We want to be autonomous. We believe in our customs. For the customs in the life of the 
west (Bolivian Andes) – La Paz, Potosi… are not like ours. We see life differently. You can’t 
make a law in La Paz which counts for all the country. For this reason we are fighting… for 
autonomy. For Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, Tarija, for example. It’s different what they (in the 
Andes) say, what they eat, their environment, everything. (…) That president who we have 
now… he does not want autonomy. (….) Autonomy is about federalism. As it is also in Brazil, 
the United States, Germany – this is how they do it as well. They make their own laws… The 
government would not lose its powers over the country.78 
 
Antonio’s words uncannily echo the argument uttered more than one hundred years earlier 
on October 2 1900 by Sixto Ballesteros. Although his aim may have been to keep Caupolicán from 
falling into the hands of the lowland élite, Ballesteros laid out his arguments on the basis of ‘needs’, 
as does Antonio years later.  
 
These (Amazonian) regions which are so different from our own (Andean regions) should 
have laws specific and in accordance with their own nature.  It is an axiom of the social 
sciences that one cannot nor should apply the same rule and the same administration to 
                                                          
78 ‘Nosotros queríamos ser autónomos. Nosotros creamos…por nuestra costumbre. Porque la costumbre en 
la vida del Occidente, o La Paz, o puro Potosí…no es igual a los de nosotros. Nosotros veamos el asunto de la 
vida diferente. No puede hacerse una ley en La Paz que sea para todo el país. Por eso estamos 
peleando…por la autonomía. Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, Tarija, por ejemplo. (…) Es distinta que lo dicen, lo que 
comen, su ambiente, todo. (…) Este presidente que tenemos…no quería autonomía. (…) (Autonomía) Es un 
asunto de federalismo. Como se maneja Brasil, Estado Unidos, Alemania maneja todo esto también. Hagan 
sus propias leyes… El gobierno no pierde el poder ante todo el país.’ 
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people and places whose nature and individual and general way of being, is all around 
different. (Ballesteros 1899b:5)79 [My translation] 
 
  
One might ask what happened between one hundred years ago and now: since 1825, 
regionalism has continuously increased rather than subsiding. The implementation of a federal 
government system might have prevented today’s deeply conflictive regionalism and, considering 
that the state-founders recognized from early on that this type of system would serve Bolivia well, 
why was it not implemented? Indeed, before the formation of the state, the provinces had signed a 
pact for the implementation of a federalist system of states making up the Bolivian Republic. But 
the criollos of Charcas (Potosi) together with Simon Bolívar hindered this and, against the 
recommendation of the lowland provinces, the state-founders established a centralist form of 
government (Stearman 1985; Roca 2007). In fact, this decision was taken in the context of regionalist 
struggles for more control and influenced by the brutal consequences of the federalist-provoked 
civil war (1812-1814) in New Granada (today’s Colombia) which the state-founders had recently 
witnessed. They saw it as their duty to overrule the consensus for a federalist system and to 
implement a centralist one instead, convinced that this was the only ‘secure source of happiness for 
a lasting peace and social union’ (República de Bolivia 1926:57 quoted in Roca 2007).   
The criollo élite of Santa Cruz would never be at rest with this decision. The fact that their 
region had become part of Bolivia at all took them by surprise. When discussions were underway in 
the 1800s over the regional annexation of provinces, Santa Cruz sent a delegation to represent the 
region’s interests to the Audience of Buenos Aires, under whose jurisdiction it had lain since 1778. 
But when the Assembly of Provinces of Upper Peru met in La Paz in 1825 to form the Bolivian state, 
it unexpectedly annexed the Mojos region, of which Santa Cruz was the capital, to Bolivia. As this 
had not been anticipated by Santa Cruz they had not sent a delegation to represent their interests 
and were thus overruled (Painter 1988; Heath et al 1969; Stearman 1976; Finot 1939). Though now 
tied to a strong Andean government seat, the Bolivian Amazon had previously had greater affiliation 
and closer relations with neighbouring countries’ Great Plains and Amazonian regions (Molina et al 
2008) a situation which after country formation (1825) became enhanced as during the growth of 
                                                          
79 ‘Esas regiones por lo mismo que son distintas el todo de las nuestras, deben tener leyes expresas, 
adecuadas, peculiares á su naturaleza. Es un axioma de la ciencia política que no puede ni debe aplicarse el 
mismo régimen, la misma administración á pueblos y lugares cuya índole, cuyo modo de ser individual y 
colectivamente considerados, son del todo distintos’ (Ballesteros 1899:5) 
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the rubber market in which “Bolivian rubber workers … were more in touch with Manaus or Belem 
than La Paz or Sucre economically, socially, and, to a certain extent, culturally” (Vallve 2010: 25). 
Bolivia’s Amazon region, divided at various times into separate departments and then partly 
again into provinces, has always remained on the fringe of political and economic state integration. 
Adding to this complexity of divisions and re-divisions is that Bolivian departments, being vast, can 
easily incorporate different climactic and environmental zones. Thus both the Beni province Vaca 
Diez and a part of the province of José Ballivián in which Rurrenabaque and many Tacana 
comunidades are situated are characterised by tropical rainforest. In contrast, most of the rest of 
the state of Beni is marked by prairies and wetlands. These natural markers influence the central 
economy of the area, large-scale cattle-ranching. This economy was initiated and nurtured by the 
Jesuits until their expulsion in 1767 and then revitalized by central élite figures such as the rubber 
baron Nicolás Suárez and his Casa Suárez in the 1940s, after the hights of the rubber economy were 
coming to an end (Rojas Ortuste et al 2000; Carvalho Urey 1978).  
Nicolas Suárez and his famous rubber empire shaped the Bolivian lowlands and its social-
political development and in this context, also regionalism. At the time the “exploitation of 
indigenous labor … could be justified as a general trend towards overcoming ‘savagery’ and a step 
towards civilizing indigenous peoples through work” (Vallve 2010: 23). Even today the rubber-boom 
and the central role which Suárez played in the resettlement, enslavement and brutal treatment of 
Amazonian indigenous groups, is still viewed very uncritically in Bolivia. The rubber economy altered 
the entire ethnic map of Amazonian Bolivia and changed ethnic groups entirely (Valen 2013; Vallve 
2010). For the Tacana community in Bolivia the rubber industry marks the largest turning point in 
their history after missionization. It split the Tacana community of Iturralde and introduced them 
into the economy of the state-system (Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005; Wentzel 1989). Tacana who were 
settled into barracas in Pando from La Paz were involved in the rubber industry as rubber-tappers 
where they served as ‘brazos’ (arms, meaning unskilled labour) alongside other Amazoninan 
between the late 1800s, until its crash in the mid 1980s (ibid; Bathurst 2006).  
Despite this history, today Nicolas Suárez is regarded as an important person in the past 
development of the region. Streets and buildings are uncritically named after him. From the 
perspective of those mestizos in Rurrenabaqe who feel that the government neglected the Amazon, 
Suárez, was a private but nevertheless beneficial entrepreneur in the Amazon who looked to 
buttress his rubber imperium and ‘civilize’ the region (Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010). For this he had 
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taken on nation-building responsibilities. Suárez financed and set up private armies to defend 
country borders; he also constructed schools whose curricula emphasised patriotism and hostility 
towards neighbouring countries such as Brazil and Chile, both of which had taken possession of 
Bolivian territory (Fifer 1970).  
Despite early attepts by the Hispanic to conquer the Amazon region, predominantly in 
attempts to find the ‘Great Paititi’, an infamous store of Inca gold, the Amazon did not become 
central to Bolivia. A situation which only changed later with the rise of the rubber boom in the late 
1800s. A number of attempts were made by the Spanish and criollo élite to explore and settle in the 
region (Ballesteros 1899b; Chávez Suárez 1944). Ultimately, however, the Europeans who 
successfully managed this were not the rich criollo élite but Jesuit and Franciscan clergy. 
Non-Indigenous Settlers of the Amazon and Santa Cruz – The Crude Camba vs. the Genteel 
Camba 
The first Europeans to settle in the Amazonian region of Apolobamba (or Caupolicán), today 
Bolivia’s western Amazon region, were Franciscan friars looking to set up missions. Any attempts by 
Spanish conquerors to colonize the region had been successfully thwarted by the local indigenous 
peoples (Ballesteros 1899b). Importantly, settlement of this area stands in contrast to that of the 
Andes and Santa Cruz. These places had been colonized by wealthy aristocratic gentry from the 
earliest period of Spanish occupation (Painter 1988). However, the Amazon became settled by a 
different European social socio-economic class. This had as a consequence that the relationship 
which was built with indians by the white settlers of the Amazon differed from the relationship 
which white settlers built with indian groups in Santa Cruz. This is aspect is central in Bolivia’s 
regionalism and for understanding in what ways the regions developed distinct social relations 
between its inhabitants.   
The first Europeans to settle in the Amazon did not primarily focus on systematic large-scale 
resource exploitation in the way that those living in the highlands did, with the mining industry and 
large-scale ranching and farming. Most the white/mestizo Amazon settlers (apart from the clergy) 
were not the creole elite of Santa Cruz (Zavaleta 2009). They were individuals and small groups who 
settled among or in close vicinity of native population. They lived in together in settlements as the 
rubber barracas (Vallvé 2010), indigenous comunidades or small towns, as Rurrenabaque (which did 
not necessarily have more inhabitants than comunidades). This settlement pattern had significant 
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influence on how whites/mestizos developed a relationship with local indians (Zavaleta 2009). All of 
these settlement types – barracas, comunidades and towns – followed a clear racial hierarchy in 
which white was on top and indian was on the bottom (also Vallvé 2010:25). Thus relationship 
between the two geographical ‘groups’ of Santa Cruz and the Amazon developed differently. As a 
rule the élite of Santa Cruz was an urban group. They governed their estates and business which lay 
in the country sides not through their direct presence but from afar (Klein 1969)80.  
In this way the city represented the place of the upper-class society. In the towns the criollos 
made up the élite society, the so-called vecinos and gente. These were the members of the social 
clubs of Santa Cruz, such as the September 24th Club which still exists today81 (Painter 1988). Rubber 
baron Nicolàs Suàrez was an exception to this. He lived not in the city but rather in the midst of his 
rubber empire in ‘Cachuela de Esperanza’, a settlement he founded in the far northern region of 
Bolivia. However, his family mainly remained in Santa Cruz (Waldmann 2008; Fifer 1972). Important 
in the development of regional identities which is based in the social relations of the different socio-
ethnic groups in one region, the criollos of Santa Cruz exploited the indians with minimum personal 
contact. ‘Their’ indians worked underground in the mines, or on the huge rubber areas or large 
estate haciendas controlled by overseers. Their direct interaction with indians was limited to 
isolated individuals present in their homes as cooks, nannies and gardeners.  
In contrast, those who settled in the jungle and wet-lands of Mojos lived alongside indians 
often also incorporating them into a debt-peonage system of their haciendas (large scale cattle-
ranching) (Vallvé 2014). Predominantly Europeans and Asians merchants settled in Rurrenabaque, 
and European famlilies settled alongside Tacana people in Tumupasa.  In comparison to the elite of 
Santa Cruz and furthermore vulnerable to state policy which dictated land distribution, they were 
only on a slightly higher economic scale than the indian peons who worked for them. In the 
Amazonian settlements of Rurrenabaque and Tumupasa, white/mestizo patrónes took Tacana 
wives, marrying into the comunidad and creating mestizo offspring (see chapter 4). Thus, unlike the 
by now infamous oligarchy of Santa Cruz and to a much lesser extent that of Beni (Gasca et al 1964), 
the mestizos in jungle regions such as Rurrenabaque could they count themselves part of the 
                                                          
80 For more on frontier settlement patterns and their impact on the political development of Bolivia see also 
Fifer (1982)  
81 Named for the date September 24 1810, which marks Santa Cruz’ first attempt at independence from 
Spain. 
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regional or national oligarchy even if they wished. The white settlers in the Amazon did not make 
up the part of Bolivia’s criollo élite. 
Rurrenabaque’s surnames attest to this. There are famous surnames in Bolivia which speak 
of important and powerful positions in the state (Waldmann 2008). They belong to families who 
made up the high society of central Bolivian towns such as Cochabamba and Santa Cruz (Soruco et 
al 2008). In contrast the surnames of the mestizos of Rurrenabaque tell of small-scale merchants, of 
livelihood-seeking immigrants from Japan, Germany, Switzerland and Turkey who looked for a 
better life across the ocean shortly before the turn of the 20th century. They settled here to cater to 
local markets. When the markets changed over time the merchants made adjustments. 
Rurrenabaque, was originally a river-port which served as a resting place for travellers with goods 
making their way into the rubber region up north. Accordingly its original name was ‘Puerto Viejo’ 
(Old Port).  
Antonio Takussi’s father settled in Rurrenabaque having come up the Beni River from 
Riberalta, famous for its large Japanese settlement. He specialized in pig-farming. In the 1960’s his 
son, Antonio, was to specialize in the trade of animal hides, especially those of the small wild boar 
(Jochi) who roam the jungle in large herds, but also of armadillo, tapir and jaguars. Before 
Rurrenabaque became La Perla del Beni (The Pearl of the Beni) of today, as a washed-out sign at the 
entrance of town announces in declaration of its touristic significance, it was popular in the 1970s 
and 80s for holiday-makers from national urban areas looking to enjoy game-hunting and fishing.  
The local élite in the municipalities of Rurrenabaque and Ixiamas were not considered to be 
part of the high criollo/mestizo Bolivian society, to which the House of Suárez (Fifer 1973) belonged. 
Rather their relative power and prestige occurred on a more local level. This sheds light on why 
many patrónes did not leave ‘their’ comunidades after the land reform of 1953. They would lose the 
high status they enjoyed. In the cities they would be one more impoverished mestizo among many 
from the rural lowlands, with the additional stigma of being from the Amazonian hinterlands.  
Today’s Benianos (people from Beni) have the somewhat negative reputation of being the 
offspring of the former ranch-help of the haciendas of the more criollo Cruzeños (people from Santa 
Cruz). Bolivian Anthropologist, Waldmann, who originates in Santa Cruz, writes: 
The Beniano is vain and arrogant. (…) The genteel camba has his centre here (in Santa Cruz) 
and from here he did his business. (…) (The Beniano) is arrogant because they went to the 
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Beni and from there to Europe. Because in the Beni was the House of Suárez, with which it 
was easy to find employment (i.e. achieve wealth). (…) Obviously there are those who have 
money, but their manner has not changed. The Beniano is yellow (i.e. racially mixed). His 
voice is cruder. (Waldmann 2008:47) [Translation my own] 
 
For all their lives, because they are the children of cattle-ranchers and ranching is a brutal 
business, their manners are brutish. Since childhood they have been looking after their 
cattle, so their way of relating is either directly from person to animal or from animal to 
animal. (Waldmann 2008:47) [Translation my own] 
 
Historically white/mestizo Benianos are looked down upon by Cruzeño society. The deciding 
factor here is upbringing (educación) which in turn is tied to family roots. Mestizo Benianos have the 
reputation of being ‘crude country folk’. This is something which the Benianos resent and which can 
be a topic of evening conversation in Rurrenabaque. The poor lowland mestizos made up the original 
cambas. Camba is a derivation of a derogatory Guaraní word, first reserved for indian ranch-help 
and later expanded to include poor mestizo ranch-help (see Waldmann 2008, Assies 2006). The term 
camba has since been proudly reclaimed by all lowlanders as a cultural category, as elaborated in 
the next chapter. The inhabitants of Rurrenabaque who today claim a proud camba affiliation, also 
make up part of Bolivia’s middle class. 
A Bolivian Middle Class Emerges – The Chaco War (1932-1935) 
The Chaco War (1932-35) played a significant role in the solidification regional patriotism 
and aggravating animosities between the highlands and lowlands (Rojas Ortuste & Albó 2009). It 
also helped establish a Bolivian middle class. During the war especially indian and mestizo lives were 
lost fighting against Paraguay, for it was they who had been sent to by the political oligarchical to 
wage the war (Klein 1969, Stearman 1985). The main conflict of the war centred on oil concessions 
which the US Standard Oil Company had under its jurisdiction in Bolivia and over which Paraguay 
sought to gain control. In reaction the Bolivian oligarchy sent its peasantry and service sector (e.g. 
teachers, merchants, domestic workers, policemen and other public employees) to its defence. 
Importantly, in the years prior to the war this sector had been expanding into a mestizo urban 
middle class, forming a body of votes which supported continuation of the caudillo system82. After 
the war and furious with the ruling élite this emerging middle class began creating their own political 
platforms and parties (Rojas Ortuste & Albó 2009; Rojas Ortuste 1994; Klein 1969). As was congruent 
                                                          
82 The rule by transitional governments, often military leaders, after the wars of independence in Latin 
American countries. 
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to the international political climate many of these movements and parties incorporated a left-wing 
Marxist rhetoric. The War had brought to the surface the divergence of interest between the middle 
class and the élite (ibid). 
The Chaco War had called attention to the miserable situation of the indians, to whom many 
in the new middle class were tied by kinship. Due mainly to the distance, not many Amazonian 
indians had been sent to participate in the War (Rojas Ortuste & Albó 2009; Rojas Ortuste 1994). 
However, just to what extent people from the Amazon were involved is hard to trace, as 
documentation on peoples’ ethnic affiliation is often limited to the Aymara and Quechua people 
(ibid). According to Beni historian Pinto Parada (1978), however, criollo/white lowlanders were 
eager to join the Chaco War and once at the front joined specifically established ‘lowland regiments’. 
Rubber baron Nicolás Suárez, the central quasi-governmental figure in the northern Amazon region 
of Territorio Nacionál de Colonias (Pinto Parada 1978), formed in 190383, dispatched a number of 
‘his’ young rubber collectors, many Tacana, to the Chaco War (Parada 1978). With this action he 
strategically demonstrated his allegiance to the government which in this time had been leaving him 
relatively free reign of the region.  
His action was also significant in that he collaborated with the central government, 
demonstrating his allegiance and patriotism to a country which did not attribute much importance 
to the Amazon, and in doing so turned a cold shoulder to the separatist faction of Santa Cruz. As 
their town had played a leading role in revolts against the government in the time leading up to the 
Chaco War, Cruzeños were prohibited from joining lowland regiments or taking up political posts – 
a security measure taken for fear that Santa Cruz would join forces with Paraguay against Bolivia 
(Painter 1988 citing Heath et al 1969, Stearman 1976).   
Overall, combatants from the Amazon were much welcomed in the war, as they were better 
able to cope with the tropical climate at the front than were highlanders. The central problem was 
how to transport the ‘recruits’ from the north to the east of Bolivia, without their tiring, becoming 
ill or dying before they reached their destination (Pinto Parada 1978). In all its brutality the Chaco 
War helped to build on the already present regionalist animosities while also, importantly, binding 
together lowlanders across the racial divide. Indeed, highland/lowland regionalism became waged 
on the battlefield (Toranzo Roca 2008). As one lowland veteran explained, instead of having one 
                                                          
83 (Camacho 1903) 
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enemy, they had two: the Paraguayans and the highlanders. Highlanders, bored and disillusioned 
with the war, made it a sport to defame lowlanders by declaring them spies and shooting them. 
(Heath et al 1959 quoted in Stearman, 1985).  
Significantly for the Tacana people, large- and small-scale patrónes who dispatched ‘their’ 
rubber collectors to the War in return suspended all their debts, freeing them of the enganche84 
scheme which bound them to the patrón for life. The patrón of the comunidad Buena Vista, too, 
sent a number of ‘his’ peons to fight in the War; indeed, most of the Tacana comunidades I visited 
have their Chaco War stories and veterans. Returning home as war heroes some Tacana people, 
such as Constantino from Buena Vista, told me that it was then that they were ‘free’. Legally, 
however, peasants were not immediately ‘free’, being still under the jurisdiction of oppressive land 
laws. However, the political climate in Bolivia had changed and the way became clear for a politics 
which took peasants’ rights into consideration. In 1952 the Party (Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario – (Revolutionary National Movement, MNR) came to power. The MNR was to 
introduce a ground-breaking land-reform in favour of the peasants. Its leaders had already 
influenced legislation on their behalf long before the party was formed, and pushed through indian 
suffrage and land ownership in 1953 (Klein 1969).  
Both the northern Amazonian region and Santa Cruz are traditional MNR supporters. The 
MNR, as a ‘people’s party’, specifically looked to break up the mining oligarchy (Klein 1969) and this 
gave it the taint of a pro-lowland party. Its platform was relevant for the inhabitants of the Amazon, 
home to many indians in peonage but also mestizos of the new middle class. Though years of 
dictatorship separate the establishment of the MNR from its present political platform many Tacana 
today still fiercely support this party. Today the MNR is considered a right-wing party and an 
opposition to President Morales’ left pro-indigenous MNR party.  
 
                                                          
84 The term used for debt-peonage in the Amazon. This is a cash-advancement system that resulted in a 
form of slavery and which could be passed on from one generation to the next. See also Coimbra (1946). 
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Image 19: Depiction of the Media Luna by the right-wing group Nación Camba Source: 
http://sucre.indymedia.org/es/2005/08/21187.shtml (accessed 5.6.2013) 
 
The Cruzeño élite supported the newly established MNR, even holding a short revolt in its 
name right after the Chaco War (Painter 1988 citing Gill 1987, and Heath 1969). In contrast to the 
Amazonian north, however, the Santa Cruz élite strongly opposed the MNR’s programme for 
suffrage and land-ownership for the indians which partly led to them disassociating themselves from 
the party (ibid). After the Chaco War, and in the early 1950s, the right-wing Comité Cívico (Civic 
Committee) of Santa Cruz emerged and formed the Cruzeños’ most vocal representative group and 
perpetuating steady continuation of a regionalist divide between La Paz and Santa Cruz but also 
Santa Cruz and the Amazon. Many of its members later became the supporters of the current right-
wing group Nación Camba (Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación - MNCL) founded in 2001. 
Today the Nación Camba pledges complete state autonomy, as understood by a secessionist 
movement. It declares on its website: 
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It is our aspiration to create our own state, based on our own culture and history. We, the 
Nación Camba, and its instrument the Moviemiento Nacion Cambade Liberación, will be 
WHAT WE WANT TO BE and not what OTHERS WANT US TO BE. 85 [My translation] 
Santa Cruz continuously expanded its anti-highland sentiment, and attributed to it an 
increasingly racial twist by using the cultural (and thus racial) difference between highland cultures 
(colla) as tied to the Aymara and Quechua people and camba (lowland) cultures as a main argument 
in its platform (see also Waldmann 2008; also chapter 4) (see image 19 above). At the same time 
representatives of the Nación Camba utilize ‘their’ local indigenous groups, such as the Guaraní, 
into the Cruzeño political cause and identity construction to make the point that their politics are 
not white-supremacist or racist (Fabricant 2012, 2009; Plata et al 2008).  
The ‘Forgotten’ Amazon in Bolivia Today 
If Santa Cruz was distanced from the centre of power when the state of Bolivia was formed, 
the image of the Amazon was that it is farther still, in addition to being ‘wild’ and ‘empty’. Indeed, 
through the years the tropical departments (Beni and Pando) have come to be known as the 
‘forgotten departments’ (los departamentos olivdados) (Molina, Vargas y Soruco 2008). As 
mentioned above, from the earliest days of the republic there has been insufficient government 
representation of the Amazonian region. While the government has never looked to ‘correct’ this 
and take measures to tie in the north with the central highland economy. It has sought to keep a 
firm grip on the region’s production outputs, especially during the rubber boom (Osborn 1968; 
Molina, et al 2008b). Crops and output of the cattle farms in the departments of La Paz and Beni 
were shipped north to maintain the workers in the rubber regions, making this part of the country 
self-sustainable while at the same in the hands of private companies, especially rubber barons such 
as Nicolás Suárez (see also Vallvé 2010). Juanita remembers that ‘before’ (antes), all the output from 
farming, including the region’s cattle, was shipped downriver from Rurrenabaque and San 
Buenaventura to Pando. Indeed, most of the patrónes of the Tacana comunidades obtained their 
main source of income from providing foodstuffs to the rubber region. 
The government’s laissez-faire attitude towards the Amazon region experienced its first 
blow and turning point with the Acre War (1899 – 1903), then again with the loss of 50,000 square 
kilometres to Peru in 1909 (Molina et al 2008b). Both incidents served to demonstrate the 
                                                          
85 (http://www.nacioncamba.net/index.php?dir=contenidos&id=1) (accessed May 2010) 
110 
 
government’s indifference towards and negligence of the region. On the other hand, the Acre War 
was also a key moment for the inhabitants of the region to clarify where their allegiance lay. The 
Acre War was a secessionist movement. Despite the great importance of the Acre region in the 
world’s rubber market, the government had not attempted to coordinate with, nor establish solid 
control over, it and when it did finally set up a taxation house in the 1890s, protest came from both 
the Bolivian and Brazilian sides, leading to a rebellion that was first indirectly and then overtly 
supported by Brazil (Klein 1969). Having had a weak military border base, and not standing a chance 
against Brazilian opposition, Bolivia lost the war (Treaty of Petropolis, 1903).  
Interested in re-establishing good ties with Bolivia and in exchange for the 191,000 square 
kilometres of land it had attained in the Acre region, Brazil granted Bolivia access to navigable waters 
in the River Paraguay as well as pledging two million pounds to build a railway from Riberalta to the 
frontier of Brazil at Porto Velho (Fifer 1972; Klein 1969; Fawcett 1910). This infrastructural measure 
was significant in that it would help lumber-transport bypass the unsurpassable rapids of the 
Madeira River. While this marked the government’s first significant effort to unite the region with 
the rest of the country, much to the frustration of the inhabitants the funds were redirected to 
establishing a railway between the highland and valley regions of Bolivia (ibid). This is still a sore 
point for lowlanders today. As a long-term consequence of the war, the region was made into a 
state department, Pando, in 1937. The name is significant in that it explicitly tied this northern 
region to the national project by being that of a highlander and state figure, President José Manuel 
Pando (1899 – 1905) (ibid). 
With a patriotically romantic tone, Beni writer Rodolfo Pinto Parada (1978) laments 
governments’ historic indifference to the necessity of tying the jungle to the highlands for quicker 
and safer access between the regions, to aid in the import and export of goods and also to encourage 
mestizo migration. Between the 1920s and 1960s there were various failed attempts to provide the 
region with more roads, and the military was dispatched to clear a pathway through the jungle with 
machetes (ibid). However, as governments changed, these plans were alternately abandoned and 
taken up again, the path by then overgrown (ibid). The rapidity with which jungle overgrowth 
covered paths recently cleared served to stress the impossibility of ‘taming’ the wild area. In line 
with the idea of remote wilderness, in the second half of the 20th century dictators reasserted the 
region’s already unfavourable reputation as it banished political prisoners to the jungles of the Beni 
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thus adding to the image of the region as a ‘green hell’86. In 1973, journalist and political prisoner 
Vargas Martínez published his memoires to tell of his miserable time there.  
Today, this image of being far and forgotten has been reinforced on several levels in Bolivia. 
Thus, for example, the order in which the state departments are listed in the media and political 
platforms tends to begin with La Paz and conclude with Beni and Pando, strengthening the notion 
that these two departments lie at the farthest end of the country (Molina et al 2008). The 
construction of the Bolivian north is a white and mestizo one, which takes its starting point from 
‘wildness’ which needs to be ‘civilized’. Thus, one might inquire where and what the indigenous 
position - as represented by the inhabitants of Tacana comunidades – has been in these 
relationships to the state and to being part of the ‘forgotten’ region.  
In the constant shifts of boundaries and renaming of geographical sections, Tacana territory 
has become divided and re-aligned a number of times, regardless of the opinion and cultural alliance 
of its original inhabitants. The fact that their territory, the province of Iturralde which is part of La 
Paz, is politically part of the highlands has had significant implications for the Tacana. Firstly, in the 
regional conflict their geographical space is politically not a ‘lowland’, yet people from it identify as 
camba. Never having had a strong political voice or a lowland criollo/mestizo élite who acted as their 
region’s representatives, as was the case with Santa Cruz, the Tacana have historically been a 
scarcely visible lowland group in the context of the nation state. 
While this chapter has traced nation-building processes and how the markers for highland-
lowland regionalism were established through early land and resource disputes, as shaped by the 
different criollo élites, the following chapter focusses more on Tacana people’s role and influences 
on these processes. This reveals both their relationship to the state in the highland as also the 
relationship they developed with local whites and mestizos. Their relationship to local mestizos 
includes their participation in the building of an Amazonian identity in which relationships between 
different socio-racial groups play a significant role. The initiative which looks to re-establish the role 
of the Amazon in the nation state as one which is of equal importance as the Andean region. 
  
                                                          
86 Green Hell is also the title of a book by Julian Duguid (1956) who describes the hardships faced in seeking 
to penetrate the jungles of the Gran Chaco of Bolivia. 
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Chapter 4 - Indian Mothers and White Fathers - Camba as Kinship 
in the Amazon 
 
Arriving in the Tacana Cultural Centre in San Buenaventura one afternoon, Juanita, who 
works here, leads me to a skirt and bikini-top made of dried palm leaves and decorated with red, 
blue and black local beads. It is on display along with other ‘typical’ Tacana artefacts such as stone 
hammers and bags into which Tacana deity symbols are woven. It is a typical Tacana dress, she says, 
which surprises me as it looks rather ‘sexy’ and like a costume of sorts. Indeed, it is what Juanita’s 
fifteen-year-old daughter wore for the municipal Miss Beauty Contest last week. Among other 
themes this contest also includes a Miss Tacana (see image 20 below). “She won,” explains Juanita 
beaming with pride, “my daughter won Miss Tacana of the year.” I take in the information with even 
more surprise. It was not unusual that the local beauty contests looked to represent a sexy version 
of local indigenous groups’ traditional dress, with this exoticizing and eroticizing indian-ness 
momentarily cleansing it of the ‘dirty poverty’ which it has come to represent. It was, however, 
unusual that an indigenous girl should participate in a beauty contest, as traditionally only daughters 
from better-off mestizo families entered into these contests, dressing up as ‘indigenous’.  
This situation has changed in recent years. Furthermore, the fact that Juanita’s daughter 
was in fact of Tacana origin did not seem to have any sort of importance or impact on the situation 
and was perhaps not even known in the context of the contest, whose contestants are typically 
drawn from the town’s schools. At the same time, the fact that the girl’s Tacana background was 
‘not of importance’ in this festivity was also probably no coincidence as it would be in line with the 
still-present stigma attached to possessing an indian heritage. Though the indigenous people are 
accepted in towns such as Rurrenabaque, there is still a heightened awareness that there are social-
racial differences between people; however in gestures of behavioural etiquette and ‘political 
correctness’ this is ‘ignored’ in certain contexts. This indicates that, on the one hand, mestizos 
accept Tacana as neighbours and fellow lowlanders (cambas) but that on the other a ‘difference’ 
(otherness) based on race and class is still acknowledged.  
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Image 20: Beauty contestants in Rurrenabaque (2010) 
Might this ‘acceptance’ across racial lines point to the success of the initiative towards a 
common Amazonian identity in which a shared heritage is prominent? This ‘identity’ is heavily based 
on camba-ness. There has been increasing effort by lowland municipalities to establish an 
Amazonian identity, which is designed not only to stress the unity of lowland peoples, but to 
upgrade their region’s national and international status from how it has been depicted in the 
Bolivian media and in Bolivia’s Andean-centric history. Unlike that of the indigenous movement, the 
Amazon identity incorporates both local mestizos and indigenous peoples and has its basis in a 
‘shared geography’.  
This chapter examines how Tacana people relate to efforts made to establish an ‘Amazonian 
identity’ and how this identity is linked to a mistrustful relationship with the state. To ‘upgrade’ the 
Amazon’s reputation a positive local heritage is advocated, and this includes local Indians. Tacana 
people position themselves positively towards these efforts. Firstly, they consider their heritage to 
be interconnected with that of local mestizos which in turn is closely linked with their camba 
‘identity’. This ‘way of being’ which Tacana people see themselves as having in common with local 
mestizos but not with highlanders (collas), is en par with Tacana people’s historical mistrust of the 
state and party politics. Though the state is now ‘indigenous’ (see chapter one), this mistrust is not 
unravelled overnight and currently finds expression in suspicion as to the integrity of TCOs. The fact 
that the state is making a switch from being ‘mestizo’ to being ‘indigenous’ is not something 
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immediately overt to Tacana people, who do not see their ‘indigeneity’ reflected in the politics 
construed far away in the highlands.  
Upgrading the Image of the Amazon  
The 2003 United Nations (UN) PNUD (Desarrollo Humano del Norte Amazonico) report for 
Bolivia summarizes the principal factors which make the Bolivian Amazon region distinct from other 
regions. These include all the central aspects which are part of the region’s history such as a weak 
state presence, the natural environment, the economy, the economic cycle and, lastly, the racial-
social stratification and plethora of indigenous peoples who have their home here. Overall it is 
recognized that the relationship of the lowlanders is simultaneously one with nature, the jungle and 
the water-ways. Significantly, this is more than the Bolivian government has ever formally admitted 
or attributed to its jungle section. 
The construction of an Amazonian identity looks to counter historical, political and social 
depictions of the region. The ‘Amazonian Project’ is an initiative called into life by the ‘forgotten 
departments’ of Pando and Beni and is based not only around the idea of a shared geography but 
also the social relations and central historical dates distinct to this area, as opposed to those from 
the Andes. As the idea of a distinct identity is also used to back up the call for more state autonomy, 
the issue is politically charged and some literatures treat the initiative as contrived and based on a 
‘false’ ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1992). Thus, some Bolivian authors (Molina 
et al 2008) criticise the ‘forgotten departments’ initiative for an Amazonian identity, regarding it as 
contrived, with ‘insignificant’ dates being institutionalized and celebrated, such as the adhesions of 
minor regions to larger regions. Yet lowland municipalities have also promoted indigenous 
individuals from the Amazon as heroes and role-models. The department of Beni celebrates the 
indigenous rebel Andrés Guayocho, who led the 1887 uprising in Trinidad against the mistreatment 
of indians during the rubber-boom era (Soruco Sologuren et al 2008). More recently Beni has also 
proudly claimed identification with the first major lowland indigenous march in 1990, the March for 
Territory and Dignity. Here, indian rebellion is depicted as a demonstration of regional effort to 
which all socio-racial groups can lay claim (Molina et al 2008).  
The initiative towards an Amazonian identity has its origin specifically in the lowland 
municipalities of Trinidad, Cobija, Riberalta and Rurrenabaque which act to represent the vast 
region around them, their influence extending even beyond the legal limits of their municipalities 
115 
 
(Molina et al 2008). In so doing Riberalta harks back to the borders of former provinces such as the 
vast Mojos region or Caupolicán, partly demonstrating a disassociation with the political 
delineations of municipalities, cantons and departments which occurred precisely so that the 
Andean government would have greater control over the region (ibid). It was with the introduction 
of municipalities at the turn of the 20th century that the state drew the Amazon region into its realms 
(see also Orlove 1993). Eventually the government further divided former provinces, and stationed 
state-representatives from the highlands there (Molina et al 2008; Roca 2001). These 
representatives were controversial for not only were they state-appointed rather than locally 
democratically-elected, but as a rule they were highland officials who, as a form of punishment had 
been ‘condemned’ to work in the lowlands. Thus, the representative felt no great affinity with his 
work and the region. Neither were the locals satisfied with having a government representative who 
did not know or understand the area. This situation reinforced Amazonian people’s distrust of the 
highland government (Roca 2008). Eventually the Popular Participation Law (LPP) of 1995 attributed 
greater revenue to municipalities and a new form of political participation was possible (see chapter 
5).  
Over the past ten years, Amazonians have created organizations meant to draw more 
attention to their construction of an Amazonian identity, also called the ‘Amazonian Project’. 
Organizations include the Movimiento de Renovación Amazonica (Movement to Revalidate the 
Amazon – MAR, Pando), Poder Amazónico Social (Amazonian Social Power - PASO in Trinidad), 
Intergración Amazónica Libertaria (Amazonian Integration - IAL in Trinidad) and Acción 
Revolucionaria Amazónica de Riberalta (Revolutionary Amazonian Action of Riberalta - ARAR). Some 
of these organisations emphasize their socio-racial heterogeneity by electing indigenous and colono 
leaders alongside local mestizos (Molina et al 2008). These organizations have little success on a 
political-electoral level, and are frequently criticized by stronger political bodies for trying to divide 
departmental unity.  
The Amazonian Project initiative draws from the media and easily accessible mediums as 
the internet to help attain information about the region and incorporate this into a positive self-
image constructed around ideas of early civilizations on their way to ‘modernity’. This is to contrast 
the idea of the Amazon as an ‘empty jungle’ populated with a mere few ‘wild savages’. Most recently 
this effort has included of archaeological information of the region as ceramic shards found in the 
tropical parts of the departments of Beni and La Paz (Tyuleneva 2008). When speaking to people of 
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Rurrenabaque (Rurreños) about the history of their region, the significance of dark earths (Kawa & 
Oyuela-Caycedo 2008; Lehmann et al. 2003), or man-made flood-dams as a historic hydraulic 
system (Eriksen 2011; Balée and Erickson 2006) is increasingly becoming a popular topic. 
Rurreños hope, that archaeological artefacts will aid in changing the region’s image as being inferior 
to the highlands. This also includes the local Amazonian indigenous groups, whose popular image in 
Bolivia is that of being ‘wilder’ and ‘less civilized’ to those of the Andes (Greene 2009).  
In the discussions around regional identity the local indigenous play a central part, for they 
are the ancestral link to the region. Indigenous people are welcomed to take an active and positive 
role in the Amazonian Project, an effort which partly draws on the ideas of Indigenismo and a 
paternalistic romanticization of indian heritage which was especially strong in the early 1920s and 
1930s (Torranzo Roca 2008; Klein 1969). In this mestizos can legitimately also stress their 
distinctness from the indians. For the fact that there may be a blood-link does not mean there is 
cannot be an unequal socio-racial hierarchy. Identifying the local indigenous group as part of one’s 
Amazon identity does not signify that all are now equal. On the contrary, as argued by the mayor of 
Cobija (capital of Pando), what remains of the hierarchy between patrón and peon, makes up a part 
of the Amazonian identity and can therefore be embraced (Molina et al 2008). While this attitude 
does not challenge structures of inequality based on race, neither does it attempt to erase or gloss 
over history.  
There is a discussion as to which image of the indian should be utilized to represent 
Amazonian identity: that prior to, or after, missionization (Molina et al 2008)? The missionized 
indian as a product of violent colonization would depict a symbol of inequality and brokenness, just 
the image the Amazon Identity advocators are seeking to avoid. The pre-mission indian is thus more 
suitable to serve as a positive representation It does not call attention to the ugly situation of the 
whites/mestizos’ subjugation of the indians and reaffirms the legitimacy of the wild region prior to 
the formation of the Bolivian nation-state (1825). Using this image would allow the Amazon to claim 
an equal footing with the highlands, which to date claims that ‘its people’ brought civilization to the 
‘empty’ wilderness of the lowlands.  
Tacana People and the ‘Amazonian Project’ 
Tacana people welcome the initiative of mestizos looking to establish an identity on 
common ground; one in which their heritage is pooled. On the one hand, Tacana cultural heritage 
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is adopted as the cultural heritage of the region and municipality as a whole. This allows them to 
step away from their history as the enslaved, mistreated lowland indians, and teach their children 
of a much nobler indian heritage which includes a Tacana hero who fought in the Acre War (Molina 
et al 2008). In the past fifteen years a handful of mestizo authors and one university project have 
taken it upon themselves to collect and publish traditional Tacana myths and fables (e.g. Gareca 
Arzabe 2007; Jemio 2001). Myths based on regional landmarks such as the famous duck represented 
by a boulder in the Beni River,87 or the sacred Macuti mountain at whose foot-hills Rurrenabaque 
lies, have also recently been taken up by the flourishing tourist industry.  
In the initiative for a common regional identity, the Tacana see a chance to ‘whiten’ 
themselves and eventually become mestizos, with an associated rise up the social ladder. Claiming 
both an Amazonian identity and a common camba-ness across racial boundaries helps to modify 
social differences based on race. In Rurrenabaque, where Silvia has her second home and her 
daughters attend school, she looks on approvingly as her sixteen-year-old skips down the hill, having 
just asked permission to go and visit her non-indigenous school mate, who lives in the ‘proper’ 
cement and brick house at the bottom of the hill. Being on the council in the municipality of 
Rurrenabaque places Silvia in an important representative position which is outside the arena of the 
indigenous movement. In the municipality she is an acknowledged indigenous representative 
representing both mestizos and indigenous people.  
Importantly to Tacana people of this study, in light of the intense politics around indigeneity 
in Bolivia, is precisely the fact that the Amazonian identity initiative is not based on common 
ethnicity so much as on a common geography (see also Orlove 1993). Even if each group has 
differently experienced the history of the region.  Tacana people have in the past avoided stressing 
their ethnicity (i.e. indian-ness), and stressing geography for the establishment of a communal 
identity is something they feel more comfortable with.  
The Amazon identity is closely linked to the camba ‘way of being’. While some authors 
endorse the history of the camba ‘identity’ (e.g. Waldmann 2008; Toranzo Roca 2008; Roca 2007, 
2001), others ‘dismiss’ it as a mere cover-up for right-wing aggression tied to state 
autonomy/secession, as covered in chapter one (e.g. Fabricant 2009; Molina 2008; Molina et al 
2008; Gustafson 2006). In these debates indigenous lowland peoples’ view is not represented. The 
                                                          
87 See chapter 2 
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relations of the Tacana to lowland mestizos and the highland state, who share a critical view of pro-
indigenous policy, illuminates the role Tacana people have played in the establishment and 
reinforcement of a camba identity. 
Camba as Kinship –Tacana People and their Mestizo Patrónes  
Geography is the central historical link connecting Tacana people and lowland mestizos, and 
from which the hostility towards the highlands springs. To the oligarchy of Santa Cruz the lowland 
mestizo in the Amazon was a mere small-scale brutish camba patrón with jurisdiction over some 
peons (i.e. indians). However, to Tacana people of Buena Vista, for example, ‘their’ patrón was the 
highest authority and the path to a political voice. He was the state representative who might or 
might not abuse them, and who collaborated with the state in dispatching them to rubber collection. 
Until the 1953 land reform (and in many cases for years after), Tacana people were engaged for 
their physical labour with little rights to their protection. They could be bought together with the 
land they lived on. Though they were at the mercy of the patrón, and without wanting to depict this 
situation as positive, this time-period is not necessarily remembered as unpleasant. It contrasts 
starkly, for example, with the experience of people from an Aymara highland comunidad near Sorata 
(Canessa 2009) where the patrón’s violence is bitterly remembered, with graphic details of the 
physical pains he inflicted (ibid).  
Meanwhile, the Tacana distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ patrónes. Bad ones flogged 
them and exploited them cruelly and excessively for their labour, “like the former mayor of San 
Buenaventura”, recounts Juanita; “he still lives here now. Peacefully,” she says, nodding towards 
the direction of his house. “He was very bad. Bad, bad bad. He beat people. As did the owner of 
Rurrenabaque’s restaurant ‘La Chirimoya’88”, and with this she waves her hand across the river 
towards Rurrenabaque. “He used to make us collect drugs!” Juanita’s voice drops to a grave whisper. 
“But we did not know. We did not know they were drugs,” she interrupts herself to pause and finally 
ask me, rubbing thumb and forefinger together, “What is that little leaf called…the one which looks 
like the camomile one?” “Cannabis?” I ask. 
 A ‘good’ patrón was one who ‘took care’ of his comunidad. Typically he became family in 
becoming compadre of different people in one comunidad. Compradazgo, based on the Catholic 
tradition of godparenthood, is a spiritual kinship tie between an indian parent and a white/mestizo 
                                                          
88 Name changed to maintain the anonymity of the people involved 
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god-parent through which indians could come into contact with the state and certain resources 
(Killick 2008b; Sanjinés 2004). Juanita’s grandparents and great-grandparents feared, respected and 
befriended the patrón of Buena Vista: he owned the land, the people on it and their labour. To them 
he was a wealthy authority and honorary family member who could bring them within the realms 
of hard-to-come-by assets such as an education, metal tools or, as Juanita said approvingly, “a shirt 
for every school boy and a bundle of second-hand clothing along with a small calf for each family at 
Christmas.”   
As demonstrated simply by the relaxed way in which Juanita points out where the former 
patrónes live today in Rurrenabaque, it seems that they – whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – had little reason 
to fear their former peons after the land reform. I was surprised to find that there was no trace of 
vengeance towards former patrónes amongst Tacana people I spoke to. Upon my asking the 
corregidor of Buena Vista why it was that after the land reform (1953) they had not expelled the 
patrón from the comunidad, he replied, visibly amused by my idea: “here we are humble (humilde) 
people. We are not like that, like the collas. They are aggressive. They do things like that (i.e. take 
revenge). But not here,” and adding that even if violent treatment had taken place in the 
comunidades: “people forget, you know. They forget.”89 
Importantly, many patrónes in comunidades were family. They not only came to share a 
symbolic kinship tie as compadres but also a blood-tie. Patrónes would take Tacana wives. Their 
children were the mestizos who held the political positions in the comunidad, stressing their 
whiteness and denying their indian roots (see also Heckenberger 2004). After the reform they were 
distinguishable from Tacana people only in that they now became better-off neighbours. In many 
instances, they still have this position today.90 In Buena Vista, one of the patrónes 91 continued to 
live in ‘his’ comunidad together with his Tacana wife and mestizo children. Though originally an 
outsider, he was part of the comunidad and as Juanita’s mother stated contently, “we always knew 
that even after the (land) reform, those men…they would all die together”, implying a camaraderie 
among all the men in the comunidad.  
 
                                                          
89 “Aquí somos gente humilde. No somo asi, como los collas. Ellos son agresivos. Y hacen cosas así. Pero aquí 
no. La gente olviden, sabes? Olviden.” 
90 See chapter seven. 
91 Buena Vista has had more than one. 
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Image 21: The nephew of Buena Vista’s former patrón (land owner) in Buena Vista with his wife (2009) 
Thus, in contrast to the relation which Tacana people built with the state, the patrón was 
‘there’. He was present and lived among Tacana people like a Tacana, to eventually become ‘one of 
them’. Thus, no matter how abusive the patrón may have been, he gave guidance and was, as 
opposed to the Bolivian state, a constant presence. In this sense, Tacana people stand ‘side by side’ 
with the white/mestizo families who formerly oppressed them, but who are also family and have 
experienced many changing situations as neighbours and kin. From this point of view, the colla 
constitutes ‘the Other’, while the Amazonian mestizo is a fellow camba. Interesting here is that 
camba and colla are built to contrast each other and though they mirror the other critically, they 
accept the differences almost neutrally, attributing them to ‘the Other’ a kind of ‘natural difference’.  
‘Camba’ as a Political Tool 
Bolivian lowland identity today has become associated with the term ‘camba’. It is not 
unusual to see bumper stickers in Santa Cruz expressing lowland pride with the provocative 
declaration: “I’m camba, so what…?” (Soy camba y que…?). The fact that being camba has been 
taken up and advocated by the political right, such as the Santa Cruz based Nación Camba which is 
famous for its racial overtones and violence (Fabricant 2012; Kirshner 2010; Centellas 2010a), 
quickly gives the ‘camba way of being’ a right-wing and conservative political taint. Specific camba 
traits have been identified as including certain attitudes and ‘ways of being’, typical festivities such 
as Women’s Beauty Contests, and, importantly, a distinct vernacular form of speech mixed with 
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colloquialisms. These aspects have become increasingly more celebrated as identity factors (Roca 
2008; Peña Hasbún 2003; Waldmann 2008). 
If ‘camba’ derives from a derogatory Guaraní word for indian ranch-help, colla is from the 
Quechua word Kollasuyo, which was a highland region of the Inca Empire. The term has recently 
become more popular, especially in conjunction with ‘camba’. The politics around ‘colla-ness’ stand 
in the tradition of the political and cultural ideas of Aymara Nation (Nación Aymara) and Inca Nation, 
as advocated especially in the mid-1980s by the highland organisation Confederation of the Union 
of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (Central Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia - 
CSUTCB) and Aymara leader and activist, Felipe Quispe. In 1984 the CSTUCB drafted a bill proposing 
an agrarian restructuring at a time at which the lowland indigenous organizations was coming into 
being. Though the bill included the lowland groups it had been drafted with neither their 
consultation nor representation (CIDOP - Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, CPIB - 
Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni), and thus did not find much resonance with the lowland 
organizations (Strobele-Gregor et al 1994). The camba ‘movement’ is mestizo-initiated and 
indigenous groups have not played a central role, in contrast to the indigenous movement which 
was initiated by indigenous peoples.  
Both terms, colla and camba, lean heavily on an indian heritage. As described at the start of 
this chapter, during town festivals mestizo people dress in the traditional clothes of the local 
indigenous groups and schools put on local indigenous-styled dances. By highlighting their 
indigenous heritage, municipalities strategically parallel the importance placed on such heritage by 
President Evo Morales and his MAS government, who put a heavy emphasis on indigenous 
reconciliation and equality (Fabricant 2012, 2009; Gustafson 2006). In doing so, lowland 
municipalities and groups like the Nación Camba look to demonstrate that their critique of highland 
indigenous culture is not an issue of racism and white supremacy. In assuming ‘indigeneity’, 
municipalities furthermore enter into the ethnic identity debate and the complex issue of 
autochthony. Here mestizos stress that they, too, are native to the lowland region and because of 
this ‘oppressed’ by the Andean government. 
The Nación Camba, based in Santa Cruz, is backed primarily by white upper and middle class 
youth, members of the conservative young men’s group, UJC (Unión Juvenil Cruceñista). Yet it has 
been pointed out (Waldmann 2008) that although the image is one of the white Cruzeño oligarchy 
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as the leading aggressors against a colono influx, this is in fact a misrepresentation. The old Cruzeño 
oligarchy, who are today’s owners of the central soy, hydrocarbon and cattle-ranching businesses, 
in fact welcome the colonos for their cheap labour and for the retailing of their products. Thus, 
contrary to popular understandings, it is not the upper class, but instead the mestizo working and 
middle classes who feel the greatest rancour against the colonos, as these racial groups meet each 
other on a similar class level, and directly compete for the same occupational activities.  
La Manera Camba (The Camba Way) 
Camba ‘identity’ has become rooted in a variety of concepts and traits in which lowlanders 
take pride. These in turn are based in ideas around ‘good upbringing’. One of these is a dialect or 
form of speech which is distinct to the colla way of speaking.  The people of the lowlands speak with 
a so-called camba accent. This is marked by aspirating the ‘s’ at the end of words, as in the 
annunciator-word ‘pues’, which converts to ‘puej’.92 Typical, too, is the usage of the suffixes ‘-ango’ 
and ‘-ingo’ to express augmentation and diminution: While a highlander might say “ahorita” 
(“ahora” – “now” - in diminutive), the lowlander would say “ahoringa”.  
Tracing the roots of the camba form of speech, lowland historian Roca (2007) makes a link 
to Argentina and, in particular, to Brazil. Significantly, he links the heritage of the lowlands to that 
of other lowland countries and distinctly not to the Andes of Bolivia. While the Brazilian Portuguese 
in its pronunciation diminishes by applying the ‘h’, the camba vernacular usage of Spanish innovates 
this into a ‘g’. Thus, the Portuguese ‘casinha’, diminutive of ‘casa’ (house), becomes ‘casinga’ among 
the cambas. By linking Brazilian Portuguese and the influence of indigenous languages (e.g. 
Chiquitanos, Quechua, Guaraní etc.) to the camba Spanish, Roca also refutes possible connections 
with the phonetics of Andalusia (Spain), from where the original South American conquistadores 
originated and where the ‘s’ is also typically dropped at the end of a word. Thus, speech-patterns 
are utilized to demonstrate heritage and ‘belonging’ in the debate around the racial and cultural 
origins of lowlanders and to their being ‘different’ to Andean peoples.  
The camba form of speech is embraced with patriotic pride and applied accordingly. The 
lowlanders consider their manner of speech to be more eloquent and ‘friendlier’ than that of the 
highlanders. Regional distinctions in speech are also a great source of humour among Bolivians, as 
                                                          
92 Accordingly, the capital of the lowlands, Santa Cruz, is jokingly yet also fondly referred to as “Santa Puej”, 
in reference to the lowland habit of frequently utilizing the annunciator word “pues” and dropping the ‘s’. 
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highlanders imitate lowlanders and vice versa. However, for the lowlanders this mimicry is also a 
sign of the highlanders’ ‘typical’ arrogance. In one example which I observed on the social online 
platform Facebook, two friends joke with each other ‘camba style’. Here they write in the vernacular 
camba accent, as well as weave in references to regional differences, chiding each other jokingly. 
Starting out with the implication that Carla should get a proper job, Anita objects to her belligerent 
‘highland’ way of expressing herself, by suggesting that she been living in La Paz for too long and 
the ‘rude’ colla manner had rubbed off on her. Anita addresses Carla with the formal ‘usted’ as 
typical in the lowlands as opposed to the highlanders, who tend to use the informal ‘tu’ (Roca 2007).  
Anita: “Eso le hace falta a ujte,  un poco de oficio.”  
[This is what you lack, a bit of career / work.] 
 Carla: “... estas brava con el mundo q le paso?.... Mucho La Paz voj, no?  
[…are you angry at the world, what is with you? Too much La Paz for you, no?] 
 
What becomes expressed in the speech form includes behavioural factors around ‘upbringing’ 
(educación). This makes up a central part of ‘being camba’. With a compilation of interviews on the 
camba habitus, Bolivian Anthropologist, Waldmann (2008), groups together a variety of themes 
described by predominantly middle class mestizo Cruzeños as being the essence of camba. These 
stand in relation and contrast to colla ‘ways’ and are roughly grouped into hospitality, good 
manners/upbringing and physical presentation based on gender roles (see also Peña Hasbún 2003; 
Bergholdt 1999; Pinto Parada 178). Cruzeños see themselves as being humble, open, optimistic and 
generous. While the (indigenous) colla is stingy and ‘hoards’, only sharing with his/her own, the 
camba “never hides his cards in his sleeves” (“nunca esta con la carta debajo la manga”) (Waldmann 
2008:38; see also Bergholdt 1999 as above). The camba is traditional in his/her patriarchal family 
values while highlanders in turn hold that the cambas are macho, much in the sense of the Wild 
West as depicted in US-American pop culture. It has been noted that the lowlands look towards 
Miami (USA) for orientation (Assies 2006) and in accord younger generations bestow typically US-
American names upon their children, noteworthy in that they are written to be pronounced with an 
Anglo phonetic (e.g. Kelli, Treisi, Jheimi and Yason). Cambas identify with behaviours such as 
drinking alcohol, womanizing and brawl fights which are all attributed to a man’s virility and 
machismo: “A camba has to drink and have his fight. A camba has to be with his female93, go dance 
                                                          
93 Here the word “hembra” is utilized - the term for a female animal, evoking a carnal, sexual image. 
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and wake up with his female. This is the pride of each camba”94 (Waldmann 2008: 38) [My 
translation].  
The female counterpart to machismo has been coined marianismo - the cult of the Virgin Mary 
– which represents the self-sacrificing mother figure. This also has its counterpart in the figure of 
overly sexualized Latina woman and whore (Wade 2009; Stevens & Pescatello 1973). While Bolivians 
do not use this term, the concept and the typical image of the camba woman is one of an 
exaggerated sexualized femininity as when ‘she paints her nails a fluorescent colour and puts on 
gold shoes at eleven in the morning’95 (ibid:55) [my translation]. Though generally approved of, 
eroticized appearances might be viewed critically if they are displayed at the ‘wrong’ moment.  
The topic around gendered and sexualized bodies is starkly contrasted to highland culture, 
where on grounds of climactic difference alone, people do not generally make a display of actual 
skin but remain ‘hidden’ beneath layers of clothing. The body culture and aesthetics of the lowlands 
is in the tradition of neighbouring countries such as Brazil and Colombia. As suggested by the man’s 
comment quoted above, stylized gender-role presentation is closely linked with music and dance. A 
style of music typically played by lowlanders in clubs and bars is the Colombian-originated Cumbia, 
which is influenced, like the Brazilian samba, by Afro-Caribbean culture, and in particular African 
slaves. This type of music was associated by colonial society with degenerate blackness which 
signalled sexual looseness, idleness and lack of discipline (Wade 2009). In the 1920’s and 30s in 
particular, this ‘jungle music’ was regarded as morally harmful (ibid). The influence of African 
cultures on those of the Caribbean and Brazil can be seen in the camba gender-roles and relationship 
to the body. The highlands, in contrast, draws most of its indigenous heritage from the Inca Empire. 
The cambas are proud of their stylized gendered performance which they attribute to their 
sense of taste and understanding of gender aesthetics. In its most institutionalized form, these 
become expressed in annual carnivals and parades (desfiles) where women sport short sexy 
costumes (Gustafson 2006, Canessa 2008). Feminine beauty is epitomized in Bolivia’s famous ‘Miss’ 
contests (female beauty contests), which even the smallest lowland municipality will have in its 
annual repertoire of celebrations. Beauty contests are such a part of lowland culture that alternative 
social groups such as the gay, lesbian and transsexual movement have uncritically adopted them 
                                                          
94 “El Camba es beber y cada uno esta con su pelada. El Camba tiene que estar con su hembrita, irse a bailar 
y amanecer con la hembra. Eso es el orgullo del Camba.” 
95 “…se pinta las uñas de colores fosforescentes y usa zapatos doradas a las once de la mañana.” 
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and hold annual competitions of Miss Transformista Gay and Miss Les-Bolivia, for which participants 
bus in from all over the country.  
The Santa Cruz professional Beauty Contest contestants group, Las Magníficas, is an 
industrialized form of this feminized body politics (Fabricant 2009; Waldmann 2008). Las Magníficas 
is a Santa Cruz based high-class professional model agency and élite social club. The models from 
the Las Magníficas are hired for key Cruzeño social events such as the annual FEXPOCRUZ (Feria 
Exposición de Santa Cruz, established 1962), a key large-scale fair in which small and big businesses 
from all over the country present their products (see Gustafson 2007). Here the models adorn the 
stands much like famous status symbols and e charge set prices for their presence as would movie 
stars and other public figures (Waldmann 2008). As with the girls in the circle of Miss Contestants in 
the small municipality of Rurrenabaque, las Magníficas belong to the élite of the comunidad. While 
formerly it was impossible that daughters of poor families entered these realms, this prohibition has 
relaxed somewhat: “Until about 30 years ago, the (Cruzeño) queens were always from the top social 
circles. If she wasn’t a Gutierrez, she wasn’t queen96” (interview in Waldmann 2008:81) [translation 
my own]. In this way today’s élite still function as role models, perpetuating social standards: “the 
upper class show their girls to you with a festive and beautiful face, as something to which you too 
can aspire97” (interview in Waldmann 2008:81) [My translation]. Being accepted into the ranks of 
beauty contestants is a ticket to the realms of higher social circles (ibid). Overall, these spectacles 
look to maintain and reinforce the European style of inequality based on the visual attributes of skin 
tone, hair and clothing (Gustafson 2006). 
Clothing, especially footwear, has always been used as a strong indicator of social class in both 
Europe and the New World (Presta 2008). Only a decade earlier, the plaza of Santa Cruz, being the 
central space for public display and class presentation, was ‘divided’ into areas/zones (zonas) in 
accord with the three principal social classes (Waldmann 2008). For the customary Sunday stroll, 
the outwardmost circle, being closest to the street, was reserved for the upper-class vecinos and 
gente of town; the second circle for mestizo employees of higher rank such as those who worked in 
the household of the criollos; and the third, in the middle of the square, for the popular classes, the 
cambas. If a promenade moved outside his or her designated ‘area’, which was in accord with 
                                                          
96 “Las reinas siempre salían de arriba, hasta hace unos 30 años, de la alta sociedad. Si no era Gutiérrez, no 
era reina.” 
97 “La clase alta te las muestra como un rostro festivo y hermoso al que podés aspirar.” 
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his/her clothes and especially shoes98, he/she would be reproached for their breach in etiquette 
with shouts such as ”to the second (area)!” (“a la segunda!”) or “to the third! (“a la tercera!”) (ibid: 
56; also Serrate Vaca Diez 1975). 
While it is held that the camba is a hospitable and generous dreamer, who, though humble, 
never seriously protests his/her situation, cliché dictates that colla are stingy complainers, 
commonly described as ‘the crying collas’ (collas llorones) (Waldmann 2008). Accordingly, it is 
lamented that the colonos who migrate to the lowlands are never content with what they have. 
They are considered overly ambitious earning and saving  
to buy his taxi, his truck. (…) They come to Santa Cruz to work like ants and achieve their goals.  
(…) The colla, from the smallest rat to the largest go out to sell something even if it’s just 
newspapers. They always find something to do, even if it’s just selling juice. In contrast (camba 
children) … wait for their father to work for them. (…) (But) the collas are made for business99” 
(interviews in Waldmann 2008:42) [Translation my own].  
 
Of Camba and Colla in Rurrenabaque and Tumupasa 
By claiming the term camba for themselves, the élite is linking itself to an indian heritage, 
thus upgrading the mestizo identity (Assies 2006). In this they inadvertently also upgrade indian-
ness in that they position themselves positively in relation to the indians whom they formerly ruled 
as patrónes. Ethnic identity becomes somewhat homogenized (ibid). While class differences are 
maintained, skin tones become increasingly irrelevant. Every lowlander is camba, yet there are 
different kinds of cambas and, as mentioned in the last chapter, this can depend on regional 
differences mixed with class situations. However, it also leans heavily on racial affiliation. 
White/mestizo cambas differ from indigenous cambas, even if it is agreed that all cambas share 
similar ‘values’: la manera camba (the camba way).  
Crossing the racial/ethnic divide insult turns into fondness. If the indigenous cambas are 
‘lazy’ (flojos), the mestizo cambas are ‘easy-going’ and ‘relaxed’ (tranquilos) (see also Stearman 
                                                          
98 The popular class did not wear shoes; if anything they wore so-called abarcas (made of recycled rubber 
tires) which did not count as proper shoes. 
99 “…a tener su taxicito, su camioncito. (…) Vienen a trabajar a Santa Cruz como hormigas y llegan a su 
objetivo. (…) El colla, desde el ratoncito hasta el más grande de ellos, sale aunque sea a vender periódicos. 
Algo tienen que hacer, desde chiquititos ya están vendiendo jugo. En cambio, (los hijos cambas) esperan 
nomás a que trabaje el padre. (…) Los collas son para negociar.” 
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1985, Waldmann 2008). While the mestizo collas are ‘dedicated’, the indigenous collas are 
ambitious´ and ‘stubborn’ (terco), while it is agreed that both are ‘hard workers’ (trabajadores). 
These acknowledged differences are both prejudices and embrace cultural traits which provide a 
communal sense of identity. They are embraced by each ‘group’, and their enactment become a 
demonstration of regional affiliation. Taking this further, regional attributes do not only become 
associated with people, but are also projected onto animals and objects. As I walked down the 
central road in Tumupasa one day with a Tacana friend, I was barked at by a small dog, which came 
lunging out at me from a local shop. My friend offhandedly offered “it’s colla” (es colla), waving 
away the animal’s aggression and self-confidence, which are ‘typical colla’ traits. Coincidentally, the 
dog did indeed belong to one of the colono families living by the road. In this way the ‘idea’ behind 
what it means to be colla or camba easily become used as adjectives and it is not unusual to hear 
someone says “that is very colla” (eso es muy colla). Similarly, one day a mestizo friend from La Paz 
explained why she did not like working with a specific colleague of hers: “It’s so boring, he is so very 
Aymara. He doesn’t speak…very, very colla, this boy.”  
Rurrenabaque is fiercely proud of its camba affiliation. I was especially able to notice this 
shortly before the referendum on the new constitution of 2009. During this time many locals wore 
a green t-shirt, green being the official colour of the lowlands, with the exclamation vota no! printed 
in large letters upon it (see chapter 5). However, this demonstration of a patria chica (fierce regional 
affiliation) became questionable when a permanent road was being built around the same time in 
Rurre. The manual labour hired were not local working-class cambas, such as the Tacana people or 
local mestizos, which would have aided the flow of municipal spending back into the local 
community. Instead, no one seemed surprised or affronted at the more expensive effort of bussing 
down collas, the ‘traditional hard workers’, from La Paz, providing them with room and board and 
setting them to the task of hammering together stones from the Beni River to produce a proper 
road.  
Similarly in Tumupasa the road around the main plaza was paved in 2009. In the past, the 
municipality had required that the locals put in a contraparte (own effort) in the form of manual 
labour, in exchange for the construction material to be provided for whatever measure was being 
undertaken in a comunidad. For the first time the Tumupaseños had protested this, arguing that in 
towns or cities no one expected the inhabitants to chip in free labour when roads or buildings were 
built. They wanted this measure provided without being obliged to ‘do their part’. The municipality 
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of San Buenaventura, which belongs to Tumupasa, agreed and as a result hired workers from 
Tumupasa instead, agreeing to pay them. I assumed that Tacana people welcomed this, considering 
their frequent laments as to a chronic shortage of cash. Before half the road was completed, 
however, the local Tacana people had abandoned the arduous task. As I was soon to witness, collas 
were bussed in from the highlands to finish the rest of the road. In the evenings, after a heavy 
workload, they did not go and mingle with the Tumupaseños, as I thought they would. Instead they 
retreated to the rooms provided for them and kept to themselves, cooking and laughing. A 
Tumupasa nun, Roswita, watched them daily from the steps of the old church overlooking the plaza. 
She was very impressed, and commented to me one evening as the men pouring hot tar: “very hard 
working, these people,” she paused; “they start early and go on even after night has fallen. Very, 
very hard working; not like the people here.”  
No Tacana people in Tumupasa took offence that Aymara/Quechua had been contracted to 
do work in their own comunidad which they might have been paid to do. In this they mirrored the 
camba attribute of being ‘comfortable’, perhaps even a bit ‘lazy’, and reminded me of what Silvia 
had once told me when complaining about the large groups of colonos coming to the area: “you 
know how we are…we are comfortable. We have our chicken, our little house, our hammock…we 
are easy-going (tranquilo). Not like them! The collas! Ambitious! Always looking to earn.”  Indeed, 
the identities of colla and camba do not compete with each other, but represent acknowledged and 
accepted differences (Bergholdt & Bogantes 1999).  
While President Morales emphasizes unity and solidarity among the indigenous peoples of 
his country, announcing the importance of Pachamama and other indigenous concepts used in his 
environmental governance, he is just as careful to distinctly avoid addressing highland-lowland 
regionalism, and the differences typically found between colla and camba ‘ways of being’. This 
stands in contrast to long-time Aymara leader and indigenous activist Felipe Quispe, who heads the 
Andean-based Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (PIM) founded in 2000. In his separatist politics, 
Quispe explicitly states that there are ‘two Bolivias’, by which he does not solely mean the divide 
between the indigenous and white/mestizos of Bolivia, which is the divide on which he bases much 
of his politics; but also between the highlands and the lowlands, the cambas and the collas 
(interview with Quispe by Cúneo 2011; Albro 2005b; Barragán 2009; Albó 2003). Importantly, 
Quispe thereby acknowledges cultural differences between indigenous groups from different 
regions in Bolivia in a way that President Morales has not yet done.  
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Tacana People’s Mistrust of the State 
Tacana people identify as ‘Bolivian’ and ‘camba’ and with these joint identifications thereby 
link themselves to the nation state and its historical trajectory. However, this does not mean Tacana 
people do not also harbour a long-standing mistrust of the state. Their sense of political impotence 
is far-reaching, as demonstrated by a variety of factors. Most Tacana people of this study do not 
particularly care one way or another which political party which is in government. I am told that 
around election times political parties will pay people to vote for them. “Each person would be paid 
around 25 Bolivianos (ca. three dollars),” explains Juanita. “They come to the comunidad and take 
down your name on a list”. On another occasion Carlos from Carmen Florida explains to me as we 
make our way to his field that “all parties are corrupt. Politics is corrupt. This is why I never vote at 
all.” Importantly, in order to vote one must today be in possession of an identity card (carnet de 
identidad). As many Tacana do not believe in the integrity of the state and because it costs a day’s 
worth of labour, many do not have one. Doris, from Carmen Florida, stresses that most people in 
Carmen Florida do not have an identity card for there are simply too many ‘hurdles’ (tramites) to be 
overcome. These include trips to the departmental capital, Trinidad, bus fares and fees for the 
documents themselves.  
A birth certificate costs fifty Bolivianos (ca. six dollars) and the identity card itself costs 
another fifty Bolivianos and many people do not have this money. And then sometimes, 
after people have paid, they do not get anything at all – nothing ever arrives. 
 
Doris stresses that if a municipal government knows that a certain comunidad will not vote 
for them, then it may very well be that they will not make an effort for these people to receive their 
identity cards. If people do not have faith in the political party in power they also refuse to register 
and attain identity cards. At the same time, an identity card is necessary to receive government 
benefits, channelled through the municipalities, such as school breakfast for children and the Bono 
Juancito Pinto, a yearly stipend for schoolchildren. 
Silvia, from Carmen Florida, explained to me in 2009 that as a municipal councillor for the 
MNR party in Rurrenabaque, she organized for representatives of the municipality to travel to 
Carmen Florida, register people free of cost and to provide them identity cards. But  
people don’t bother. They don’t show up. They don’t understand. And then they come to 
me when they are ill and say, how do I get a hospital bed, my sister or wife needs to go to 
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the hospital but I cannot afford it. I say to them, do you have a carnet? They do not. But you 
must be registered with the municipality to receive a hospital bed free of charge.  
 
In the same instance Silvia stresses angrily, “but those colonos, they all have carnets! Their 
baby is still in the stomach, but it already has a carnet!” insinuating that the colonos are quicker to 
act, better-organized and generally better-off than the local Tacana people. The lack of party-
political consciousness which Tacana people of this study demonstrate today contrasts starkly 
contrasted with the time of the land reform of 1953. This event serves as a milestone in Tacana 
people’s memory. “Here in Rurrenabaque,” Anita tells me “we vote pink (the colour of the MNR 
Party)”. Reflecting, Anita treats her MNR party allegiance as something of a family tradition: 
I don’t know why. I just always vote for them. My grandfather voted for them. It was always 
a big deal when they came to the comunidad for campaigning. We would hold a big fiesta 
just for them. It’s as if our brains are programmed to just continue voting for the MNR today.  
 
A significant demonstration of mistrust of the higher political level is Tacana people’s 
suspicion of TCOs. Though the policy behind land-tenure is pro-indigenous, Tacana people question 
the motives involved. Though not aware of it, with this they are in line with Charles Hale’s (2004) 
critical assessment of neo-liberal multiculturalism, where NGOs take on state-functions and 
indigenous areas are formed (and decentralized) so as to allow better control, be it for lumber, oil 
or, more recently, for carbon credits100. No matter how altruistic, the collaborations sought and 
concepts introduced by NGOs are embedded in Western ideas.  
Tacana People’s Mistrust of TCOs 
One great advantage of TCO, as I was told by leaders of CIPTA, is that it protects Tacana 
members from being taken advantage of (aprovechados) by politically and financially stronger 
individuals and institutions as has happened throughout the past. These range from foreign 
companies looking to buy lumber concessions from Tacana comunidades to Bolivians who want to 
study the region’s botany. Everyone who approaches Tacana comunidades inside the TCO needs to 
approach CIPTA first. “We have had many problems in the past,” Adolfo Chavez told me in 2004, 
                                                          
100 In reference to the UN REDD scheme to counter climate change. 
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long before he became president of the indigenous umbrella organisation, CIDOP; “so anyone who 
wants to work with the Tacana needs to go through the CIPTA board first.”  
While this precaution is understandable, it may also falsely evoke the images of a seamless 
internal relationship among the Tacana. Yet, just as Tacana people quickly harbour suspicion 
towards outsiders, the same applies to fellow Tacana people, especially if these are actors in political 
systems such as the indigenous movement (CIPTA, CIMTA).101 These are still political institutions 
tied to the state. The TCO board of CIPTA, composed of Tacana people from various comunidades, 
is a state-like entity with whom individuals negotiate over land rights and central issues such as 
logging, hunting and judiciary issues. Thus, though the TCO does not represent the state, it does link 
the Tacana people to the state and incorporates them into the national political system.  
There is a growing suspicion among Tacana people that the TCO system will not hold.  Nico, 
the corregidor of Buena Vista in 2008, explained how he and his family experienced the formation 
of the TCO Tacana back in 2000. CIPTA’s president went around to different Tacana comunidades 
explaining the benefits of communal land ownership in an effort to have comunidades join the TCO. 
People were encouraged to contribute their documents containing the land titles and, with the help 
of NGO professionals, these were legally pooled to TCO Tacana territory. Nico shakes his head 
smiling as he remembers this time period. 
I was young and foolish. It was all explained to us in one comunidad meeting and no one 
really understood what it meant anyway. So we all said yes. It sounded good. But now, 
years later, I realize it was a mistake. With this we are no better off than before when the 
land was ours to use but not ours to own! I would not say yes again. Now I know better. 
 
Since the 1953 land reform a number of Tacana people have owned the land they cultivate, 
and often their plot of land has been worked by family members for generations (obviously 
excluding the time of the fallow period which is between two and seven years). However, many 
Tacana individuals have never attained ownership-documentation which states their name. This is 
a typical situation and when I asked Nico how he would ‘prove’ that the plot of land was really his if 
it ever came to a dispute he gave the answer many give: “oh, everyone knows it’s mine. It’s always 
been ours.”  
                                                          
101 For an elaboration on the TCO Tacana see chapter 5 and 6. 
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While it has been possible for Tacana people to acquire legal ownership of land since 1953 
the hurdles to be overcome to attain documentation are often simply unrealistic. They include 
having the financial means to travel to the departmental capital and registering the plot of land, 
payment for a lawyer to draw up the draft of the document and even photocopies. These are 
concrete obstacles for a people who live predominantly from what they farm and for whom cash is 
hard to come by. Often the formal procedures to attain documentation are more costly than the 
land itself. Considering the circumstances, Tacana people typically sell their land by simply selling 
the original documentation with the former owner’s name – frequently the old-time patrón - intact. 
Should a legal dispute arise, which is not uncommon among siblings of a family, the situation 
becomes complicated.  
The costs involved in the formation of a TCO in Bolivia are tremendous and too high for the 
state. The neo-liberal model again comes into play. It is not atypical that indigenous groups must 
secure their own funding to help them in the process of land consolidation. Large conservationist 
NGOs are happy to offer their services, seeing the possibility of helping a vulnerable social group 
traditionally exploited by its own government. At the same time, they also recognize the possibility 
of playing a substantial part in implementing their organizational goal of conserving the 
environment. NGOs helping indigenous groups often help to draft land-tenure management plans. 
This means they provide lawyers and other professionals which help Tacana people in comunidades 
– who typically lack even basic educational skills – to legally set down on paper how they will manage 
their territory in a ‘sustainable’ manner which in this case means that the balance of the natural 
surroundings is preserved.  It is processes such as these in which the ‘permitted indian’ becomes 
shaped. Without denying that there is room for negotiation, collaboration is only possible when a 
Tacana organisation (e.g. CIPTA) complies with terms drawn up by the NGO’s.   
The process of ‘giving up’ one’s land-title in order to pool to the TCO was made very 
attractive for Tacana people who often had land-documents in hand, but ones which did not name 
them as owners. As NGO professionals and Tacana leaders explained to people of the comunidades, 
they would not have to pay one cent or make a single trip in order to attain legal documentation for 
the land to be put in their name. This marks the key moment to which Nico refers and which many 
Tacana people ‘misunderstood’. The people in his comunidad, he claims, had not fully grasped the 
implications of what a TCO was. The TCO system was new and the law it followed was equally new. 
People thought that an NGO had come to help them place the land-titles in their personal names, 
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but instead it was to be in their name communally as an ethnic group and then as a comunidad. 
Today Tacana people can be heard commenting, as Nico suggested above, that the TCOs are nothing 
other than a new government or foreign-led form of controlling the area and controlling the people 
who live on it. Nico, having had financial luck in the past years, has since bought himself land 
privately. 
Somewhat ironically, predominantly poorer Tacana people - those who never had the 
financial means to update their documentation or who did not already hold third-party land 
ownership documents - pooled their land-titles to the communal TCO land. Thus, one can often find 
that better-off Tacana people have private land-titles while poorer Tacana people must rely solely 
on communal land. This causes tensions in comunidades. At times, those families which rely on 
communal land can be heard claiming that those with private land-titles should not have the same 
entitlement to the comunidad’s communal land. 
This chapter has demonstrated that Tacana people harbour a strong mistrust of the state, 
and the politics of ‘indigeneity’, which they see as being dominated by the highlanders. As 
demonstrated in the following chapter, Tacana people’s suspicion of the government continues and 
even surges as Morales’ pro-indigenous politics are considered ‘pro-colla’, and partial to the 
indigenous highlanders.  
  
134 
 
Chapter 5 - “The Colonos come like Termites to take our Land.”- 
Struggles over Land and ‘Ways of Being’ in an Amazon 
Municipality 
 
I walked the cobblestoned streets of Rurrenabaque in October 2008, struck by the fact that 
most people in the town, both rich and poor, sported the same green t-shirts: the symbol for the 
Media Luna102 autonomy movement which at that moment was also campaigning against an 
amended constitution to be voted on by referendum. If passed, this would give considerably greater 
rights to indigenous groups and redistribute land to landless indigenous people. Most of the t-shirts 
had the imprint: Vota No! Because central newspapers defined the desire for Media Luna autonomy 
as a demand by the Santa Cruz oligarchy and élite, I was surprised to find that everyone was wearing 
the green t-shirt, some of which had Autonomia! printed on them. This went for the mestizo 
employee of the photocopy shop as much as the Tacana cook at the restaurant next to it. Having 
only recently arrived to do fieldwork, I wondered why indigenous peoples as well as middle- and 
working-class white/mestizo Bolivians of Rurrenabaque would be against the proposed change, an 
attitude which aligned them with the traditional Santa Cruz oligarchies and supported the Cruzeños’ 
monopolies of land and industry in the lowland regions.  
No exception to sporting a green t-shirt was my friend, Tacana informant and Rurrenabeque 
municipal councillor Silvia Becuma of Carmen Florida. When I visited her, I noticed she had even 
decorated the entire inside of her wood-board home with green Vota No! posters. At first, I took all 
this to be a sign of gross miscalculation due to people’s ignorance of the subject. Had Tacana people 
not understood that the referendum would grant all indigenous people of Bolivia more equality?  
Did it not occur to them that their position was aligning them with the mestizos, historically 
members of the patrón-families who had exploited their labour? Surely Tacana people had been 
‘brainwashed’ by the local mestizo élite who ran the municipality and administered municipal 
benefits to their own advantage?  
In the media and in academic literature, the role of ‘culture’ in the conflict between colonos 
and Tacana people has been either completely dismissed or downplayed. However, this denies 
agency to local indigenous groups and under-represents their role in the highland/lowland conflict 
                                                          
102 Half Moon – Bolivia’s eastern lowland region 
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in Bolivia at large. Conflicts over land between indigenous groups demonstrate a necessity for a 
more precise and differentiated definition of ‘indigenous’; one which takes into account the specific 
geographical origin of a group, and its cultural distinctness. The indigenous movement has been 
criticized for the fact that it “takes little or no account of previous or subsequent movements of 
populations’ (such as that of being lowlander or camba) (…) (and ignores) discrepancies between 
the daily practices of peoples classified as indigenous and the rhetoric that is used to represent them 
on the global stage” (Brightman 2008:21). The conflicts and political differences between the 
distinct social and cultural groups are made tangible in political spaces such as municipalities. As this 
chapter demonstrates, Rurrenabaque is a stage where inter-ethnic conflict can take shape and 
cultural differences become legible.  
This chapter first demonstrates how changes in municipal policy have opened up new 
possibilities for Tacana people to practice citizenship, specifically as indigenous people. Small rural 
municipalities lend themselves to observing interactions between indigenous groups, especially as 
the mid-1990s neo-liberal reforms (LPP) granted rural municipalities more decision-making power 
and included provincial sections. This meant that indigenous comunidades, which are typically 
located around municipal towns, were pulled into the municipal range. The combined with the 
strengthening of ‘indigenous identity’ politically, has enabled indigenous people to participate in 
local politics not only as Bolivian citizens in municipalities (municipal councillor, mayor, etc.) but also 
as openly ‘indigenous’ representatives (Kohl 2003; Medeiros 2001). This aspect of multi-faceted 
identities makes visible the racial-social affiliation of individual political actors within the 
municipality in a way which was not previously possible.  
After laying out the historical trajectory of municipal policy in Bolivia, this chapter turns to 
Tacana people’s participation in the municipal planning system, throwing light on the way in which 
municipality residents are subjected to interpretations of policy by local political representatives. 
Within the context of the municipality, Tacana representatives actively counter what they see as 
corruption by colonos, who are taking advantage of municipal funds. The municipal platform allows 
for a demonstration of the ‘humble manner’ with which Tacana comunidades and individuals 
participate in municipal politics, and which Tacana people themselves contrast to the more 
aggressive colono ‘manner’. Through certain issues which have become especially central in the past 
years, such as land-possession and allocation, Tacana people believe that the MAS project favours 
highlanders and thus colonos over their own people and all other lowlanders. 
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Rural Municipalities and the Popular Participation Law (LPP) 
The municipality as a representation of mestizo culture and politics sets a stage on which 
conflicts between highland and lowland cultures unfold. This progression also reveals the distinct 
relationship held by highland and lowland cultures within the mestizo municipality. For a long time 
the MNR party, which opposes the MAS was voted into power in Rurrenabaque. Perhaps Tacana 
people felt ‘morally obliged’ to align themselves with their fellow mestizo lowlanders, as has been 
suggested by social scientists (Painter 1988) for other cases in the Bolivian lowlands. Painter 
attributes the alignment of indigenous groups with the socially and politically advantaged mestizo 
classes to the level of poverty of ‘poor cambas’. He is not completely off the mark, as typically the 
indigenous people work for the middle- and upper-classes as domestics and hired help in the fields. 
It is a challenge for anyone to keep up to speed with the rapid changes of policy and decree in 
Bolivia, particularly in a rural jungle area such as Rurrenabaque, where there is a high rate of 
illiteracy. Indeed, when I asked Silvia how she had come to learn of the contents of the new 
constitution, she replied: 
The municipality organized a workshop and there we council members read article by article 
together, and were able to see what the government wants to do. So we organized workshops 
and through local television we explained to the population what the decree was all about. 
And for these reasons we are voting ‘no’.103 
It could be argued that the mayor and his MNR-dominated municipality had interpreted the 
referendum to their own benefit, an interpretation which they then channelled to the rest of the 
population in Rurrenabaque. I was to find, however, that the reality is more complex. 
 
The formation and history of municipalities in Bolivia differs greatly from region to region 
and again from case to case (Molina et al 2008a). An understanding of the trajectory of municipal 
formation, which has come to serve as a voice for political opinion, sheds light on the negative 
opinions held by many Tacana of the constitution of 2009 and why it is, as Silvia stated, “a bad 
constitution, in which one is punished with thirty years’ gaol for the slash and burn of one’s own 
fields.” Or as Nilo from Carmen Florida said, “it states that if you listened to music other than what 
                                                          
103 “hemos tenido un taller por la alcaldía. Y articulo por articulo hemos leído y hemos hecho ver que el 
gobierno quiero hacer. Hemos hecho talleres, mostrando a la población por la televisión porque lo está…el 
decreto. Y por eso nosotros votamos por el ‘no’.”   
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is native to the region, they send you to gaol. This means we will now all have to listen to Tsimané104 
music!”  
Although municipal autonomy through popular (vecino) suffrage was written into the 1938 
constitution (Klein 1969; Roca 2008), municipal mayors continued to be appointed by the central 
government until 1985 (Pacheco 2004) and beyond, as was the case in Rurrenabaque. This had the 
effect of undermining any local-level opposition to central legislation and allowed the mayor to be 
replaced should a problem arise. Thus it was desirable for local authorities, which took the form of 
church authorities, land-owners, and merchants/industrialists (in the rubber, sugar cane, Brazil nut, 
cattle and lumber industries), to nurture a friendly relationship with the government representative 
in the departmental capitals. This attitude went not only for small municipalities such as 
Rurrenabaque, San Buenaventura, and Ixiamas, all of which lie within Tacana territory and are within 
the vicinities of numerous Tacana comunidades; but also for central Tacana comunidades, each led 
by a corregidor (in collaboration with the local church representative) elected by the comunidad but 
appointed only with the approval of the municipal mayor and government-appointed departmental 
prefect. The prefects were to remain appointed by the central government until 2005 when 
President Carlos Mesa (2003-2005), in an attempt to climate of departmental anger triggered by 
measures to privatize water services, issued a decree declaring that departments elect their own 
prefects (Roca 2008)105.  
In an effort to improve the system of municipal government, a new municipal law was 
passed in 1985, which established prescribed? Required? that municipal governments be 
henceforth elected by the local public and have limited power over a small range of urban services 
(Pacheco 2004). This this what? Election? was unlikely to have included the indian population but 
rather referred to ‘gente’ (ie white/mestizos) of the municipality. The indians – or campesinos, in 
accordance with the term applied after the 19523? land reform - were generally assumed to be 
living in comunidades in the jungle areas outside the towns and were only included in the 
peripheries of the municipality by the LPP106. As in the case of San Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque, 
                                                          
104 The Tsimané are an ethnic group who co-inhabit the area with the Tacana, mestizos and further ethnic 
groups (see chapter 1). 
105 As this decree broke with Bolivia’s centralism it was vulnerable to being criticized as being 
unconstitutional. It was thus declared that this election was a mere recommendation and that the president 
would ultimately choose the prefect, in accordance with what the vote insinuated (Roca 2008:78). 
106 Altogether 113 new municipalities were created with the passing of the LPP (Roca 2008). 
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the mayors came from principal local white/mestizo families of Asian or European descent, who had 
at some point in the 20th century migrated to the region. Thus, for example, Yerko Nuñez, 2009 
mayor of Rurrenabaque in 2009 and re-elected into office in the municipality elections of April 4 
2010, comes from a long family line of mayors.  
In 1994, within the framework of the LPP which aimed at decentralizing Bolivia, municipal 
governments were again strengthened both in jurisdiction and funding. Local government was 
awarded 20% of the national budget, each municipality being allocated an amount in proportion to 
its population. With the backing of these funds, municipalities were made responsible for basic and 
essential infrastructure such as the construction of schools, health facilities and roads. Furthermore, 
the jurisdiction of municipal governments was expanded beyond the immediate urban centres to 
include the territory of provincial sections (Kaimowitz et al 1998). This was an important change for 
indigenous comunidades located further away from municipal towns and one which in the cases of 
Carmen Florida, Buena Vista and Tumupasa would become more complex with the implementation 
of the TCO Tacana and TCO Tsimané-Moseten. With the LPP, the rural populations living in 
comunidades in the jungle had the right to participate in the new five-year municipality planning 
system (in the so-called Plan de Desarrollo Municipal – PDM). Their residents were also allowed to 
stand for public election to the municipal council, which was monitored by a vigilance committee 
(Comité de Vigilancia), (Kaimowitz et al. 1998, Pacheco 2004). This was an important step towards 
indigenous citizenship  (Postero 2007). 
Essential in the bundle of laws making up the LPP was the requirement that indigenous 
comunidades were to be recognized as legal entities through a so-called personaría jurídica (legal 
body). With this the comunidad authority, the corregidor, has the legal right to administer and 
execute comunidad norms (Goldstein 2003). Having a personaría jurídica means becoming an 
Organización Territorial de Base (OTB) (a grass-roots organisation). Various groups within a 
municipality can become OTBs if they received their personaría jurídica, for example mothers’ clubs, 
neighbourhood organizations, indigenous groups or carpenters’ associations. As an OTB the 
comunidad can annually apply for project-funding to aid in their comunidades’ improvement, by 
elaborating a so-called Plan Operativo Anual (POA) which must comply with the PDM plans. The sum 
of these legal changes resulted in indigenous comunidades acquiring legal status, which, in turn, 
legitimised the indigenous status of their inhabitants. This reinforced the still new concept of Bolivia 
as a pluri-national state. In  
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 Silvia explains that in the first years after the introduction of the LPP ‘they’ - Carmen Florida 
and the majority of the municipality - had been “against the law”. Consciously or not, with this she 
was in agreement with the indigenous and highlanders’ umbrella organisation, Confederation of the 
Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Bolivia, CSTUCB) and its initial rejection of the decentralization plan. The CSTUCB had claimed that 
the policy was yet another manipulative means to take power from indigenous groups. As in many 
other municipalities in Bolivia, the new policies were not properly understood and thus not fully 
implemented (Postero 2007; Beneria-Surkin 2004). However, Silvia adds, “later we realized that the 
Participation Law was a good law”. To disseminate information to the public, prevent corruption 
and maintain a high standard of transparency of local governments’ spending, the LPP included the 
introduction of municipal summits (cumbres municipals). Silvia’s change in perspective can be 
attributed to informative workshops in which she partook. This US-AID funded initiative was 
specifically aimed at local municipal leaders, and explained how to implement policies and conduct 
summits. Stepping forward to make use of its legal OTB status, in 2007 Carmen Florida applied to 
the municipality of Rurrenabaque to construct a well, a communal source of potable water, in the 
comunidad. 
 “Evo is not sending down the IDH107 funds” – The Municipal Summits as a Political Tool  
The municipal summits were first implemented to provide more transparency on the 
spending of the municipality. Comunidades and organisations send representatives to participate in 
these summits. Here excel-lists are projected onto a wall, providing information on what has been 
accomplished in the past year. While providing transparency and re-enforcing a sense of 
community, these summits are also used by the party in power, the MNR, for political purposes. 
Importantly, the MNR is an opposition party to Evo’s MAS party against which antagonism is 
encouraged. Shortly after the new referendum in 2010, the MNR mayor of Rurrenabaque, Yerko 
Nuñez, was confronted aggressively in a summit by colonos demanding an explanation as to 
incomplete obras (public projects/works) in the municipality. Colonos are typically considered MAS 
supporters, while local lowlanders are traditional MNR supporters. The underlying tone was that he 
                                                          
107 Impuesto directo a los hidrocarburos – A hydrocarbon tax whose revenues are channelled towards the 
development of municipalities. By 2011 the revenues from this sector totalled US $2.2 billion, which is more 
than 50% of state revenues (Kohl and Farthing 2012). The IDH were a result of the Morales government’s 
new mineral tax implemented in 2006. 
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had lined his pockets with public money, and was corrupt. Smoothly Yerko turned the focus from 
himself, calling with angry disappointment: 
Yes, this project was not completed! But it is not our fault. For how can we spend money 
that is not given us? There was no money left to finish the project! We do our best! But the 
president (Evo Morales) is not sending down the IDH. 
 
I heard continual talk of ‘the IDH’ during my research. When someone talks about the IDH, 
he or she is always referring to revenues allotted to municipalities from the hydrocarbon tax, 
redirected by the government. It is common that people directly refer to Morales when they talk, 
saying “Evo is not sending us the IDH”, evoking the image of the president himself preventing a 
truckload of money from descending to the Amazon from the Andes. Yerko’s outburst presented an 
argument which was not novel to any of the participants, and a murmur ran through the crowd. The 
negative sentiment which had been directed at the mayor was redirected against the government, 
the MAS party and President Morales.  Once again it was confirmed, as Alejandro from Carmen 
Florida had once explained to me, that the President, “does not love us” (no nos quiere). Alejandro 
nods and repeats “Evo does not love us, so we don’t love him either” (no nos quiere, entonces 
tampoco le queremos). The missing IDH funds become one more example of how Morales hinders 
the development of small lowland municipalities; and the fact that he ‘dislikes’ them as they are 
lowlanders and do not make up his main voting constituency.  
The hard facts around the ‘missing’ IDH, however, are different. In accordance with the 2009 
constitution, funds have in fact become lawfully redirected so that municipalities with higher 
constituencies (above 15,000 inhabitants) receive a larger percentage of them. Rurrenabaque is 
among the smallest municipalities in Bolivia. Yet even those of its inhabitants who have understood 
the change in law still see cunning and malice. Daniel, a mestizo of Japanese descent living in 
Rurrenabaque, tells me: 
Of course he (Evo) changed that law! This way his people (Aymara and Quechuas) get all the 
benefits. The smallest municipalities are here in the lowlands. While the big cities, they are 
in the highlands. They are La Paz, El Alto and Oruro. Full of collas! 
 
Indeed, the Andean cities of Oruro and El Alto have the highest percentage of Aymara 
inhabitants in Bolivia. In the presidential election, these places demonstrated the highest 
percentage of Morales’ supporters. Thus, whether the lawful redirection of funds is fully 
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comprehended or not, mestizos and indigenous people of the municipality are in consensus: the 
current government is against them. This is an aspect which further unifies the two racial-social 
groups against incoming highland colonos and plays into the age-old regional conflict. 
Of ‘Humble’ Tacana People and ‘Cunning’ Colonos 
When I sat in on the municipal summit in Rurrenabaque in 2009, the first thing that struck 
me was the number of bored faces and mothers languidly fanning their babies’ faces. This was in 
great contrast to the first municipality summit I had visited in 2004, at which the town hall’s roofed 
open-air space was packed and there was a buzz of excitement in the air. It seemed that most 
comunidades had sent a representative to take part. Now, five years later, I seemed to see many 
more representatives of colono comunidades ‘de la carretera’ (from the main road) – as people said 
here, because the main road is where the colonos usually settled - than representatives from nearby 
indigenous comunidades representing Tacana, Moseten, Tsimané, Lecos and Ese-Eja. Everyone 
focused on the council member at the microphone who was listing what the municipality had spent 
of the IDH money received from the government and other major donors such as UNICEF and the 
World Bank. The summit is where the annual POA of each comunidad is explained, and comunidad 
members can see what other comunidades have applied for, what has already been put into action 
and what is still awaiting completion. 
When the inhabitants of Carmen Florida acquired a water tank in 2009 in accordance with 
their POA, it was built right next to the schoolhouse and the cede central – the comunidad’s main 
meeting house. As far as I could gather, they had waited years for the meagre four metre by four 
metre concrete construction, year after year submitting the request to the municipality. But 
because ‘Evo was not sending down the IDH’, things had advanced slowly. Now, finally, there was 
one tap furnishing drinkable water and weekly comunidad meetings were filled with plans on how 
each family could lay a white plastic pipe to their compound so that they would not have to make 
the long trek to. Miguel, the new corregidor, soon told me “it’s no good. It leaks.” I saw that he was 
right as around the tank there was a continuous puddle of water, much to the delight of domestic 
pigs.  Also, “the water pressure,” Marco from Carmen Florida explained to me “is not strong enough 
and it’s no use to lay down pipes leading to our houses.” Voicing his disdain for the malfunctioning 
water-tank, Miguel looked to make a point about the municipality of Rurrenabaque and about his 
fellow comunidad inhabitant, Silvia, who represented indigenous comunidades on the municipal 
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council. Both, he implied, were useless. Generally, as he told me on other occasions, all politics was 
useless and this was why he never voted at all.  
 Miguel’s scepticism of parties, governments and their municipal revenues is not unusual 
among the Tacana, as discussed in the last chapter. In line with Tacana people’s ‘humble’ manner, 
neither he nor the comunidad got very upset when the water-tank proved a failure. In fact, I was 
amazed at their calm and almost nonchalant reaction. No boisterous or immediate protest was 
launched. Instead, one day, the traditional group of comunidad authorities - the corregidor, the 
president and the schoolteacher - decided to set out to Rurrenabaque to talk to the mayor and try 
and improve the situation. It was immediately obvious that their ‘shy’ manner stood in contrast to 
the colonos’ way of reacting to perceived injustice.  
Silvia from Carmen Florida had been voted onto the municipal council for the second year 
in a row now. She was very proud of this fact. This year she was in charge of the commission Tierra 
y Territorio (land and territory). Acting within the framework of the law, Silvia sees it as her 
obligation to protect the municipality, which she simultaneously considers her ancestral territory, 
from falling into the hands of the ‘wrong’ people. The ‘wrong’ people in this case are highland 
migrants of Aymara and Quechua descent (colonos). 
For weeks she recounted to me in the evenings what complications this work brought with 
it. But it was “interesting”, for here she was “gaining a lot of experience. I am learning the laws. 
Most of the people of the comunidades don’t understand the laws.” One of her favourite stories 
was about how colonos “take advantage” (aprovechan) of the municipality. In doing so, they also 
take advantage of the local people (la gente del lugar), meaning lowlanders, a situation she wants 
to hinder. The collas, she explained carefully,  
always try to get more, to make a profit (ganar). They are ambitious! They help each other. 
They go to the municipality and ask for land, they buy this land cheaply. But not like we do. 
We buy it for our family, to build a house….have animals. No. They buy and cut down all the 
wood! Just for the wood! They always look for profit. But the people of the region, we do 
not look to make profit. We (Tacana) want to live peacefully and comfortably. We sell a 
chicken here or a tree-trunk there, but only in order to live peacefully. Comfortably. But how 
can we do this, if the collas advance on us like termites taking our land and cutting down 
our trees to sell?” 
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Sitting on the porch of her house in Rurrenabaque, Silvia recounted to me how groups of 
colonos who have recently come to the lowlands will show up at the municipality to register their 
newly-settled comunidades. In this context, Silvia’s work requires her to travel to these newly-
settled colono comunidades lying outside Rurrenabaque. It is her job to verify their physical 
existence. She has come across a number of cases in which colono families have created fake or as 
they are called, ‘phantom comunidades’ (comunidades fantasmas). I had asked her why they would 
so so. “To receive the money for schools and health posts” Silvia cried, rubbing thumb and index 
finger together in the typical gesture signifying ‘money’. To the inhabitants of Rurrenabaque, the 
fact that colono families create ‘phantom comunidades’ in order to reap municipal benefits 
(subsidies) reserved for infrastructure such as schools and roads is not a novel phenomenon. With 
a mixture of pride and anger Silvia recounts an occasion upon which she and her municipal 
delegation had travelled to the outskirts of the municipal boundaries to verify the existence of the 
newly established colono comunidad ‘Los Jovenes’, only to find that there was  
 
 (…) nothing - only jungle and overgrowth – and a group of collas of all ages waiting to receive 
us with a huge fiesta.  The new comunidad, however, was nowhere to be seen; just a shack 
somewhere in the middle of a cleared jungle field. The collas had assembled together all of 
their family and neighbours to help feign being the members of a new comunidad. (…)  
They would try and deter us from walking out to the new comunidad (from the road), saying 
that the path was feo (ugly, ie muddy) and the distance great. But I would insist. I want to 
see the comunidad, where is it? And then we would walk. We walked for hours and hours 
through the jungle. Since I am from el campo (the country-side) and a comunidad, I am used 
to walking and it does not bother me. If I were not from a comunidad I would not have had 
the training to walk so far and long. Indeed, the others from the delegation who are from el 
pueblo (ie mestizo) stayed behind. The collas made me walk for hours hoping to tire me out. 
In the end they showed me a shack for cows in a field and told me this was the sede (meeting 
house) of the comunidad. But where were the houses? There were none.  So I refused to 
sign their documents. They were very angry. By the end of the month they issued a formal 
complaint against me (ie so that I would resign or the post would be taken from me). They 
don’t know the laws! But I know the laws! I know that what I did was right. 
 
In this example, Silvia uses the fact that she has an indigenous identity (for which she uses 
the expression ‘from the comunidades’) positively, and to strengthen her position. In being 
indigenous she presents herself as being in a superior position to that of the mestizos (for whom 
she uses the expression ‘those from the town’) as from here she is able to uncover and recognize 
the colonos’ ‘deception’ in a way that mestizos cannot. Being indigenous gives her certain abilities 
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which the mestizos do not have (eg to walk greater distances and not to succumb to the bribe of 
fiesta, food and drink), and she can employ these abilities to the benefit of all lowlanders. Thus, 
being indigenous enables her to not only ‘protect’ fellow Tacana people but also lowland mestizos 
from the intruding and deceitful colonos. This runs counter to the historic power dynamic of the 
mestizo as former patrón and sole authority, and the indigenous as ‘protector’ of land and territory 
for both lowland mestizo and Tacana. 
In Silvia’s statement lies the claims that Tacana people, by being indigenous to this area, 
have more integrity and a higher investment in defending the land against ‘intruders’ than do non-
indigenous people. The conflict Silvia presents is not between mestizos and indigenous, as one might 
expect given the colonial politics of land distribution. The conflict lies between Tacana people and 
colonos, two indigenous groups, the former of whom, as Silvia claims, “advance on us like termites, 
taking our land and cutting down our trees to sell”. Firstly, this incident demonstrates that 
‘indigenous identity’ is becoming increasingly accepted and developed among Tacana people, as a 
useful political tool but disengaged from the formal indigenous movements of Bolivia. It further 
demonstrates that Tacana people have a stronger affiliation with a ‘camba’ rather than with an 
‘indigenous’ identity.  
According to Silvia, the colonos are upfront and bold in what they demand. She remembers 
that “at the summit meetings the collas yell and cry and make a show if they are denied benefits, 
they say: Our children need to go to school! The municipality has to build us a school!” and with this 
Silvia shakes her fist in the air, mimicking the colonos’ behaviour.  “On the other hand,” she adds, 
“the nature of us here in the lowlands is different. We don’t complain,” and she finishes as the 
Tacana so often do, “somos humilde” (we are humble). 
“The Colonos have Become more Aggressive” - The Struggle over Land 
Land is an especially sensitive issue, and one which has become topical in the past years. 
“Before all the new laws,” says Silvia, “land was worthless. There was a lot of it. It did not matter. It 
was cheap. No one wanted it”. But since the introduction of land tenures, national parks, new 
municipal laws, attributing territory to municipalities and, not least, changes in laws around lumber, 
the issue has changed. Land has become hard to come by and the timber industry has become 
central in and around Rurrenabaque. Criticism of incoming colonos, too, has therefore increased. 
“The problem is,” says Silvia, “colonos just come in without asking. They are bold. They come and 
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settle, just like that!” she snaps her fingers. “It’s because that president of theirs (Morales) backs 
them up. They come here, go into the national parks, go into the TCOs, settle private property – 
they feel strong, those colonos. They have become more aggressive now!” 
Fleshing out what Silvia was referring to, Canela from Buena Vista, a forest-ranger for the 
Madidi National Park, explained to me on a different occasion that patrolling different sections of 
the protected area she and her team regularly came across colonos, cutting down trees and clearing 
large sections of forest in preparation for planting.  
“They just show up and start building their comunidades. Sometimes it is months before we 
are even aware of them. They don’t always want to leave. They argue with us and say: ‘you 
have so much space here! You don’t need it all to yourselves.  Why do you need a TCO with 
so much space? We need to live somewhere we need to make our fields. We are not 
leaving!”  
Canela shakes her head, “we talk to them. We explain that this is a national park that they 
cannot just come and live here. Sometimes they listen and sometimes they do not”.  
 
There is no doubt in the minds of the inhabitants of Rurrenabaque that the self-confidence 
in the form of ‘aggressiveness’ of the colonos has increased with the election of President Evo 
Morales. It is said that the MAS’ rise to power has bolstered the self-esteem of ‘Evo’s people’ while 
in 2003 the term ‘colono’ still had a neutral ring, when I returned in 2008 to do research the term 
was beginning to have a negative connotation. Today, organizations in Rurrenabaque such as The 
Special Federation of Colono Agriculturists of Rurrenabaque (La Federación Especial de 
Colonizadores Agropecuarios de Rurrenabaque - FECAR) are looking to change their name, omitting 
the word ‘colono’. ‘Colono’ is starting to become associated with all the negative traits of the 
highlands; it is becoming an insult.  
Tacana people often give the impression that their troubles can largely be attributed to 
colonos. Before they began migrating en masse “times were nice”, as Juanita told me as opposed to 
the government by mala gente (bad people) such as Evo. In the era of President Paz-Estenssorro 
(1951 - 1956) and at the time of land reform they were ‘heard’ and ‘set free’. Those were lindos 
tiempos (nice times) when the Tacana comunidad members were “unified and respected each 
other”. But this mutual respect, according to accounts from Carmen Florida, Buena Vista and 
Tumupasa, changed first with the coming in of evangelical churches (see chapter one) and now with 
the increasing influx of colonos.  
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In fact, however, historically there has always been a steady flow of Aymara/Quechua 
migrants into the Tacana territory and in modern times the most intense influx came with the 
construction of a road leading from La Paz to Rurrenabaque and on to Ixiamas in the 1980s. The first 
highland-migrant comunidades were, if not directly welcome, at any rate tolerated. They did not 
pose a threat for, as Silvia said, “there was a lot of land”. The same went for individual highland 
families who settled in the Tacana comunidades of Ixiamas and Tumupasa, which hold a high 
population of colono families.  
Today problems occurring in a comunidad are commonly attributed to the influence if not 
the direct presence of colonos. Colonos, it is said, introduce ‘bad habits’ (malas costumbres). As the 
term ‘colono’ is starting to become an insult, Tacana people such as Silvia will be more indirect when 
referring to them, saying instead ‘persons from the outside’ (gente de afuera) or ‘people from the 
main road’ (gente de la carretera). Describing a fellow comunidad member’s bad conduct in illegally 
cutting down trees which belong to the comunidad, Silvia refers to him as having associated too 
much with the colonos: 
All the Nury (brothers) cut wood…and never ask for (the comunidad’s) permission. And they 
don’t contribute any benefit to the comunidad. They could at least give something…we 
don’t have chairs, we don’t have tables for the school. They really are taking advantage (of 
the comunidad) … they like to do as those from the main road do (como los de la carretera, 
ie the colonos).108 
(…) 
 I became very angry upon learning this and I said (at the monthly comunidad meeting), “the 
people who come from other places (ie the highlands), the only thing they are good for is to 
be told what to do! The people originally from here (ie the Tacana people)…we never before 
had problems. We lived as brothers!” 
 
On another occasion, Anita from Carmen Florida, expressing her frustration and to illustrate 
the highlander’s arrogance towards the lowland groups, recounts a conflict with a highland market 
woman, whom she refers to as a cholita for her typical highlander appearance of long braids, and a 
                                                          
108 “Todos los (hermanos) Colques cortaban madera… y no pedían permiso... Y no dan nada a la comunidad. 
Por lo menos dar un beneficio…no tenemos bancos, no tenemos mesa…silla… en el colegio. Son muy 
aprovechadores…le gusta hacer como hacen también aquí en la carretera. (…)Yo me enoje grave. Yo dije (en 
la reunión), la gente que vienen de otro lado, solo sirven para ser manado! La gente originaria del lugar…jamás 
hemos tenido problemas. Hemos vivido como hermanos!” (Field Notes) 
147 
 
long shawl and skirt. The indoor market of Rurrenabaque exclusively houses colono women selling 
produce both from local production and imported from the highlands.  
I was so angry. That cholita told me that we down here (ie Tacana people) would be nothing 
without them. We depend on them (for the import of products from the highlands). They 
think we need them?! We have our fields! We live from our fields! I told her, we live from 
our fields, we don’t need you! 
 
Local inhabitants feel that though there has been a switch in government since Morales’ 
accession to the presidency, this has only been to the benefit of highland indigenous peoples, who 
are receiving privileged treatment. This is especially the case in land redistribution issues in which 
the government supersedes small municipalities, such as Rurrenabaque, which does not back the 
MAS party and attributes land to landless highlanders without first consulting them Silvia explains:  
The colonos come sent (by the government) with their land title in hand. Many land titles 
(have been doled out to the collas and they) come directly from La Paz to settle here. The 
president sends all of them here to the main road and they already have their land-titles. 
(…) The normal conduct, however, would be to respect the (municipality) laws. If someone 
wants land, they should have to go to the capital109. Or turn to the town hall; negotiate with 
the town hall, with the authority here, the mayor.  And then from this they can proceed 
(with the transaction on a national level). But not them, no. They brought their navigation 
devices, ignoring the municipality and do their own thing. This is the kind of abuse the 
government hands out. And he (Evo Morales) also does this with the TCOs, but since we are 
only indigenous, he doesn’t care. He will do whatever he wants.110 
 
Somewhat confusingly, Silvia’s statement asserts that because the Tacana people are ‘only 
indigenous’, the equally indigenous president ‘does what he wants’. In the first instance this logic 
does not add up. However, what it demonstrates is that Silvia does not count ‘ethnicity’ in the 
equation of why the MAS project is different from those of all the previous governments. She does 
not ‘recognize’, that the MAS and Evo Morales specifically follow a ‘de-colonizing’, pro-indigenous 
                                                          
109 The capital of the department of Beni is Trinidad. 
110 “Aqui en la carretera (the only road leading from the Bolivian Andes to the Amazon) les mandan ya 
titulado ya. Artos títulos vienen de La Paz directo, para que (los collas) se asienten aquí. … El presidente 
mandó todos donde la carretera para que estos se sane…y que tengan título.” ... “El conducto regular es no 
atropellando las leyes… si alguien quiere tierra…tienen que irse al departamento. Hacer solicitar a la 
alcaldía…hacer tramitar por la alcaldía…con la autorización del alcalde. Y luego hacer el procedimiento. Ellos 
no. Ellos han traído directamente su vía satelital (GPS), desconociendo el municipio…ignorando…y haciendo 
sus cosas. Esa clase de atropello hace el gobierno. (Y lo hace) con la TCO…pero si somos indígenas…no lo va a 
importar…va meter lo que él (Evo Morales) quiere.” 
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course and that this is revolutionary to Bolivia. However, what she does ‘recognize’ is a much more 
intricate aspect in the context of indigeneity in Bolivia: that there is more than one indigeneity and 
hers is not the ‘right’ one. In her statement, by using the term ‘indigenous’, she is silently also 
utilizing the term originario (original). Previous to the rise of the modern indigenous movement, the 
highlanders regarded themselves as originarios while the lowland indians were termed ‘indigenous’ 
The Andean-centric history of Bolivia considered being ‘originario’ as a step up from being 
‘indigenous’. Grisaffi (2010), who did research in a mixed colono–comunidad in the valley regions of 
Bolivia, the Yungas, found this attitude exemplified in the statement of one colono man: that ‘they’ 
(the colonos) are originarios and not indigenas, different for the fact that they are a bit more 
‘civilized’. For when they first arrived, “(m)ost of them (the Yuracare people) ran away into the 
jungle but some of them had become civilised already. They didn’t want to give up their lands…but 
we conquered them with alcohol, cigarettes and salt.” (ibid: 426). 
Juanita works at the Centro Cultural Tacana located on the other side of the river from 
Rurrenabaque. As the cultural centre is in a strategic location overlooking the town’s plaza, Juanita 
can see the buses from La Paz coming into town each evening. From here they continue towards 
Ixiamas, on the road which leads into the TCO Tacana and to National Madidi Park. Juanita repeats 
what Silvia had already told me: that colonos are simply allotted land by the government with no 
coordination with local authorities. However, there is more. “They have land-titles for our land,” she 
notes calmly. “They have documents which allots them land in the TCO!” I look sceptical, for this 
would mean the government takes the liberty of allocating TCO land, land over which it does not 
have jurisdiction. In the end I was never able to see official documents stating that this was the case. 
But more interesting than whether this was actually true or not was the strong belief and feeling of 
impotence which Tacana people expressed concerning what had been lawfully attributed to them. 
It demonstrated the deep-seated mistrust of the government, as covered in the previous chapter, 
and signalled the old belief that anything the government attributes to them could just as easily be 
nullified again. However, the difference was that while previously this had been the threat of a 
‘mestizo government’, it was now one of an ‘indigenous government’ which simultaneously 
privileged ‘his people’ (Aymara/Quechuas) to the disadvantage of lowland indigenous groups.  
This chapter has demonstrated that the failure to take into account differences between 
highland and lowland indigenous groups ignores the impact which Andean-centrism has had on 
Bolivia. This failure also perpetuates the muting of lowland indigenous voices and encourages the 
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traditional view of them as ‘less civilized’ and marginal. The indigenous movement and the politics 
around indigeneity in Bolivia constitute a platform which Tacana people are not able adequately to 
make use of, as they do not feel it represents them. To avoid this, it is vital to understand which 
Tacana people are involved in the indigenous movement and to recognize that there are different 
Tacana people, as shaped by class status. This in turn is closely linked to how race has been 
constructed, which is the focus of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - “Some Families have a Bit more.” – Race, Mestizaje 
and Social Classes 
 
When I returned to visit Tumupasa in 2009 I could not help but be surprised at seeing the 
same palm-thatched roofs and wood-plank houses I had encountered six years ago.111 These echoed 
the rather romantic black and white photographs taken by early anthropologist Karin Hissink in the 
1950s (see Hissink and Hahn 1961) as well as more recent anthropological descriptions (eg Wentzel 
1989). It struck me how slow the situation was in changing, especially after so many years of 
international aid and more recently the indigenous movement, in which the Tacana were 
represented by considered to be among the most successful indigenous organizations in Bolivia.112  
Was it that people preferred living this way? Taking a closer look around, I saw there was, in fact, 
some change. A few houses were made of brick and covered with corrugated iron sheets. One might 
wonder which lucky families had come by the more prestigious type of housing material, and why it 
seemed that others had been left out of the vast wave of ‘rural development projects’ over the past 
twenty years.  
 
Some authors argue that claiming an indigenous identity has provided the most vulnerable 
groups with the possibility of liberating themselves from the nation-state and international contexts 
which promote a new kind of capitalism (Brysk 2000; Nash 2001; Sieder 2002; Postero and Zamosc, 
2004; Postero 2007; Martínez Novo 2006). In a comparison of indigenous movements across Latin 
America, Brysk (2000) lays out how social movements based around ethnicity have given today’s 
indigenous people a platform and tools which to negotiate rights and resources independent of 
national and international markets. While this may be true, the fact remains that fixed definitions 
of indigeneity have worked to give credence and political power to certain ‘kinds’ of indigenous 
(Hale 2004; Kuper 2003), namely those which are part of national and international indigenous 
organizations as opposed to those not involved with these, no matter how native in origin. As might 
be expected, this causes tensions. Those belonging to the Tacana indigenous organizations, 
especially if they are active members on the CIPTA board, are typically a sore point with those who 
                                                          
111 Wentzel in her article (2009) makes a similar observation in reference to returning to Tumupasa after 
having conducted fieldwork there in 1987. 
112 In 2004 CIPTA was collaborating with more than twenty national and international funding organisations. 
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are not involved. They provoke suspicious comments, such as that of Juanita’s sister-in-law, 
originally from the mission comunidad of Tahua and now living in San Buenaventura: 
Money flows into projects and then you don’t see where it goes. It only goes to certain 
people – to the people working in the NGOs or the leaders of the TCO. Certain people (ie 
Tacana) profit from NGOs, but most people do not. 
 
If the Bolivian state has failed to adequately establish the differences between indigenous 
groups, it certainly fails to consider important differences within the same indigenous group. A 
significant one of these is social class. As demonstrated in this chapter, this failure has led to an 
inefficient distribution of power and resources among one group and brought about conflicts 
between different indigenous groups. In collaborations and negotiations for resources, especially in 
the context of indigenous movements, the indigenous comunidad represents itself and is treated as 
a homogenous unit, mirroring Enlightenment ideas of traditional egalitarian Amazonian societies. 
However, as is immediately obvious upon entering Tumupasa, Buena Vista or Carmen Florida, some 
Tacana are in a more privileged position in the comunidad than others. It has been accepted for 
generations that there are ‘important’ Tacana families who have traditionally always had, as Juanita 
from Buena Vista put it, “a bit more”. Among the Tacana, as in Bolivia as a whole, class alignments 
are rooted in blood linkage which is tied to race and origin. Some Tacana are ‘whiter’ than others. 
Tacana people increasingly comment, as they begin to understand the political power implied in the 
indigenous movement, “the president of CIPTA, Emilio, is not really Tacana at all! His father was 
white! We, we are the real Tacana. Him, he is not really Tacana!” Taking bloodline as a basis and 
tracing the history of the Tacana since colonization, one might argue that all Tacana are, in fact, 
mestizos. This is of particular interest in the present context, as Bolivia’s middle-class is increasingly 
claiming mestizaje. Mestizos in Latin America have played an important hybrid role in colonial 
society as both the impure deviants and the transmitters of modernism to indians (De La Cadena 
2000; Mörner 1967 et al). 
This chapter focuses on the comunidad of Tumupasa to observe how mestizaje has been 
evaluated differently in the lowlands and highlands. This in turn uncovers how mestizaje is linked to 
today’s indigenous movement and constructions around indigeneity in Bolivia. Key here is how race 
has become linked to social class. Focusing on the time prior to the surge of ethnic movements, this 
chapter first reviews the construction of the indian as based on the Andean indigenous, as discussed 
in more detail in chapter one. It then discusses the role mestizaje has played in Latin America and 
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more specifically its development in Bolivia, where lowland development needs to be distinguished 
from that of the highlands.  
Tracing the first white settlement in the Amazon and also in Tumupasa demonstrates how 
colonial policy organized wealth for taxation purposes. In creating racial categories for taxation 
purposes, policy came to dictate a person’s racial affiliation as aligned with their financial standing 
and regardless of their ‘biological race’. In the Amazon comunidad, such as Tumupasa, mestizos 
came to play important mediation roles, between the comunidad and the state. This was enforced 
by a colonial political system, the so-called cabildos indigenas (indigenous councils) which were a 
greater guarantee of control over the indians of a comunidad. This system enhanced the 
perpetuation of an élite, who were as a general rule the white and mestizo families in the 
comunidad. In Tumupasa and Buena Vista these families still maintain their status although due less 
to any economic advantage than to their name. They have become significant again today in that 
they are not only the former political leaders but also the new ones in the indigenous movement: 
political leadership ‘runs in the family’. They are the people who first collaborated with outside 
bodies such as NGOs and finally came to engage Tacana people in the indigenous movement. The 
fact that these families were originally from the non-indigenous sector of Tumupasa reveals much 
about the debates around the construction of ‘indigeneity’. It also sheds light on the character 
around which the ‘permitted indian’ (Hale 2004) becomes constructed. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to challenge arguments which validate the consolidation 
of indigenous identity as a successful tool for agency, but to support the argument that indian-ness, 
along with other identity features, needs to be considered in particular contexts (Martínez Novo 
2006). Tracing the contexts which surround the different constructions of indian-ness in Bolivia lays 
bare the mechanisms by which lowland groups remain less visible than highland groups. This in turn 
allows a clearer understanding of how violent conflicts between highland and lowland indigenous 
groups are easily overlooked. 
The focus here is on a lowland comunidad. As mentioned in chapter one, different 
categories of lowland comunidades existed, distinguishable by how they were founded (see also 
Brysk 2000). The earliest types as missions, such as Tumupasa; established by patrones, such as 
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Buena Vista; or as established by highland colonos along the lines of the ayllu.113 Significantly, the 
mission comunidades incorporated a constellation of hierarchies, creating social classes which were 
rooted in turn-of-the-century European ideas of eugenics (see Stepan 1991). In these, achieving 
‘whiteness’ was most desirable while being ‘indian’ was linked to inferiority. In the latter half of the 
20th century the mestizos were typically attributed a hybrid role such as that of teacher, who 
understood and could interact with the indians and could also bring them closer to white culture. 
However, the lowland mestizo and indian have remained fairly invisible in Bolivia where the 
representation of the indian is defined around the culture and trajectory of Aymara and Quechua 
people. 
The Andean Indian as the Status Quo 
The representation of the highland indian culture does not translate to lowland cultures on 
a number of levels. Lowland cultures did not structure their lives around ayllus but settled in 
European missions, many of which today have come to be regarded as representations of original 
indigenous culture. In Bolivia, belonging to an indigenous comunidad is key in ‘measuring’ a person’s 
indigeneity. This is also represented in Tacana people’s collective identity term, ‘the people of the 
comunidades’ (la gente de los comunidades). 
Although the representative image of the indian has changed in Bolivia in the past decade, 
the historical archetypal image of the highland indian contributed to shaping racial categories, 
despite the fact that the modern indigenous movement began in the lowlands. The lowlanders 
became a focal point for NGOs and in other aid contexts. It was found that access to land and 
resources could be gained by arguing in terms of origin and ancestry. Although the indigenous 
movement has brought about a shift in the national representation of the Bolivian indian, the image 
of the lowland indian is still considered in relation to the representative image of the Andean indian. 
This dominant image has also determined understandings of mestizaje and the mestizo. 
Mestizaje has played an ambiguous role in Latin America. It appears that mestizaje 
symbolized different things in the Andes than in lowland nations (especially Mesoamerica) (see 
                                                          
113 The ayllu is a specifically Andean form of indigenous organisation centred on a group of families and 
communities which come together to administer justice, and carry out communal forms of agricultural 
production. For an overview of the ayllu system and its historic relation to the mestizo state see for example 
Rivera Cusicanqui (1992). For a more specific treatment of a highland migrant community in the lowlands 
and near Tumupasa see Wentzel (1989). 
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Gotkowitz 2011). In Andean America mestizos were historically assigned a lower place in colonial 
society than indian (De La Cadena 2000). While the Andean indian was ignorant, naïve and hard-
working and the white European was intellectual and civilized, the mestizo was cunning, calculating 
and corrupted (ibid). Generally mestizaje was a sign of female moral degeneration, a problem linked 
to incorrect female sexual behaviour such as overt lust (ibid).  
Mestizaje typically arose from the indian woman being impregnated by the white man. This 
pattern raised the issue of ‘social hygiene’ which combined physical and moral elements for the 
correct sexual behaviour necessary for a healthy, robust society (Stepan 1991; Wade 2009). Issues 
surrounding the indians and mestizos gained prominence in the context of the Latin American 
indigenist (indigenista) movement. A predominantly white intellectual movement was developed 
especially in the 1920s and evolved into different branches of thought up until the 1990s, when 
popular ideas from this context gradually became replaced and superseded by the indigenous 
movements. The indigenous movements have largely criticized indigenism as a demonstration of 
positive racism which does not look to challenge the unequal racial hierarchies, but rather reconfirm 
them (Coronado 2009; Canessa 2006a; Becker 1995). 
Culturally and symbolically, in order for mestizaje become valid it needed to be ‘cleansed’ 
from its impure, mixed state. This entailed a certain process, which originated in the concept of 
‘decency’, a notion which has changed from decade to decade since colonization. This concept is 
rooted in the notion of ‘purity of blood’ relevant to the Christians of the Iberian Peninsula in the 
1300s, as opposed to those of Jewish or Muslim descent with whom they shared the territory for 
seven hundred years (De La Cadena 2000; Wade 2009). Decency became the signifier of validity for 
indian-ness under the Spanish Crown in the 1500s which accredited indians who converted to 
Christianity with the status of limpieza de sangre (cleaning of the blood) (Stolcke 1994; Wade 2009). 
The ‘cleansed’ status never signified equality with the European colonizers, many of who themselves 
were recent Muslim and Jewish converts to Christianity (Cohen 1969). The inherent concept, 
however, remained relevant and is important in issues around suffrage and nation-building.  
‘Decency’ was the marker which non-whites needed to achieve to be accepted into the 
realms of colonial society, and eventually form a legitimate middle-class in Bolivia. Initially decency 
needed to be acquired by individuals through statutes which were issued by the crown or state 
itself. Later, however, it came to mean a specific lifestyle. This incorporated a formal education, 
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‘hard work’ and, importantly, cleanliness (De La Cadena 2000). As Mary Douglas (1966) has pointed 
out, in its essence dirt represents disorder (or chaos) which needs to be put in order to achieve 
cleanliness. Accordingly, impurity has typically been treated as a feature of subordinate groups and 
builds on the idea of dirt and contamination. It was believed that an ‘adequate’ education would 
bring the non-whites into the realms of being gente decente (decent people) which in turn brought 
them into the realms of being ‘civilized’ and ‘having culture’, and edging closer to whiteness itself. 
In Bolivia the representation of the mestizo as a degenerate hybrid began to change after 
the Chaco War (1932-35).  As laid out by Laura Gotkowitz (2008), the 1942 manifesto of the newly-
organized MNR party lauded mestizos as a sort of national symbol against colonialism. This attitude 
was probably adopted from those of lowland countries of Mesoamerica (eg Nicaragua) which 
considered mestizaje as a healthy hybrid, a mix of indian and European persons which inherits the 
better of the two blood-lines? (Hale 2002; Gould 1998). At this point in 1942 the MNR strove/strives 
to incorporate mestizo representation into the government. Significant in this revolutionary gesture 
is that a distinction was made between ‘mestizo-whites’ and ‘mestizo-indians’, thereby maintaining 
the racial hierarchy between the intellectual heads of the party and the middle- or working-class 
mestizos (Gould 1998).  
The first MNR government took steps to stand in solidarity with both the indian and mestizo 
population as demonstrated by the May 1945 Indigenous Congress called by President Gualberto 
Villarroel. Though this measure was principally taken to gain better control over different sections 
of the country, it was still the only one of its kind in South America at the time, and perhaps in all of 
Latin America in that it included a large number of indigenous representatives. The first indigenous 
congress was in Mexico in 1940, the Inter-American Indigenista Conference (or Pátzcuaro Congress) 
but, as generally characteristic of the indigenista movements, was predominantly composed of non-
indian, well-educated social scientists and government officials motivated by paternalistic interests 
(Becker 1995). What made the Bolivian congress significant was that indian leaders were directly 
assigned the responsibility of keeping ‘order and peace’ in their comunidades (Gotkowitz 2008:192). 
This position of responsibility attributed to indians a form of citizenship, for in their position of 
authority they represented the state. Significant for Tacana people’s history, the congress gathered 
together indian leaders mostly from the highlands and the valleys of Bolivia, disregarding the 
Amazon. 
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Constructing Mestizaje – Highland and Lowland 
In the Andes the mestizo of Quechua/Aymara descent was urban and had left his/her rural 
comunidad to find work among the working-class and in the market infrastructure of the white city 
of La Paz (Albó 2008; De La Cadena 2000). Thus, mestizaje became associated with the Andean city 
(De La Cadena 2000). However, as the representative depiction of indian-ness and mestizaje did not 
smoothly translate to the Amazon, its role and significance for the Amazon comunidad have 
remained largely invisible on the national political platform. In the Bolivian Amazon mestizaje was 
not urban as in the Andes but remained rural; and signified not a degeneration of moral values but 
an upgrading of the racial standing of the comunidad. This is an attitude much in line with the turn-
of-the-20th-century thought on miscegenation which, following eugenicist beliefs, equated 
blackness with backwardness and whiteness with progress, and envisaged that blacks might 
upgrade the genetic composition of their race by mixing with whites (Stepan 1991). Indeed, and 
relevantly in particular for rural areas, after the 1953 land-reform mestizaje became ‘the ideological 
backdrop of Bolivian national identity’ (Albó 2008:30). Mestizaje linked the Tacana comunidad to 
civilization and, importantly, the nation-state. The male mestizos of Tumupasa were the 
comunidad’s role models and ‘hope’ for modernization and a better life to which all would have 
access. They generally held a privileged position in the comunidad and belonged to its élite. Lowland 
comunidades’ positive idea of? mestizaje is somewhat different to  the highland culture’s 
perception. This difference may also be attributed mainly to how mestizaje is constructed as a 
unidirectional concept. 
Generally mestizaje has been constructed as a fluid hybrid state which by default moves in 
one direction only. Its starting point lies with indian ‘primitiveness’, which, when in contact with 
Europeans, by default begins a journey towards ‘modernity’. In this construct, the indian is 
attributed the role of a passive receptacle of new concepts rather than that of a contributor. The 
unidirectional nature of this flow is emphasized by the fact that 20st century authors (see Kubler 
1952 ) speak of ‘reverting’ and becoming ‘absorbed’ when referring to Europeans settling in and 
adapting to indian villages. The image is that they are going ‘backwards’ and leaving modernity, with 
the implication that indian cultures did not produce civilizations equal in status to those produced 
by the Enlightenment.  
The white settlers thus become absorbed into the indistinguishable natural mass of animals, 
forest, rivers and savages. This in turn evokes the image of ‘chaos’ which, in line with decency, as 
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discussed above, is ‘dirty’ or impure. This line of colonial logic thus regards white people who 
become indian as regressing to a state of impurity and chaos. There exists a silence around the 
possibility that a plethora of white people have, since the very beginning of Spanish colonization 
(and perhaps even before114), settled in comunidades and taken on indian culture, to the extent that 
no remaining traces of ‘European culture’ are discernible to new white visitors generations later.  
This Eurocentric attitude lies at the base of historical misconceptions. A prime example is 
Holmberg’s (1950) notion that the Siriono, who are native to the Bolivian Mojos area (department 
of Beni), were a previously ‘uncontacted’ people. He based this assumption on the ‘primitive’ state 
of living in which he encountered them, regarding this as proof that they had they had previously 
never been in contact with Europeans. Had that been the case, modernity would have ‘rubbed off’ 
on them and directed them onto its ‘progressive’ path. In fact, however, later theories showed that 
the Siriono had not only come into contact with Europeans centuries ago, but it had been this very 
encounter which caused their cultural decline from a large and proud culture, a more humble and 
less powerful one. Inherent in the Eurocentric idea that ‘whiteness’ always comes out ‘on top’: 
European settlers retain their ‘culture’ while indian ways-of-being ‘give way’ to Enlightenment ideas.  
Economic Situation in the Creation of Race 
Racial categories were coined in Latin America especially to serve in taxation (Albó 2008; 
Zavaleta Reyles 2008; Toranzo; Roca 2008; Wade 1997; Mörner 1967). In this way white people’s 
migration into lowland comunidades is meticulously documented in state archives. Significantly for 
better understanding the constructions around race, the amount of documentation generated, and 
the period of time it covers, prove the continuous settlement white people in indian comunidades. 
The fact that white people were then ‘absorbed’ by comunidades, to use the expression of authors 
who have made early contributions in the discourses around the constructions of race (eg Kubler 
1952, Mörner 1971), also reveals how far racial attribution is linked to economic status, which in 
turn is linked to policy and legislation. White people were only considered to have been ‘absorbed’ 
into indian comunidades if they did not have the financial means to uphold their dominant status 
and thus ‘stand out’.  
                                                          
114 This would be in accord with theories and histories that note that before the arrival of Columbus, 
European merchants had been trading with peoples in the Americas. See for example Cohen (1969). 
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In this context, authors also use the terms ‘retrogression’ and ‘reverting’ (Kubler 1952, 
Mörner 1971) when talking about non-indians115 who adapted to indian comunidad life. For taxation 
purposes, groups of people could become ‘white’, ‘indian’ or ‘mestizo’. While in 1796 the province 
of Huanuco in the Peruvian highlands originally had a mestizo majority, owing to its rural setting and 
the new harsh economic conditions the province “reverted” (Kubler 1952:82) to an indian majority 
before 1854. Sanz (1985) makes a similar point in reference to Quijos in lowland Peru. In 1754 the 
governor reports that in a comunidad of thirteen mestizos and two indian families, “the mestizos no 
longer differ from the indians in colour or other way of life, for despite being a mixture of whites 
and indians in colour or in way of life, they have retroceded” (ibid:262). A loss of economic status 
meant becoming indian. 
As the Bolivian Amazonian comunidad was always remote and far-removed from the 
nation’s hub, notions on socio-racial structure common in the Andes did not significantly impact the 
Amazon area. A clear-cut separation between the residential locations of the races was put into law 
in the early years of colonization (Mörner 1967). This set a precedent for a physical separation of 
races in cities, which did not exist in the same way in rural comunidades. A separation of settlements 
such as that of white La Paz and its indian twin-city El Alto116 benefitted the urban white upper-class: 
the white élite had the service-sector populations (composed of indians and mestizos) within 
comfortable range, but not as direct neighbours. This sort of segregated settlement policy did not 
function in the rural areas, allowing more room for indian customs, as polygamy, to dominate.  
In pre-colonial Amazonian cultures, it was not unusual for a man to have more than one 
wife, with polygamy particularly associated with positions of leadership. My informants told me that 
before the land-reform of 1953 one or two men in Tumupasa had more than one wife. The same 
went for Buena Vista. “The padre tolerated this,” Juanita from Buena Vista explained. He only 
stepped in if a man took on too many wives, “three or four…more than he could support.” Thus in 
                                                          
115 Prior to the 20th century Peru distinguished between racial and social groups with a variety of terms each 
dedicated to a specific combination of racial and social mixture. For taxation purposes it distinguished 
predominantly between the indians and the castas. The castas included whites, Afro-descendants, mestizos 
and races other than indian which belonged to the labour and merchant classes (Kubler 1952). 
116 The indian sister city of El Alto developed parallel to La Paz, probably in line with the initial colonial policy 
of separation. The laws enforcing separate residential living spaces were included in the Recopoliación of 
1680. (Mörner 1971). 
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the lowland comunidad the overbearing notion of sexual morality was different to that in the cities 
of the highlands.  
Tumupasa and the Nation State’s Construction of Racial Affiliation 
The racial construct in the Amazon is such that the white, as the ‘better-situated’, looks 
down on and ridicules the mestizo while the rural indian, being lowest on the socio-racial scale, looks 
up to the mestizo. In this construction, from the white person’s perspective, the mestizo is the 
‘lesser’ person, and the ‘degenerate mix’, while from the indian’s perspective, the mestizo is the 
more powerful person. Mestizaje is the first step on the path to becoming white. The very schema 
of mestizaje is a one-way street leading to ‘whiteness’ and which aims to naturalize its superiority. 
This has shaped the identity of the Bolivian Amazon. Removed from this schema, the rural lowlands 
are in fact no more or less indian or mixed-race than the urban areas which are considered whiter 
than the rural areas.  
Tumupasa is a case in point. Established as an indian mission in 1713 on the site of a failed 
white settlement, white families were at the heart of the comunidad’s very foundation (Chávez 
Suárez 1944). In late 1886 the clergy José Cardus observed of Tumupasa, ‘it seems the population 
comprises 260 married couples with a total of 1200 souls which include six or seven white families’117 
(Cardus 1886: 166). Tumupasa has seen a continuous trickle of white family settlers since its 
foundation (Wentzel 1989; Cardus 1886). Throughout the centuries in Peru and (today’s) Bolivia, 
whites and mestizos willingly settled in indian comunidades to exploit indian labour. A priest from 
Quito wrote cynically of this phenomenon in 1695: “the Spaniard to the most miserable mestizo or 
indian who dresses himself in such a way as to escape from tribute [land tax] (…) joine(d) the indians 
and settle(d) down in their villages in order to have them available day and night for any purpose 
(…)” (Mörner 1971:99 quoting Perez de Tudela y Bueso 1964:331). In the indian mission and patrón 
comunidades Tumupasa and Buena Vista, the few white families eventually mixed kinship ties with 
indians, whom they then openly recognized as family.  
However, even though there have always been white families in Tumupasa, it has never 
been considered as anything other than an indian comunidad. This is especially reinforced today in 
the context of ethnic movements, in which Tumupasa is a leading example of an original indigenous 
                                                          
117 (Translation from original Spanish my own) “Parece la población se compone de 260 matrimonios, con un 
total de 1200 almas, inclusas seis o siete familias blancas.”  
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comunidad. The conclusion can be drawn that white people who lived here and remained, 
eventually became – in the eyes of the law - indian. Changes in the law on land-ownership affected 
racial attribution throughout the centuries, as in the case of the last patrón of Buena Vista before 
the passing of the land reform of 1953. He had taken a Tacana wife and their offspring still live in 
the comunidad. They are Tacana people. In earlier centuries this manner of ‘absorption’ will have 
worked similarly.  
The Ley de Agraciados (Law of the Fortunes) of 1856118 attributed land to new settlers in 
the lowlands. It can be assumed that these became the patrónes of the former white settlers who, 
if they had lost economic power, had since become ’indian’ in the statistics of the government. The 
1886 Ley de Tierras Baldias (Law of the Waste Lands) granted indians the right to own land. 
However, this law was principally passed as a measure to encourage migration to the Amazon in 
light of the rapidly growing rubber economy. It was a government measure to control the ‘remote’ 
(from the perspective of the Andes) Amazon area through taxation (Guiteras Mombiola 2010). 
Considering indian peoples’ weak educational and financial standing, it was unlikely that they 
acquired land-titles. It is more likely that wealthier mestizo and white settlers coming in from other 
areas acquired land and ‘employed’ the natives as manual labour. Taking these legislative shifts into 
consideration and combining them with the steady stream of white people who relocated to the 
lowlands, it can be concluded that the racial mixture of Tumupasa and other Tacana comunidades 
is no more or less mestizo than that of the larger cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz. Yet the city of Santa 
Cruz, especially, is considered white because of it its descent from the creole Spanish oligarchy 
(something the inhabitants are also overtly proud of119), while rural areas are generally considered 
to be more ‘indian’.  
Important here is that the white élite which resided in indian lowland comunidades was in 
no way the same type of élite in power as the white criollo oligarchy of Santa Cruz who was 
altogether a stronger socio-politically and economically (see chapter 3). This had the significant 
effect that the economically superior oligarchy in the lowlands, and specifically in Santa Cruz, came 
                                                          
118 See Carvalho (1978) 
119 This is represented, for example, in the statement made by the winner of Miss Bolivia 2004, in which she 
announced “…people that don't know Bolivia very much think that we are all just indian people from the 
west side of the country, La Paz (...) I'm from the other side of the country, the east side … we are tall and 
we are white people and we know English so all that misconception that Bolivia is only an Andean country, 
it's wrong." 
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to symbolize the ‘whiteness’ of the region regardless of their actual ‘racial mix’. Their powerful 
situation overshadowed the white patrónes of Buena Vista and elsewhere in the Amazon making 
the fact that they, too, have a white racial affiliation insignificant alone for the fact they were not of 
the country’s economic elite. The strong likelihood that the white families who settled in Tumupasa 
and Buena Vista adapted to Tacana practices and beliefs, contributes to the invisibility of their 
‘white’ origins. In Tumupasa mestizos would continuously nurture their white blood link, through 
the maintenance of their status in the civil registry of the comunidad. If over the course of a few 
generations this documentation became destroyed in a fire or similar (fires have been frequent in 
comunidades) then there was no proof of their racial heritage but for the oral history passed down 
within the comunidad. 
The fact that Tumupasa today represents an authentic indian comunidad demonstrates that 
the concept of mestizaje does not entail the concept of white people becoming indian. Overall there 
is a lack of literature on white people (or Europeans) who became indian whatever the process 
might look like, in contrast to the great body of literature elaborating on the different trajectories 
necessary for indians to become mestizo and finally white. The underlying presumption here is that 
while non-whites can achieve ‘decency’ through certain behaviours, those who are ‘white’ from the 
outset cannot by definition – or only as an exception – ‘revert’ to something they never were in the 
first place. This assumption, inherent in mestizaje, has remained unchanged over the decades. At 
the same time, to support Bolivia’s independence from Spain, Simon Bolivar’s famous Letter from 
Jamaica (1815) positively uses and identifies with mestizaje, stating “(…) we are (…) neither indian 
nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the 
Spanish usurpers (…)” (Mörner 1967:86 citing Lecuna 1956:190). 
The Mestizo Leaders and the Cabildos Indigenas in Tumupasa 
In the construction of indigeneity and in the indigenous lowland comunidad, the mestizo in 
Tumupasa came to play an important mediation role between the white person and the indian. In 
this role s/he reconfirmed the superiority of ‘whiteness’ as equating modernity but also certified 
the indians’ ability for ‘improvement’. This happened both symbolically through the visual - in 
becoming lighter-skinned - and politically by taking up authority positions in the comunidad. The 
mestizo sons of a white father and Tacana mother who grew up bilingual and attained a higher 
education served as the go-betweens for Tacana and white European authorities in the 
comunidades. Here being mestizo was a path towards upgrading the comunidad’s racial and social 
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standing. The mestizo’s presence highlighted that indian-ness could be improved by education (De 
La Cadena 2000). Typically only mestizos could afford an education, which provided a way out of 
indian-ness.  
Tacana people of this study define the Tacana mestizos as being descendants of whites and 
indians. They may use the term gringada, especially if the person has retained much of his or her 
‘whiteness’, for example by having lived outside the comunidad for many years. Thus, Francisco 
from Buena Vista mentioned that Tumupasa schoolteacher Lucho, born to an Italian father and 
Tacana mother, was gringada. Being gringada can roughly be translated as ‘whiteness mixed in with 
indianness’ in which the indian aspect remains obvious to comunidad members. In rural working-
class Bolivia the term gringo is reserved for all white foreigners and not only for US citizens, and is 
not immediately derogatory. Mestizos from Tacana comunidades are viewed by the inhabitants as 
‘belonging’, or even family. However, they are usually literate and economically more successful, 
with links to the world outside the comunidad.  
To instil a sense of nationalism and ‘belonging’ to the nation-state, as well as to achieve 
better control indigenous comunidades, the 19th century state collaborated with the church to install 
the political system of the so-called indigenous councils (cabildos indigenas) (García Jordán 2000). 
The cabildo indigena was based around the traditional socio-authority system of the indian 
highlander, the allyu (ibid) and thus can also be seen as an imposition on Amazonian groups. The 
cabildo indigena was responsible for ensuring that the routines which contributed to holding the 
comunidad together ran smoothly. The indigenous cabildos largely mirrored the cabildo system of 
colonial Alto Peru, the political structure of white and criollo settler towns. While the Audience of 
Charcas (1559) represented the Spanish state, the cabildos represented the people of the 
comunidad as laid down in the Laws of the Indias (Leyes de Indias) (Law of the Indies) by the Real 
Ordenanza del Virrey Toledo (Ordinances of Virrey Toledo) in the late 1500s. This system was to 
allow for a sense of community while also instilling European law, values and training in the colonial 
system of political affairs (ibid).  
The main positions in the cabildo indigena of Tumupasa were filled according to racial and 
social standing. White and mestizo inhabitants held the highest positions. These were the 
‘respectable folk’ in the comunidad, the so-called vecinos and gente. The highest possible authority 
position was that of corregidor. Each year in conjunction with the priest or patrón two or three 
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names of possible corregidors would be sent to the mayor of the town under whose jurisdiction the 
comunidad lay. The rest of the authorities and posts which made up the cabildo indigena were voted 
upon each year (Wentzel 1989; Hissink & Hahn 1985, 1961). Among their principal responsibilities 
was the nourishing of a certain order and unity among comunidad members. Thus, for example, it 
was within the responsibility of local authorities to help organize festivities, which were aligned to 
Catholic saints’ patrón days (Hissink & Hahn 1961).  
Significantly for the link between race and social class, the post of corregidor and other 
important positions always went to the same families, as was the case also in Rurrenabaque. Here, 
family affiliation outweighed gender affiliation and women, too, were appointed corregidora. The 
vecinos and the church representatives generally depended mutually on each another and 
benefitted from each other’s socio-economic positions. With the land reform in 1953, the 
comunidades’ race-based social stratification began to break down. The superior status of the élite 
who had typically identified themselves as ‘white’ and then ‘mestizo’ in the Tumupasa registry 
became mostly symbolic as their financial status became little better than that of the rest of the 
comunidad members (see also Wentzel 1989, 2008). Even before this, however, the financial power 
of the élite had not been significantly higher than that of the majority. Indeed, when Juanita of 
Buena Vista speaks of some “people having a bit more”, visually this was represented by houses 
made of a concoction of packed straw and mud which would then be whitewashed, as opposed to 
walls made of charo. Wealthier compounds typically held more houses than poorer compounds, 
which had just one sleeping and one kitchen house. Elite families furthermore had more domestic 
animals such as horses and cattle, and employed other comunidad members in the household and 
to work in the fields. Thus, when stepping into a Tacana comunidad such as Tumupasa or Buena 
Vista the untrained eye generally saw rudimentary huts and houses and the overall impression was 
that of poverty, especially compared to houses in towns and cities.  
Despite the land reform, formerly important families, identifiable by their surname, 
retained an élite status. As mentioned, policy shifts could bring about shifts in an individual’s racial 
attribution. Having lost their financial superiority which had formerly set them apart from the rest 
of the comunidad members, mestizos in Tumupasa and Buena Vista could now be easily ‘overlooked’ 
by the state and regarded as ‘one more indian’. In this way the combination of financial power and 
geographical location contributed in the shaping of one’s racial identity. However, policies did not 
necessarily change internal social rankings. By the time of the land reform of 1953, the system of 
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authority grounded in racial affiliation had become self-perpetuating. Certain families in Tumupasa 
were and are the established élite.  
Today, tracing the racial roots of vecino (or élite) families is a delicate undertaking, and 
introducing this topic is not easy. Even professionals and NGO workers who have been collaborating 
with Tacana people long enough to know such details will wave away any inquiries as ‘politically 
incorrect’. With the rise of the ethnic movements this topic has become charged in a new way. Being 
indigenous can mean political power. As Juanita once offhandedly said, “today the whole world 
wants to be indigenous”. Going around inquiring as to a Tacana leader’s blood-links is not exactly 
getting on people’s good side, and too much interest is regarded with suspicion. The present tension 
around the topic indicates the extent to which the politics around mestizaje continue to be charged, 
and the ambiguity around indigeneity. In particular, it suggests Tacana people are less secure in their 
indigenous identity than they are in their ‘camba’ one. Some individuals, such as Juanita freely 
explained to me which families hold blood-ties with the former priest of Tumupasa or are 
descendants of the patrón of Buena Vista. Others, however, such as Italian-Tacana Lucho who has 
spent much of his adulthood abroad, vehemently denies that anyone in Tumupasa or Buena Vista is 
the descendant of a patrón. Either way, information on affiliation can be acquired from the 
comunidad’s civil registry in which people are identified as white/mestizo or indian.  
Recognizing the complications posed by racist bureaucrats in attaining land titles after the 
land reform, initiatives were taken in the 1970s by church groups (and later by NGOs) to help 
indigenous groups. In 1972 the Maryknoll missionaries initiated the Equipos Móviles de Educación 
Integral Rural (Mobile Teams for Rural Education - EMEIR) to help establish unions and agricultural 
cooperatives in Bolivia which focused on issues of land redistribution (Herrera 2005). In the 1980s 
Father Diego of Tumupasa bought land-titles for Tumupasa families, with the understanding that 
they would repay him over time. Some people in Buena Vista and Tumupasa were able to obtain 
their private land-title without the help of the church. Juanita mentions that in Tumupasa and Buena 
Vista, the traditional élite families, who are among those helped by the priest, today mainly hold 
private land-titles within TCO territory. 
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Indigenous Leaders and Projects in Tumupasa - Paving the Way for the Indigenous 
Movement 
One might assume that the 1953 revolution and land-redistribution policy radically altered 
the socio-political structure in a Tacana comunidad. Indeed, this might have been the case, were the 
Tacana people, as a group, ‘vengeful’ as opposed to ‘humble’, but it was not. Leadership positions 
were attributed to the same families. What did change, however, were the types of initiatives taken 
to continuously ‘improve’ the comunidad. With new initiatives, new committees were formed but 
the people on these remained largely the same. The central goal of these committees, beyond 
organizing festivities such as the Easter Procession, was the continuous modernization of Tumupasa.  
By creating committees the mestizo families directed the comunidad members towards 
‘modernization’, thereby continuously linking Tumupasa to the nation-state. This was important 
especially as the comunidad lay far from the country’s political hub and had limited possibilities for 
obtaining current information. Tumupasa’s efforts not to lose contact with municipal and 
departmental politics can be contrasted to other indian comunidades which lived in complete 
isolation from their wider surroundings, and were virtually indifferent to an affiliation with the 
nation-state. Importantly, committee positions also brought political leaders within the range of 
outside collaborations and short-term employment, a very attractive situation as cash was almost 
impossible to come by. Being on the board of a committee was central in gaining experience with 
the outside. To Tacana people this also translated ‘knowing how to travel’ (saber como viajar), which 
included the confidence to move in the towns and ‘know’ how to interact with people. In this way, 
being from an élite family could open doors and bring one within the realms of obtaining an 
understanding of life beyond Tumupasa; of larger political and social situations and, not least, the 
confidence to interact with NGOs when these began appearing.  
The increased outside collaboration of state projects and NGOs perpetuated and 
naturalized the privileged status of the élites: already having experience led to the gaining of even 
greater experience. This situation is reconfirmed in the attitude of numerous Tacana people today 
towards élite families. Upon learning from Juanita that “some families have a bit more” as they had 
received the help and support of the local priest and/or the patrón, I initially wondered why this 
seemed to be accepted so uncritically and why it did not arouse more jealousy. But, since élite 
individuals have had a head-start, they possess social and political knowledge and experience in 
collaborating and negotiating with NGOs and government representatives. Thus, Tacana people 
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who have not been in these privileged positions will encourage experienced comunidad inhabitants 
to take on leadership positions and negotiate with NGOs, in the hope that this will prove fruitful for 
the comunidad as a whole. It is hoped that they will ‘know how’ (saber como) to collaborate and 
thus bring ‘projects’ (proyectos) into the comunidad. When I first introduced myself in Carmen 
Florida at a monthly comunidad meeting, my initiative as an anthropologist was not quite 
understood. Because I was ‘from the outside’ (de afuera), it was assumed I had come to bring 
‘projects’. People from the outside who come to Tacana comunidades around Rurrenabaque are 
usually NGO workers or other professionals who have come to ‘help’ the comunidad within the 
framework of the international development arena, more recently specifically geared towards 
‘indigenous people’. If one does not bring ‘projects’, one runs the risk of not being welcome and 
may be asked to leave. Such has been a result of international development. 
As a rule, ‘projects’ are efforts to modernize the comunidad and entail different 
infrastructural measures. To give an idea of the steadiness and continuity of these initiatives, in 
Tumupasa over the course of the 1960s and 70s they have included a Neighbours Committee (Junta 
Vecinales), a School Committee (Junto de Auxilio Escolar) and a Road Committee (Junta Caminera). 
The Road Committee, established in 1976, relied on departmental funding by CORDEPAZ (The 
Cooperation for the Development of La Paz Piedmont, Corporación Desarrollo para La Paz Del 
Piedemonte Oriental) and included about 120 km of road which passed through Tumupasa (Wentzel 
2009). Then, in the late 1970s and early 80s, the Agrarian Reform Commission (Comision de la 
Reforma Agraria) was established to dedicate itself to the acquisition of land-titles for 
Tumupaseños. In the early 1980s efforts to bring potable water to Tumupasa led to the 
establishment of a Water Committee (Comité de Agua Potable). During this time the church, 
embodied by the local priest, Padre Diego was the central figure. He led the committees, aiding 
comunidad members and in this way acted as an intermediary between state and comunidad. It was 
due to his efforts that 192 individual land-titles in Tumupasa were acquired in the mid 1980’s. When, 
in the 1980s, CORDEPAZ again collaborated with Tumupasa in the installation of a health post 
(headed by the Comité de Obras Publicas) and funding suddenly lagged, Padre Diego’s initiative 
provided the missing sum.  
These incidents demonstrate that although the government collaborated with rural (ie 
indian) populations, the traditional authority, in the form of a church representative, continued to 
be the reliable and consistent leader. While this was useful for the success and continuity of the 
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‘projects’, it also served in reconfirming that the traditional comunidad authority was not indigenous 
but white (priest) or mestizo (mestizo Tacana élite). This implies that non-indigenous people’s 
involvement is essential for successfully tying the comunidad to the nation-state and subsequently, 
as will be demonstrated, to the indigenous movement. 
Being a former mission comunidad has been to Tumupasa’s advantage as it has fallen within 
the responsibility of a church congregation. Even in the decades in which there was no direct church 
representative living in Tumupasa, there was always a designated representative who came for 
special events, such as christenings. Importantly, in being a mission comunidad, Tumupasa had the 
European infrastructure which was necessary in processes around gaining land-rights and becoming 
involved in the indigenous movement, which is the topic of the following chapter. Understanding 
such aspects is necessary in understanding what the criteria are which the ‘indian’ needs to fulfil in 
order to be ‘permitted’ (Hale 2004).  
While Tumupasa represents a genuine indigenous comunidad in the eyes of the state, this 
chapter has demonstrated how people in comunidades are constructed as ‘being’ indigenous (and 
mestizo) along socio-political and economic guidelines as dictated by colonial policy which organized 
and taxed ‘wealth’. Key in the organisation of indigenous comunidades were the cabildos indigenas 
which reaffirmed socio-economic and racial categories. Identifying the heterogeneity in an 
indigenous comunidad helps to understand the mechanism for the distribution of power and 
resources within it. At present, for the Tacana of this study, this is linked to who is involved in the 
indigenous movement and who is not.  
As demonstrated in the next chapter, mestizo Tacana who formerly emphasized their white 
blood-link now highlight their indigenous blood-link,) by becoming involved with the ethnic 
movement. Contrary to the way in which such transformations are now portrayed politically, 
ideology in fact plays less of a role in Enlightenment-based notions of ‘reclaiming’ a collective ethnic 
identity than practical concerns around attaining natural resources and upgrading one’s standard of 
living.  
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Chapter 7 - Whose Indigeneity, Whose Idea? – Of Land, Lumber, 
NGOs and Reluctantly Embracing Ethnicity  
 
When walking through the plaza of Tumupasa today one might come across the former 
schoolteacher, Lucho. A fluent Tacana-speaker who has lived in La Paz for a number of years, he 
might approach you, content for the chance to talk to a foreigner. Though he hardly knows you, he 
will engage you in a convincing discussion on the importance of bilingual education and the 
preservation of Tacana traditions. It immediately becomes clear that Lucho is proud of his Tacana 
heritage. Soon he will offer you a look at his copy of the Tacana-Spanish dictionary which he helped 
compile in the early 1990s.  
Indeed, Lucho came to be an excellent informant and friend who taught me a lot about the 
history of Tacana people in Tumupasa. Thus it came as a great surprise when on a different occasion 
Carlos, the corregidor of Tumupasa, taking a break from harvesting rice and resting in the shade of 
his house with a bola (wad of coca-leaves) in his cheek, shook his head about my enthusiasm for 
Lucho. With a smile he remarked, in the typical calm Tacana manner, that yes, Lucho used to be the 
schoolteacher. In fact, he had been his teacher! But, no, he would never send his son to school with 
Lucho. Nor would other parents. Indeed, today in Tumupasa he would never receive the position of 
bilingual educator. Twenty years ago, when a respected authority of the comunidad, Lucho had 
applied corporal punishment to his students for speaking Tacana in the classroom. Lucho is the son 
of a Tacana mother and an Italian father.  
This chapter focusses on the process by which the Tacana people of Tumupasa began their 
participation in the politics of the indigenous movement in Bolivia. Understanding this process 
illuminates the debate as to how indigeneity is introduced and constructed ‘on the ground’. The 
indigenous movement of the late 1980s is based on claims to TCOs for which inhabitants of 
indigenous comunidades could apply. To be eligible, members of comunidades had first to 
successfully register as ‘indigenous’. For this, in turn, all inhabitants had to first ‘agree’ to their being 
native or indigenous, as becomes explained below. A central issue in this politics of indigenous 
identity, is looking closely at which stake-holders are involved in its constructions and what each of 
their motives is. Discerning the stakeholders and their agendas, demonstrates how far ‘being 
indigenous’ (i.e. being ‘ethnic’ or non-white) is a construction in the framework of the neoliberal 
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nation-state. NGOs greatly influence this construction. As an effect of decentralization, NGOs are 
able to play nation-building roles which are normally taken on by the nation-state. This also includes 
a heavy involvement in the politics around indigeneity which includes working very closely with 
indigenous groups and contributing to how indigenous identity becomes defined.  
In the past, Tacana did not stress – indeed, downplayed – the ‘ethnic’ element of their 
communal identity, preferring to focus on their shared Amazonian geography, camba identity and 
the fact that they came ‘from the communidades’. The shift towards ethnicity is principally a political 
move to attain resources. For this, Tacana leaders, many of whom many had up to this point self-
identified as mestizos, had to shift from stressing their ‘white’ blood link (which was typically from 
the father, as in the case of Lucho) to their indian blood link (the mother). Fellow Tumupaseños who 
were not leaders, meanwhile, needed to be persuaded to follow them in embracing an ethnic 
identity. This was problematic as, since the outset of the missionization which first introduced them 
to the nation-state, Tacana people had been continually encouraged to ‘whiten’ themselves. This 
required actively and continuously moving away from indian-ness, if necessary with the aid of 
punishment, as demonstrated in the case of the schoolchildren who spoke Tacana. This decision to 
emphasise indian-ness required Tacana leaders to find a process which would allow them to 
embrace an ethnic identity, not only legally (so as to attain land tenure) but also in the context of 
their common history and shared experience as a people. This process is of emphasis in this chapter.  
To lay out the involvement of Tacana people with the indigenous movement, this chapter 
begins with lumber and logging in the Bolivian Amazon, which eventually led to Tacana leaders to 
apply for indigenous land-tenure. As lumber became lucrative, affecting their living space while at 
the same time ignoring their presence, Tacana leaders in Tumupasa, in line with ‘helping’ to 
modernize the comunidad, searched for ways to become involved. In the early 1990s, in line with 
policy reforms, claiming an ethnic identity became a solid tool for laying claim on local resources. 
The new generation of Tacana leaders, better educated and more confident than their parents, 
began to engage in direct collaboration with NGOs and national bodies, superseding traditional non-
indian authorities such as the comunidad’s priest. However, inexperience and mistrust made these 
new collaborations problematic.  
The political leaders of Tumupasa decided to follow suit with other indigenous peoples 
around the country who were establishing indigenous organisation and formed the national Tacana 
organisation CIPTA to claim land-tenure. The church, a principal representative of Tacana people, 
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thus made way for a new type of collaboration: an indigenous organisation, CIPTA and 
predominantly conservationist NGOs. Key to this process was also the geographical location of 
Tumupasa for it is no coincidence that this process happened specifically here. The collaboration of 
NGOs inherently contributes to the shaping of Tacana indigenous identity and Tacana leaders, who 
had up until then discouraged indian-ness, were now encouraging the comunidad to embrace 
ethnicity. In this they accepted the aid of NGOs, who organised workshops to lay down a multi-
faceted management plan for the Tacana land-tenure. This plan was set in a Western-style 
framework, encouraging Tacana ‘cultural’ attributes in a way which Tacana people had never done. 
It introduced Tumupaseños to the concept that they ‘have’ traditions and culture and that the sum 
of these attributed them a new political power.  
Ideology as Strategy - What Lumber has to do with the Indigenous Political Organizing  
As discussed in the last chapter, in the effort to raise their standard of living and modernize 
the comunidad, the leaders of Tumupasa were always on the lookout for projects in which the 
comunidad might become involved. The 1980s in particular saw increased activity in the lumber 
business in Bolivia as the government was rapidly selling concessions to international industries, as 
well as national ones based in Santa Cruz. The Amazon area was especially affected. For the industry 
to come in, however, passages had to be created. For a long time a principal passage had been the 
water way. I was told that during the peak times of logging, the Beni River had been so densely 
packed with logs drifting downriver “that one could cross from Rurrenabaque to San Buenaventura 
simply by jumping from log to log.” 
Road construction was also underway. Indeed, shortly prior to the logging-boom, 
Tumupaseños had helped in the ‘project’ of constructing roads between San Buenaventura and 
Tumupasa. They had worked without monetary remuneration, instead being paid in food stamps by 
the government. This type of government exploitation perpetuated the colonial practice of 
devaluing the manual labour of campesinos and also reinforced the tradition of barter, typical of the 
area. On a larger scale, this road was part of the government’s migration programme, the so-called 
March to the North of 1971. By 1986 this programme had led to the migration of around two colono 
families to the province of Iturralde (Wentzel 2009). Though the in-migration of colonos is regarded 
with scorn today, in the 1980s it did not pose a threat.  
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Instead, what the Tacana were watching, much more closely and with increasing frustration, 
was how their forest was being carried off over their heads, as lumber truck after lumber truck 
rumbled from the depths of the jungle, through their comunidad and on to Ixiamas. Between 1979 
and 1987 the government had agreed to large-scale deforestation to help ‘develop’ the Amazon 
region. Soon, however, people came to realize that these efforts were less about national or regional 
development than they were about satisfying the interests of private companies such as those in 
Santa Cruz who had obtained concessions of more than 2.9 million hectares of land in northern La 
Paz and Pando (ibid; CDF 1988). 
As the logging of especially mahogany and other trees reached a highpoint, The 
Tumupaseños either wanted to have stopped or, when it became clear that this would be a lost 
battle, be included in the benefits it brought. They wanted to have land concessions or, if they could 
not have these, then be employed in the logging industry (Wentzel 2009). Yet there seemed to be 
no way to become involved. Disputes over lumber concessions in the 1980s first spurred ideas 
around indigenous land-tenure, based on granting local people authority over the resources around 
them. The first initiatives were launched further east, in Santa Cruz. The Guaraní people created the 
indigenous lowland organisation Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (Central de Pueblos 
y Comunidades Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano - CIDOB) in 1982, which initially exclusively 
represented Guaraní people in the department of Santa Cruz. By 1989, however, CIDOB encouraged 
the participation of other lowland indigenous groups.  
Similarly, shortly before terminating its work in Bolivia in the early 1980s, the Summer 
Institute of Linguistics (SIL) (Castro & Dolores 1997) had helped in the formation of Chácobo, Ese-
Eja and Caviñeno peoples’ indigenous organizations (Astete 2011; Riester 1989). With the help of 
CIDOB, these established the Regional Ethnic Committee of North-Eastern Bolivia, CRENOB (Comité 
Regional Étnico NorOeste Boliviano) in 1989. In 1991, CRENOB expanded to include further ethnic 
groups, such as the Yaminahua, Machineri, Pacahuara and Araon and changed its name to Central 
Indigenous Organisation for the Amazon Region of Bolivia, CIRABO (Central Indígena de la Región 
Amazónica de Bolivia) (ibid). The focus on ethnicity was significant in these processes of political 
organisation (Astete 2011). 
Establishing indigenous organizations sub-divided the monolithic campesinos group into 
distinct groups based on their ethnicity. The focus was no longer on occupation (farmer) as had been 
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the case since land reform (1953). As a result, the ethnic diversity of the lowland region was 
highlighted in an entirely new way. Significantly, the highland-lowland divide which causes so much 
tension today had been able to remain invisible in part because cultural-ethnic distinctions between 
indigenous groups simply did not exist in any serious political form. ‘Indigenous’ equated simply 
with campesino. Under this definition, colonos were campesinos from the highlands who settled 
among campesinos from the lowlands. Any conflicts to emerge would be one among campesinos, 
presumably over land, to which each, because they were from one nation-state, had the same 
rights. An argument based on being native to the region did not enter into the equation. With the 
emergence of the indigenous movement, however, ethnic differences had a platform.  
The lowland indigenous movement in Bolivia originated with the 1990 March for Territory 
and Dignity (Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad) which led from the lowlands to the highlands 
and was organized by CIDOB (Postero 2007; Yashar 2005). Significantly, this movement was initiated 
in the lowlands. This was a novel situation in Bolivia. Previously ethnic movements had emerged in 
the Andes, under highland leaders of Aymara descent (Yashar 2005) such as the political leader 
Felipe Quispe, who took the Aymara name, El Mallku, which carries meanings attributed to a former 
indigenous nation, the Aymara Nation. Such initiatives were tied to the Katarismo movement of the 
1970s which drew on early 18th century indian revolts headed by Tupaj Katari (Klein 1969). Though 
there was a strong ethnic aspect, highland groups did not predominantly use ethnicity as the main 
basis of their argument for achieving rights. Rather the focus was around occupation, in accord with 
the political climate of the times. Thus highland indigenous peoples established unions, a central 
one being the Confederation of the Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (Central Sindical Unica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia - CSUTCB) in 1979 (Yashar 2005; van Cott 2005; Klein 1982). 
The CSUTCB was, however, heavily based in the establishment of unions and workers’ groups. 
Highland Aymara and Quechua actively linked themselves to the colonial structure of the nation 
while still successfully maintaining fractions of their own socio-cultural form of organization.  
It was only with the lowland indigenous movement that a ‘localness’ to a specific geographic 
location within the nation-state became relevant, and the basis for indigenous land distribution. 
Initiatives based on indigenous peoples’ rights to land heritage became closely tied to the 
conservation of living-spaces. In 1990, this paved the way for the conservationist policy, the so-
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called ‘Ecological Pause’ (Pausa Ecologica Historica120) which instigated the removal of six logging 
concessions in the lowlands, of which 937,000 hectares alone were the department of Iturralde, 
where Tacana people of this study reside (Wentzel 2009). CIDOB and its indigenous affiliate groups, 
in collaboration with NGOs, launched efforts to grant native lowland comunidades the possibility to 
lay a claim to the territory these concessions had left. An indigenous right had also been reflected 
in laws drafted by the government’s land-reform institution, National Institute of Agrarian Reform 
INRA (Insituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria - INRA) in the late 1980s.  
In reaction to pressure from CIDOP member groups, the state passed a Supreme Resolution 
explicitly declaring native land-tenures pertinent to the country’s social and cultural heritage 
(Wentzel 2009 see above citing herself 1989). The government of President Sanchez de Lozada 
established the Secretariat for Indigenous Issues (Subsecretaria de Asuntos Indigenas) and created 
TCO. In so doing, the government dodged the mounting criticisms claiming that a democratic 
government was allowing land distribution and logging concessions to private parties, without 
granting local inhabitants claims to their native land and resources (ibid 2009). It was for strategic 
rather than ideological reasons that the government had agreed to the creation of TCOs. By 
sectioning the land and allowing for portions of it to be owned by local groups, the government was 
better able to go about the politics of neo-liberal decentralization. 
The government was not alone in acting strategically in its creation of ‘indigenous rights’, in 
which the concept of ‘being indigenous’ was granted a new powerful political level. The Tacana 
people, too, decided to engage strategically with this new concept. In the late 1980s Tacana leaders 
registered Tumupasa as an ‘indigenous’ comunidad. This stands in contrast to how Andean groups 
had organized in earlier movements. Previously, Andean indigenous movements in Bolivia had taken 
care to explicitly avoid basing their struggle on the terminology of ethnicity, so as to have a better 
chance of achieving their goals. They had framed their politics in the contexts of workers’ rights. 
Socio-cultural ideology had, however, played a central part in their organizing. In contrast, the 
strategic move to highlight cultural ideology in the most recent indigenous movement had been on 
an impulse from non-indian outsiders. International arenas such as the UN and the Forum of 
Indigenous Peoples created platforms for groups to gain rights on the grounds of ethnicity.  
                                                          
120 (DS 22407) 
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Tacana people themselves did not initially welcome a strategy based on ethnicity and 
heritage. They did not initiate political organization as the highlanders had. This is significant when 
wanting to understand which actors and which factors contribute to the making of Tacana 
indigeneity and in which aspects highland and lowland indigenous ways of organising differs. Tacana 
leaders in Tumupasa principally identified as mestizos and this is what gave them an advantage in 
the comunidad. They distinctly did not identify as Tacana (see also Wentzel 2009). In the early 1990s 
they were encouraged to change this attitude by professionals from the global North and the 
indigenous umbrella organisation CIDOB, itself acting in close collaboration with Western 
professionals. In order to receive resources, they were to base their struggle on the aspect they had 
been trying to get away from since missionization: their ethnicity.  
Former socio-class issues come to light in the outside impulse which moved political leaders 
of Tumupasa to accept ‘being indigenous’. Better-off Tacana people (who were leaders), were the 
first to embrace ethnicity as a political tool. While they had understood the benefits to be gained, 
they needed to persuade fellow comunidad members to follow suit. It was not easy: the first 
reaction of fellow Tumupaseños was suspicion linked to the belief that the better-off leaders would 
benefit from this new ‘indigeneity’, while they would remain pobre como siempre (poor as always). 
This attitude partly still prevails today among Tacana people of the comunidades. “The indigenous 
movement,” I have been told on a number of occasions, “is something for those with connections 
(to the outside and to NGOs)”.  
It is ironic that those who were least ‘indigenous’ in Tumupasa not only readily took on an 
‘indigenous identity’, but launched the project to persuade the other, less-privileged and more 
‘indigenous’ Tacana to embrace an ‘indigenous identity’. Tacana people, being a ‘humble’ observed 
these efforts with amusement. I was told that Celin Quenevo, who was later to hold the position of 
CIPTA president for over ten years, at this time received the nickname el indigena. “Oh, here comes 
el indigena, we said when we saw him coming,” I was told by a grinning Lucho one afternoon, as he 
recounted the beginnings of CIPTA and the Tacana land-tenure to me. The fondness with which he 
recounts this era is telling of the scepticism people felt towards the new politics at the time. It took 
much hard work to persuade the majority of comunidad members to agree to being ‘indigenous’, in 
order to then be able to register Tumupasa as ‘indigenous’ and launch on the process of gaining 
land-tenure.  
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Importantly, a different version of these beginnings has been given to the outside world, 
and may very well enter Bolivian history books. An optimistic and uncomplicated attitude towards 
indigeneity by indigenous groups themselves fits with neoliberal state politics and the construction 
of the Enlightenment’s happy ‘noble savage’. A recent publication by CIPTA (in collaboration with 
NGOs), depicts the rejuvenation of Tacana ‘ethnicity’ as a political project which had long been 
yearned for:  
At the outset of 1990, some young Tacana recognized the necessity of organizing the 
comunidades, to value our traditions, our culture and to defend our territory, which 
historically we have always occupied (…). A number of us participated in the Indigenous 
March for Territory and Dignity (Translation mine) (CIPTA 2007:8)121 
 
Not only is this depiction of Tacana people’s involvement with the indigenous movement 
strangely uncomplicated, as if years of racism had left Tacana ‘values’ and ‘traditions’ untouched, 
but neither does it mention any collaboration from the outside. Yet this collaboration (ie NGOs, 
professionals, church affiliates etc.) is key in the shaping of Tacana indigeneity and their becoming 
involved in the first place. Indeed, the German anthropologist Sondra Wenzel notes her own 
involvement, having encouraged two representatives from Tumupasa to travel to Cochabamba to 
participate in a CIDOP meeting in 1987 (Wenzel 2009). It is important to recognize this outside 
involvement, if only to understand the sudden and extreme volte-face between centuries of 
avoiding an emphasis on ‘ethnicity’ to swiftly embracing.it 
Furthermore, while ‘ethnicity’ was now accepted, Tacana people’s principal concerns 
around becoming ‘modern’ and ‘modernizing’ the comunidad had not altered. It was simply that 
ethnicity was the better strategy for securing ‘modernization’, which continued to be focused on 
the acquisition of resources and the improvement of one’s standard of living. There is some irony 
here, for by definition ‘modernization’ stands in contrast to ‘indigeneity’, which in the neo-liberal 
state is represented by the romantic Enlightenment language of ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’ (as 
demonstrated in the introduction of this thesis).  
One might ask how Tacana involvement with the indigenous movement might have looked 
if the initiative had not come from a Tacana mestizo élite and those vecinos with a secure link to the 
                                                          
121‘A partir de 1990, algunos jóvenes tacanas vimos la necesidad de organizar mejor a las comunidades, de 
revalorizar las tradiciones culturales y de defender el territorio que históricamente habíamos ocupado (...). 
Varios de nosotros participamos en la Marcha Indígena.’ (CIPTA 2007:8). 
176 
 
nation-state (formal education, land ownership etc.). It may very well be that had it not been for 
Tacana mestizos in Tumupasa, Tacana people would not have become involved with the indigenous 
movement as quickly as they did and would, instead, have acted more according to the logic, and at 
the gradual pace, of the Ese Eja who were not ‘organized’ enough to get the process of acquiring 
land-tenure underway as quickly (see Alexiades, Machuqui & Monje 2009; Lepri 2003). This 
possibility is supported by statements made by my Tacana informants, such as Juanita from Buena 
Vista, who explained that the reason Tacana leaders were re-elected, even though they are ‘corrupt’ 
and have ‘too many privileges’, is that they simply know (saber) how to work in the Western system 
(see also Rosengren 2003). They therefore possess knowledge which other Tacana people do not 
have.  
The Ese Eja, who do not have a strong indigenous organisation as do the Tacana, became 
involved with indigenous politics of the state much more gradually (see Lepri 2003) and their initial 
reluctance to become involved was born of the impulse to avoid a situation which ‘pits indians 
against non-indians and … turn(s) them once again into enemies,’ (Lepri 2003:127). Thus, the 
indigenous movement and ‘indigenous identity’ might be an uncomfortable and foreign project for 
Tacana people, and in many ways removed from what ‘being Tacana’ means to people of this study. 
Significantly, however, refraining from navigating the currents of indigenous politics, leads to an 
increase of the injustice set-off by as this not only ‘pits indians against non-indians’  but can lead to 
increased tension over territory between indigenous groups (see Alexiades, Machuqui & Monje 
2009).  
 ‘Ethnicity’ as a new Political Platform  
The ethnic movement provided a platform from which to claim legitimacy and the right to 
agency which no other context had provided Tacana people for centuries. It gave a context for 
autonomy in decision-making processes about the comunidad and their lives which had hitherto 
been mainly defined by outside bodies, looking to see how best to aid ‘poor rural peasants’. In 
previous years Padre Diego had represented a respected outside authority that had successfully 
initiated projects. During the 1980s there emerged for the first time a generation of Tacana in 
Tumupasa who had sufficient formal schooling to provide them with the practical skills and ‘self-
esteem’ to engage directly with funding-authorities without an outside go-between. Thus, the élite 
Tacana families became the principal agents in the switch from church alliance to NGO engagement. 
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However, the first collaborations failed and it was these failures which later encouraged Tacana 
leaders to turn to the possibilities offered by the platform around ‘ethnicity’.  
Remembering specific incidents of failed collaborations in the early 1990s, Lucho recounts 
that his cousin and old-time friend of the Buqui family, Pedro had used his position of authority to 
hinder a large-scale project from a Spanish NGO: a vocational university complex to be established 
directly in Tumupasa. “Because all the projects were going to the Altiplano they wanted to help us 
down here,”122 Lucho explains, but Pedro’s “hunger for money” (el era hambriente por la plata) led 
to the collapse of the entire project. He and his followers set the precedent that either the 
management of the project be handed to them and thus taken out of the hands of the NGO worker 
and her team, or they would not allow the school to be built at all. Lucho states sarcastically that  
Padre Diego, observing that things were not working out well, did not try and become 
involved. And they (the vecinos) did not want advisors! Even the president of the state has 
his advisors!! But they thought themselves wise men and did not want advisors.123  
The political leaders explicitly avoided being represented by the traditional outside figure, 
the church, in the form of Padre Diego. Yet, as Lucho explains, they did not have the expertise and 
experience to make outside collaborations successful, and had misunderstood how NGOs function:  
NGOs don’t receive money to just hand out to everybody… but to build with! (…) I think they 
just wanted to manage the funds to have a good time with. Happily. Without taking any 
responsibility.124  
The first attempts to collaborate with outside professional organisations failed because of 
unfamiliarity with bureaucracy and knowledge about how funding organizations function. However, 
these failed attempts demonstrate an important aspect, namely the desire – at least among the 
better-situated Tumupaseños - for self-representation, and the need for a platform from which this 
can be achieved.  
Political leaders in the late 1980s were not persuaded by ideology, but rather by the 
continuing aspiration for modernization and obtaining resources to register their comunidad as 
                                                          
122 “Han escogido Tumupasa porque el altiplano, todo el mundo les ayuda. Hay muchas ONGs, en cambio en 
esta zona, no.” 
123 “El padre vio que las cosas andaban mal entonces se retiró. No querían asesores. Aunque hasta al 
presidente del estado tiene asesores! Ellos se pensaban sabios y no han querido asesores.” 
124 “Los ONGs no reciben plata para repetirlo… sino para hacer obras!” … “Creo que ellos querían manejar la 
plata y disfrutarla. Alegremente. Sin tener responsabilidad.” 
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‘indigenous’, despite the derogatory connotations attached to the term. In 1988 the possibility 
occurred of a 1,000,000 hectare lumber concession which could be claimed from the Centre of 
Forest Development (CDF - Centro de Desarollo Forestal) by ‘indigenous comunidades’ (Wentzel 
2009). It was then that the vecinos of Tumupasa recognized that the ethnic movement provided a 
platform from which to tackle the issue of land rights and resources, and put in a claim for 
indigeneity 
From the Church and Tacana leaders, to CIPTA and NGOs - A Shift in Stake Holders 
The Tacana created the indigenous organisation CIPTA in December 1992 to better lay claim 
to land and resources, signalling a major shift in primary stake-holder - from church to NGO. CIPTA 
was founded in Tumupasa at a second meeting of its kind, with eight participating Tacana 
comunidades and supported by the indigenous umbrella organisation Confederation of Indigenous 
Peoples of the Beni (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni - CPIB), an arm of CIDOB (see also 
Wentzel 2009). In 1993 CIPTA attained legal status (personaria jurídica).  
At the time of its foundation the CIPTA member comunidades included Tumupasa, Napashi 
(also San Silvestre), Santa Juanita de Maravilla, Buena Vista and Villa Alcira. In 1995 the comunidades 
of Villa Alcira, Bella Altura, Macahua, Carmen Pecha, San Pedro and Santa Fé joined (ibid). In 1996, 
Santa Juanita went on to establish the representative ‘Tacana Indigenous Organization’ 
(Organización Indígena Tacana - OITA) which incorporated thirteen Tacana comunidades of the 
department of Pando, located by the border with Brazil where many had been Tacana settled during 
the rubber boom at the late 19th century (Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005; Herrera 2003a). These were 
later part of the TCO Tacana II (2006 with at the time around 350,000 ha). 
Being a legal body, CIPTA posed new possibilities for funding entities and NGOs. The legal 
rubric ‘indigenous people’ had opened up new networking possibilities. Before the widespread 
formation of Latin American indigenous movements, international aid had been geared towards 
‘rural populations’ and ‘peasant comunidades’ - terms which were in accord with the measures 
taken under the 1953 Agrarian Reforms to eradicate the stigmatized term ‘indio’ (see Postero 2006; 
Van Cott 2000 et al). With the formation of indigenous organisations, NGOs could enter into 
contracts directly with indigenous groups. This has the bureaucratic advantage that funding for ‘the 
indigenous’ could be neatly channelled to ‘indigenous groups’.   
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By 2004, CIPTA had about twenty different NGOs looking to collaborate with it. It was 
considered as one of the best-organized indigenous organizations in the country. Whereas 
previously the political nucleus of Tumupasa had comprised of committees headed typically by élite 
families accompanied by Padre Diego, the main political nucleus now shifted to CIPTA and its board 
alongside NGOs. With the formation of the TCO Tacana I (2003 with a title over 388,500 ha) and its 
management plan, political efforts gradually extended from Tumupasa to other comunidades125. 
Efforts first aimed to bring a basic infrastructural standard to member comunidades such as health 
facilities electricity, potable water, and a radio communication system with which different 
comunidades could contact one another. 
In the process of land reform, land tenure and indigenous rights, the specific region and 
indigenous comunidad are essential in shaping the nature of the given land tenure process. Each 
Bolivian land-tenure is somewhat different from the next. What is central in this process, though 
often not obvious is the specific comunidad from which the process of acquiring land-tenure is 
launched, and which then comes to represent the people of the region at large. In the case of the 
Tacana people of Iturralde, this was Tumupasa. Without Tumupasa there would have been no 
Tacana ethnic revival movement, or, rather, this would have come about entirely differently. Today 
Tumupasa is the seat of CIPTA. Hotels have since been built in the rustic comunidad of 1000 families, 
predominantly by colono families who were the first to recognize a source of profit to be made from 
the delegates and actors of the indigenous movement, and who bus in to attend central meetings 
with CIPTA. 
The Neo-Liberal State Shapes Indigeneity 
In the case of the Tacana people of Iturralde, it was also significant that the state had singled 
out their geographic area for land reform before they themselves had even submitted their petition. 
Bolivian Sociologist, Zulema Lehm, who worked on the Tacana land reform for WCS, told me that 
the state had had in mind a general land-reform process which did not distinguish between the 
different types of inhabitants nor rely on their collaboration, but focused on reform in terms of 
‘public interest’126. When the state’s intention became clear, the Tacana in 1997 attempted through 
                                                          
125 See Estrategia de Desarrollo Sostenible de la TCO Tacana con Base en el Manejo de los Recursos Naturales 
2001-2005 (CIPTA and WCS/Bolivia 2002). 
126 The so-called CAT-SAN (Land formation integrating the Cadastre - Saneamiento integrado al Catastro) 
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CIPTA to change the nature of the reform process to a specifically indigenous land-tenure claim127. 
Though the government gave its approval this did not mean that it had the finances to carry out the 
reform, which was now more costly as it included the participation of the CIPTA member 
comunidades. This is not an atypical situation as normally in land-reform processes the state relies 
on funding from the World Bank and other bodies. For this reason WCS agreed to collaborate with 
the Tacana to attain TCO land. 
Significant in this process in the politics of indigeneity is that Tumupasa’s actors were 
successful precisely because of the comunidad’s mission past. In order to successfully ‘claim’ 
indigeneity, the petitioning group needs to have some understanding of the state’s bureaucratic 
system and subsequently not be ‘too’ indian. The same goes for collaboration with NGOs, which 
work with the same bureaucratic logic. A former mission comunidad, especially, was easy to 
synchronise with the nation’s Western-style logic and bureaucracy (see also Killick 2008a). At the 
same time, however, in the eyes of the state Tumupasa represents an indigenous comunidad., 
demonstrating that.  
In 2004, the German aid organisation DED, for whom I was then working, would first revise 
in how far an ethnic group had the capacity for working with the organizational structure of the 
DED, before entering into a cooperation with them. This included a certain format for applications 
for funding, and preparing reports and feedback, for the neo-liberal model is put into action in these 
instances. The state has attributed responsibilities for certain social groups to foreign and state-
independent bodies such as NGOs and bilateral aid organizations. For indigenous groups to 
successfully work with these organizations they must adapt to the Western bureaucratic routine 
and become ‘permitted indians’. Thus, while organizations of the global North claim to be aiding 
indigenous cultures in their rights and in the preservation of their ‘culture’, they first require that 
indigenous cultures adapt to their form of organization, and ideas of what ‘indigenous’ is, in order 
to then help them preserve these. Though President Morales claims to decolonize the country (see 
chapter one), this system has not changed in Bolivia since his election. The state in its structure 
remains mestizo. If an ethnic group is ‘too’ indigenous, it cannot benefit from the ethnic rights 
revival programme. One might therefore question how ‘indigenous’ the indigenous rights revival 
                                                          
127 The so-called SAN-TCO (Saneamiento de TCO - Regularization of Indigenous Community Lands) 
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movement can actually be given that the indigenous movement is modelled to fit with 
decentralized, neo-liberal governments. 
In its construction, indigeneity has become institutionalized and its platform is made up of 
indigenous organizations which are represented by indigenous leaders. The mere existence of 
indigenous organizations sets boundaries of inclusion and exclusion not only between different 
ethnic groups, but also within a group. In the mid-1990s, for example, a World Bank project looking 
to fund ‘indigenous people’ declared Peru void of indigenous people on the basis of the non-
existence of a national indigenous organization (Greene 2009; Lucero 2006; Warren 1999). By 
aligning indigenous people along a Western system, those indigenous who do not comply with 
certain definitions come to be seen as non-indigenous. As a result they remain as ‘invisible’ as they 
before the formation of the indigenous movement in Latin America. 
Various stake-holders (the state, NGOs etc.) contribute to the construction of the Tacana 
identity. Among them are NGOs which directly work with Tacana people (e.g. educating them as to 
land-rights) and those which help represent them to the outside world, as happens in the flourishing 
‘eco-tourism’ industry in and around Rurrenabaque.  Many Tacana comunidades have become 
eagerly involved in the tourist industry. However, as part of their collaboration NGOs also decide 
how to present Tacana-ness to tourists, something which must comply with a number of criteria for 
ensuring a sustainable treatment of the environment. In Rurrenabaque there is a strict regulation 
that tourist agencies are not allowed to let their customers hunt, for example, which was one of the 
attractions for many years. As a result I have heard young Tacana tourist guides ridicule hunting in 
front of their customers, which to me sounded completely absurd considering that everyone I knew 
in Tacana comunidades loved hunting. These are situations in which NGOs reinvent Tacana tradition 
for their own outside representation of it. This has been observed for other indigenous groups. 
NGOs working with the Ese Eja also involved with ‘eco-tourism’ (Alexiades & Peluso 2005) equally 
edit traditional knowledge to then “channel it back to the community as part conservation and 
cultural revitalization projects, whose goal is to reinvent tradition in ways that downplay aspects 
considered aesthetically, morally or politically undesirable, or incompatible with modern 
sustainable land-use planning” (ibid:12). 
Indigenous politics provided a context for the leaders of Tumupasa to continue to pursue 
their interests. This also meant, rather than collaborate with the church, they now turned to work 
with major international conservationist NGOs. In this course NGOs such as CI and WCS began to 
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make the transition from being purely nature conservation organizations to including the 
‘preservation’ of indigenous cultures. This was no small challenge and included a complex learning 
process. Tacana leaders are aware that their indigeneity is a platform of negotiation. They are not 
given a blank slate by aid organizations to fill in ‘what is Tacana’. CIPTA has been in constant 
negotiation over what NGOs should ‘do’ for them, and what they in return will ‘do’ for these NGOs. 
In the case of conservationist NGOs such as WCS, this is the agreement to conserve the forest in 
exchange for funding of infrastructure. This is reflected in the words of Adolfo Chavez, the current 
president of CIDOB, who is from Tumupasa and who has been involved with CIPTA since its 
foundation. At the national CIPTA assembly in 2008 he stated to fellow Tacana people: 
 
(…) (A) good co-tenant was found when we began the relationship with (WCS). We were 
strict; they wanted to study butterflies and meanwhile we didn’t know if we would receive 
the land-title or not (…) Thus, dear brothers (…) even though land-tenureship was not within 
their vocation, it was done.”128  
 
As the Bolivian state has refrained from setting down specific markers of what constitutes 
‘indigenous’, NGOs have had more leeway to influence and define attributes themselves according 
to their own philosophies129. Just as the government realized that granting land-tenures  was a 
mechanism by which to control the jungle area, NGOs also realized that the jungle area was best 
managed (in this case conserved) by splitting it into areas and collaborating with the native groups 
to act as caretaker. The Amazon indian as the natural caretaker of the forest has become central in 
an indigenous identity and a popular image on the websites of conservationist NGOs has become 
the Amazonian indian in traditional makeup (e.g. feathers, body-painting, bow and arrow), effective 
especially to grab media attention and help to facilitate the acquisition of resources.  
However, what effect does this have on Tacana people in Tacana comunidades who are not 
leaders and who do not interact with NGOs or other bodies in international aid contexts? Tacana 
                                                          
128 “Podríamos decir que se ha encontrado un buen aparcero, cuando nosotros nos conocimos con ellos fuimos 
duros, ellos querían investigar sobre mariposas en lugares donde no sabíamos si nos iban a titular, (...) 
entonces hermanos, de esa sencilla amistad que nace cuando no había ningún financiamiento, pese a que no 
era su vocación hacer seguimiento agrario, lo hizo.” Wentzel 2009:34 citing CIPTA 2008ª (translation my own). 
129As part of the 1994 constitutional reform, clause 171º pertaining to indigenous identity states, relatively 
vaguely: ”Reconocimiento de derechos de pueblos indígenas: I. Se reconocen, se respetan y protegen en el 
marco de la ley, los derechos sociales, económicos y culturales de los pueblos indígenas que habitan en el 
territorio nacional, especialmente los relativos a sus tierras comunitarias de origen, garantizando el uso y 
aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales, a su identidad, valores, lenguas, costumbres e 
instituciones.”   
183 
 
people have become represented as caretakers of the forest, and programmes around preservation 
have become fixed into their land-tenure management plan. But what is their real take on the 
matter? Though the Tacana have become tied to nature and the forest, in reality they initially cared 
very little about the preservation of the jungle. In many instances, the jungle is not something 
vulnerable to them but, in accord with the wet and dry season, a threatening entity which constantly 
needs to be tamed. “During the rainy season, the jungle is bad. It is angry. Tricky,” explains Felicitas 
from Carmen Florida as we make our way to the river with empty buckets and canisters to fill them 
with potable water. “If you sleep under a jealous tree, it will make you ill. You wake up in the 
morning and you will be ill. It’s different in the dry season. But in the wet season, few people aren’t 
afraid of the jungle.” 
There is a significant difference in how the Tacana perceive the forest and how it is viewed 
by the global North. Conservationist issues are a product of the West. Older Tacana generations in 
particular scoff at this rhetoric. They claim that the Madidi Park is a white elephant preserved for 
the gringos (US people) who plan to reap any resources which may be found there in the future. 
This often puts Tacana people like Anita, who works for the park’s maintenance, in a difficult 
situation. Patrolling the park she will come across former class-mates. 
In certain seasons people go and look for gold upriver. It is illegal, but people will use 
dynamite. They also fish with dynamite. Very popular. They know it is illegal. I have known 
these people since child-hood. Some hate the (national) park and say it is being controlled 
by gringos. They do not see what I do as work. Walking around the forest in a uniform. I sit 
down, talk to them, we joke. They know I have to report them but I don’t want conflict. I 
warn them, but I do it jokingly. 
 
Anita is very aware of her people’s opinion on park preservation. Fulfilling her work 
requirements while maintaining a good relationship with fellow Tacana people is a balancing-act. 
Thus, while Tacana indigeneity is tied to the preservation of their natural surroundings, this is not a 
rhetoric which Tacana people themselves advocated in the first instance but has become one they 
have learned and are well-versed in. This does not mean that they do not ‘take care’ of the jungle. 
But what it means is that this ‘identity factor’ was projected onto them, via concepts and language 
which are distinctly Western and regardless of they ‘care’ about the jungle or not.  
To give a small example, Tacana people believe that every living and non-living thing has an 
‘owner’ in the form of a deity. If too many spider monkeys are hunted, then the deity of the spider 
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monkeys will take revenge, and to prevent this it is wise to refrain from hunting spider monkeys for 
a given time. This system can be interpreted as being a form of preservation of the equilibrium of 
forest and fauna. However, this aspect of Tacana culture is inconsequential for the collaboration 
with conservationist NGOs which will, either way, construct the Tacana land-tenure plan in such a 
way that it is ‘sustainable’ for the natural surroundings. Tacana people are sceptical of the 
preservation plans surrounding the Madidi Park, as Anita’s friends fishing with dynamite suggest. 
This fact demonstrates that Tacana beliefs about the relationship between humankind and nature 
(whatever these might be) have not been understood by NGOS for they have not been adequately 
made part of their relationship. NGOs will construct Tacana indigenous identity with or without the 
participation of Tacana people.  
Making Indigenous Leaders 
NGOs working with the Tacana have, whether consciously or not, helped in the 
naturalization of a certain kind of indigeneity by encouraging and discouraging certain behaviours. 
In this manner NGOs have also perpetuated a structure of authority based on race which was 
present in the comunidades upon their arrival and which they took as being authentically Tacana. 
This ‘indigenous system’ was explained to me by an employee of WCS:  
the Tacana have the tradition of rotating the comunidad’s authority among certain 
important families. The authority typically remains among certain families. This is their 
tradition and this is something we respect.  
 
Among certain Amazonian peoples, authority may indeed have been handed down from 
father to son, and was thus exclusive to certain families. However, it is a considerable stretch to 
make a direct link from this to the Tacana comunidad today, which is based on a mission structure 
where hierarchy was built around eugenics. 
Indigenous authority structures are convenient for NGOs, for with these they know directly 
whom to approach and whom to ‘train’ as leaders. Indigenous leaders are trained in special 
workshops where they learn the ropes of the Western system: how to write reports, how to speak 
to comunidades, how to understand the funding system etc. When seeking out individuals to ‘train’, 
NGOs do not make a background check on their ethnicity, or have a checklist as to what constitutes 
‘indigenous’ or ‘Tacana’. However, seeking out the ‘purest’ Tacana people would entail seeking 
among the poorest of the comunidad, if one considers how race is constructed historically. NGOs 
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rather intuitively seek out those with a certain self-confidence, and a certain level of formal 
education. This tends to exclude Tacana people who have no custom of interacting with ‘outsiders’, 
and who “cry in shame upon seeing outsiders, because they are so timid, so shy,” as some women 
were described to me from the comunidad of Tahua. Leaders will rather be those Tacana people 
who ‘know’ (saber) how to talk to outsiders. In this way, NGOs working with Tacana people have 
come to perpetuate the leadership tradition which was intact when they arrived. They encouraged 
leadership skills and positions in the élite families who had represented the comunidad in the years 
prior to the indigenous movement – people who originally identified as ‘white’ in the comunidad’s 
civil registry.   
The Buqui family, a traditional leadership family of Tumupasa whom I came to know, proves 
a case for this. The oldest Buqui child became the first president of CIPTA. His siblings followed in 
his footsteps and during the 1980s and 90s the majority of them took leadership positions, first with 
church groups and projects in the comunidad and, when the time came, with CIPTA. The first Buqui 
president of CIPTA in the late 1990s moved on to work for Bolivia’s National Service for Protected 
Areas (Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas - SERNAP). Two Buqui sisters became involved (CIMTA) 
which was created parallel to CIPTA, and the older one moved on to be president of the umbrella 
organisation, CPILAP, between 2002 and 2006. Today she lives in La Paz. As this example 
demonstrates, former political leaders have continued to play crucial roles for the Tacana 
comunidad, eventually moving on to becoming central figures in the politics of the indigenous 
movement.  
Although the indigenous revival movement has brought about a shift in power from the 
emphasising one’s indigenous rather than white blood-link, this does not signify that different 
people or families initially take on leadership positions replacing the former mestizo authorities, as 
one might assume. Nor did these vecinos suddenly lose their élite status to become replaced by a 
new indigenous élite as represented by ‘pure’ Tacana who had no white or mestizo blood. Instead 
vecino family members resituated themselves. They no longer stressed a mestizo/white heritage but 
assumed their Tacana ‘side’, re-evaluating and upgrading their ethnicity. Indeed, with the ethnic 
revival movement, the élite leaders of Tumupasa experienced for the first time an advantage in 
stressing their ‘Tacana-ness’. There was not necessarily a great shift in power and authority among 
Tacana people from how it had been before in the comunidad. What had changed, however, was 
the precedent as to what status now entailed. While it was still tied to ‘race’ and assets of wealth 
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such as cattle, horses, land and lumber, it now looked favourably upon an indian blood-link over a 
white one.  
Whatever its underlying rationale, the indigenous movement marks a turning point in the 
construction of Tacana-ness, as the tables were turned in the social hierarchy rooted in race. 
Previously social identity had been gendered advantageously towards the white blood-link, as 
represented by the mestizo’s white father, often a patrón or priest. Now, power has switched to the 
indigenous blood-line, the indian mother, whose racial status attributes legitimacy for the claiming 
of a political indigenous identity. Only by embracing indigeneity have Tacana people of Tumupasa 
been able to achieve land ownership. Ethnicity has become a ‘tool’ and within this context, Tacana 
people willingly tolerate ‘indigeneity’. But, as discussed in chapter one, amongst each other Tacana 
people will not use the term ‘indigenous’ or even ‘Tacana’; these are ‘professional’ terms which 
have become reserved for using with NGOs, or when working with other indigenous organizations. 
On an everyday basis, the Tacana, in self-referral, will fall back on traditional expressions such as la 
gente de las comunidades. 
This chapter has also demonstrated that at their core, definitions around ethnicity are about 
inclusion and exclusion (see also Hale 2004; Kuper 2003). This framework of inclusion and exclusion 
works on a number of levels. By being ‘Tacana’, Tacana people have attained exclusive rights to 
resources which other non-local ethnic groups, namely the Aymara/Quechua people, do not have, 
or have differently (for example, as landless indigenous people). In contrast, when indigenous 
peoples used to be monolithically labelled campesinos, no such distinctions about rights to territory 
on the basis of one’s heritage could be made. All held equal rights. To complicate the situation, an 
indigenous group (and again within this group, individual people), needs to be versed in the colonial 
and Western routines around policy and processes of the state in order to be able to make claim to 
the rights which ethnicity offers. Elite leaders are in an advantageous position here. They adhere 
most to Hale’s construct of the ‘permitted indian’. 
I further explore the concept of the ‘permitted indian’ in the following chapter. As 
demonstrated here, the reconstruction of ethnicity has affected gender-roles and expectations 
around gender-behaviours. Ethnicity has centred on specific female gender behaviours, in which 
colonial constructs of patriarchal organization are discernable. This raises the question of whether 
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the indigenous movement provides adequate spaces for women and specifically Tacana women and 
whether they are able to represent their interests and express their needs. 
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Chapter 8 - “They don’t want to give us Unmarried Women Land 
to Work.” –Tacana Women’s Situation within the Politics of 
Indigeneity  
 
In the comunidad of Buena Vista a wooden contraption of two heavy beams placed on top 
of one another is carried to the plaza. Children not yet of school-age look on as some men sweat to 
lift the heavy beams. It is the cepo – a tool for punishment. Spaces have been carved to trap wrists, 
neck and ankles (see image 22 below). The contraption appears to be based on medieval European 
stocks, yet it is now officially recognised as a tool of punishment specific to the Tacana culture and 
is legally applicable in the new communal justice system (justicia communario) (Van Cott 2003). This 
reprimand is meant for Adela, the first woman corregidora of the comunidad, who is said to have 
set a bad example. Rumour is that she committed adultery while on a trip representing the national 
Tacana women’s organisation, CIMTA, and as a result Tacana men are now refusing to let their wives 
travel to participate in work-shops offered by NGOs. They do not want them to leave the comunidad 
for fear that they will act “similarly” to Adela. 
As well as being a leader in the comunidad, Adela also serves on the board of the Tacana 
women’s organisation (CIMTA) and is very active in the indigenous movement. It appears that the 
severity of her punishment is linked to her public role but the situation seems unjust to me and I 
wonder why the other women of CIMTA do not step in to help Adela. The inequality seems 
particularly clear, because as my friend Juanita would later tell me: 
“Men always do what Adela did. (The president of CIPTA) used to be with another woman 
though he had a wife, or Eduardo used to give all his earnings from being dirigente (of CIPTA) 
to his lover instead of his wife and children.” (…) “Men are never punished as hard as 
women. They are put in the cepo only for a few hours, because they don’t like to be 
humiliated.” 
 
Ultimately this part of Adela’s punishment was called off, perhaps because she never 
returned to her comunidad from her day-trip to Rurrenabaque. Eventually she was banned from her 
comunidad and continued to live in Rurrenabaque for the year, cleaning houses to pay board and 
rent.  I would come across her in the local market buying vegetables. The formerly so proud Adela 
would wave me over timidly, asking uncertainly: “Have you heard anything? Have the señoras from 
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CIMTA said anything [i.e. in my defence]? Can you talk to CIPTA?” Adela also lost her role as 
corregidora of the comunidad as well as her position in CIMTA. Five years later meeting her again in 
the comunidad she now remains absent from politics and projects.  
 
Image 22: The cepo (trap) in Tumupasa (2009) 
 
Adela’s incident serves to highlight principal issues in the construction of indigeneity and 
demonstrates how definitions around what is ‘authentically’ indigenous are tied to specific ideas of 
‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ gender-role behaviour in the context of Tacana indigeneity. Picking up from 
the last chapter, only certain behaviours are permitted within the realms of indigenous politics, 
while others lead to exclusion. Permitted behaviours are roughly aligned to constructions which are 
Western and which for this reason fit into the neo-liberal state system. This includes subtle rules 
which adhere to gender-role behaviour.  
In this chapter, I argue, following De la Cadena (1995), that women, being ‘more indian’, 
have both been cast as the embodiment of ‘indigeneity’ and made responsible for its maintenance.’ 
(Andolina et al 2009; Radcliffe 2009; Canessa 2005b). Tacana women’s roles are used to 
demonstrate what Tacana indigeneity is, and what it is not. These roles are aligned remind one of 
colonial attitudes about women’s subordinate status and fits into the context of Hale’s ‘permitted 
indian’, also based on colonial and Enlightenment ideas. I argue that Tacana women’s behaviour has 
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come under greater vigilance with the rise, and now within the contexts, of the indigenous 
movement.  
Women’s movements greatly influenced policy changes which were implemented in 
development programmes around ‘gender-equity’. The UN Forum articulated that women should 
be protected from violence, but this is the only mention it makes in regard to gender issues and 
indigenous politics (Radcliffe 2013). In Bolivia, gender-specific incidents, such as those concerning 
gender-based violence, has improved with policy reforms passed as part of the LPP of 1995. Overall, 
however, the development arena has failed to adequately engage with indigenous women’s 
concerns, as this chapter demonstrates, in focussing on Tacana women’s efforts to improve their 
standard of living and socio-political position. Different incidents in which Tacana women position 
themselves on the platform of the indigenous movement demonstrate that in many cases they have 
more successfully pursued their goals outside it. 
This chapter first provides a brief overview of the situations of women in Bolivia and Latin 
America, as has come to the forefront of public consciousness with women’s movements; and, 
subsequently, the implementation of gender-equity programs. This overview demonstrates the 
trajectory of the gender-role issue in Latin America and, specifically, Bolivia. As with other aspects 
of indigeneity in Bolivia, indigenous women’s gender-roles and treatment have predominantly been 
framed in the context of the Andes. Gender equality is a central issue in the international aid arena 
and directly affects Tacana people. The international aid context has significantly shaped Tacana 
people’s awareness and attitude towards gender issues. NGOs have greatly shaped the 
representation of ‘the Third World Woman’ while also implementing gender equity policy and aiding 
the establishment of indigenous women’s organizations such as CIMTA. The efforts of individual 
Tacana women, if they do not fall into the representative image as encouraged on the platform of 
the indigenous politics, remain invisible. Again, social class and standing play a significant role in the 
possibilities and resources which individual women can attain.  
Women’s Movements  
The wider trajectory of women’s movements in Bolivia provides a context for the situation 
of Tacana women in regard to the indigenous movement. Women’s movements informed policy 
which was implemented in international development programmes. The manner in which women 
as a group engaged with their situation on a socio-political level differed considerably in the global 
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North and Latin America. In Europe and the USA, 19th century women’s rights advocates sought to 
gain the vote, and to strengthen women’s position by advocating a right not to be defined over their 
bodies, for these tied them to politics based on their reproductive capacities and role as mothers 
and nurturers of the family. In contrast, women’s movements in Latin America tactically drew their 
arguments from just this role as dictated by their female bodies and the capacities tied to this 
(Milanich 2011). Women were the natural upholders of morals because of their innate maternal 
instincts. This instinct attributed to them an essential inclination towards justice (Molyneux 2001; 
Molyneux and Razavi 2002; González-Rivera and Kampwirth eds. 2001).  
Because Latin American women’s movements based their main argument on women being 
the natural nurturer, they posed no threat to either liberal or conservative parties as they did not 
question the traditional gender-roles in the way in which European feminists had. In the period of 
dictatorships and political instability women’s role in the socio-political arena was throttled, as was 
that of other grass-root political action and social movements of the time. When social movements 
became possible in the post-dictatorship era of the 1980s and 1990s, supporters of women’s 
movements first worked towards limited rudimentary goals concerning ‘women’ as a monolithic 
group, which in fact represented the dominant group of white and mestizo upper- and middle-class 
women.  
In Peru and Chile, central forums in which women could engage and organize were the so-
called ‘popular eating houses’ (comedores populares or ollas communes) which tied women to a 
traditional gender-role but also provided the space for organizing and political activism (Molyneux 
and Razavi 2002). In Bolivia the Mothers’ Clubs (Clubs de Madres) gained the highest profile of any 
women’s organization. Indeed, every Tacana comunidad has a Mothers’ Club and their presidents 
are women from élite families who have resilient personalities and strong leadership skills. Women’s 
organisations such as the Mothers’ Clubs were typically aligned to church initiatives such as child-
rearing and, as already apparent in its name, did not look to break down established gender-role 
norms. Initially, the primary interest in having a Mothers’ Club, explains Juanita, was that members 
would receive resources such as dried milk and infant clothing channelled to them from CARITAS130. 
No matter how conventional, these platforms provided women with a space for acquiring political 
skills as well as interacting with different organizations and professionals. In Peru and Chile, this 
                                                          
130 CARITAS is a Catholic social service organization first founded in 1897 and one of the first of its kind. 
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form of political action was in line with the liberal programmes which welcomed women’s use of 
public spaces and overt political activism. Conservative church contexts and nationalist party 
programmes, which generally frowned upon women entering the political arena, could conveniently 
make use of women’s collectives, in order, for example, to advocate traditional family values 
(Molyneux 2001).  
Initially, issues around race and social class were too intricate and counteractive to be 
addressed by the women’s movement. Addressing them would have meant destabilizing middle-
class women’s lives in such a way that it would jeopardize their time for activism. Feminists in Bolivia 
were often white/mestizo intellectuals who led privileged lives and were able to engage in activism 
because of the low-paid female indigenous domestic work they employed and depended on. In the 
early 1980s, it was crucial that the supporters of a movement adhered to a few clear-cut, 
rudimentary goals even if this meant that the interests of those dominating the group would be 
better represented than others (Molyneux 2001:174).  
In Latin America, the initial large-scale absence of women in indigenous movements was 
interrupted by individual female indigenous leaders who have come to be celebrated as heroines, 
such as Rigoberta Menchú from Guatemala and Silvia Larzarte from Bolivia. However, they were 
never directly involved in an ethnic movement per se and are an exception rather than a rule 
(Canessa 2010). It is rare that women were prominent participators in indigenous movements in the 
way they were in southern Mexico’s Zapatista Movement (Canessa 2010; Hernández Castillo et al 
2006; Hernández Castillo 2001).  
In her research, Marcia Stephenson (1999) traces the ideology of womanhood in Bolivian 
culture and how ‘female-ness’ has been constructed by the state. Due to the diversity in ethnic 
cultures, the Bolivian state sought to homogenize cultural identity which became based on specific 
representations of gender-roles. Generally, European women, regarded as enlightened, have been 
regarded as the exemplar of womanhood. ‘History and national narratives are gendered and draw 
upon representations of role model citizens’ (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996:148). In Bolivia this 
European ideal stands in binary opposition to the ‘ethnic woman’. As Bolivia is an ‘Andean country’, 
the latter is represented by the Andean woman with certain identifiable signifiers of Andean style 
and dress: the pollera and long braided hair (Stephenson 1999). In this way, the indigenous woman 
is racialized as Aymara or Quechua. She carries the defining factors of ethnicity through her visual 
style, her language and her role of child-rearer, through which she transmits her ‘ethnic’ culture.  
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A significant difference between highland and lowland indigenous women is the Andean 
women’s longstanding history of claiming public space as market women, or operating in other 
people’s spaces as domestic servants. These roles provide women not only with the chance to leave 
their immediate domestic environment but also to earn an independent income (Stephenson 1999, 
Weismantel 2001). The Andean women’s claim to public space and political participation comes 
from a long tradition of strong unions, made official after the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and behind 
which façade stood the culturally specific allyus. Tacana women of this study, in contrast, come from 
a tradition of missionization, which was heavily patriarchal and followed traditional European 
gender-role traditions. Deviating from these brought punishments which in earlier times only white 
authorities, the priest and the patrón, could inflict but which were then adopted by indigenous 
authorities. This included the huasca – the leather whip - and the cepo - the pillory-like instrument 
of humiliation which also awaited Adela for having committed adultery. 
Gender-Roles in the Tacana Mission and Patrón Comunidad  
In the context of today’s ethnic revival movement, women’s participation is encouraged via 
so-called ‘gender posts’ (positions dedicated to monitoring gender equality), women’s organizations 
and quotas whereas previously Tacana women in comunidades of this study were rather 
discouraged from entering the public/political domain of the comunidad. In the 1980s, Nacha’s 
father, a traditional authority figure in Tumupasa, had approved of his daughter’s becoming 
involved as a leader with the comunidad’s youth-group organized by the church. “My father partly 
approved of this because it was with the church,” she explains. However, he did not approve of his 
daughter entering any wider political realm in the comunidad. “When I became the president of the 
Mothers’ Club he did not like it, nor did my mother.” In the late 1990’s, with the ethnic revival 
movement, Nacha became involved with CIMTA of which first her sister and then she herself was 
president. 
While this is an example of élite Tacana women’s political involvement, before the 1990s it 
was more common that Tacana women influenced political spaces indirectly. Among the Tacana, as 
often among traditional Amazonian societies (see Killick 2005; Rosengren 1987; Lévi-Strauss, 1967), 
leaders were granted the privilege of polygamy, and their wives had responsibility for the 
preparation of meals and drink especially chicha – a brewed and fermented maize or yucca beer, on 
which their husbands were dependent for their display of sociality. Not being able to provide chicha 
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would affect a leader’s reputation and in turn one might argue that this gave Tacana wives some 
substantial power (see Killick 2005; Lehm 1998).  
 Juanita remembers that when she was a child, wives could not hold central political 
positions, but could take on the responsibility of their husband’s position while he was absent from 
the comunidad. When her father was cacique (indigenous leader of the cabildo indigena) of the 
comunidad and needed to travel, her mother represented him and if necessary “doled out beatings 
(palizas) hard, sometimes harder than her husband”. Generally, and depending on the relationship 
between the couple, the husband might take the advice of his wife in comunidad votes and 
discussions. However, ultimately it was up to the husband to decide how far his wife was his equal 
partner and it was always within his right to punish her should she disobey him. Anita stresses that 
when she was a child her grandmother was ‘just one more daughter’ (una hija más) in the house, as 
everyone feared the severity of her grandfather’s generous usage of the huasaca (leather whip).  
International Development and Gender-Equity Programs  
In the 1980s and 1990s women’s movements across the globe resulted in large-scale 
implementations of gender-equity programmes, influenced in particular by the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. To improve women’s equality and rights in Bolivia, 
President de Lozada established the Ministry of Gender, Indigenous People and the Elderly 
(Ministerio de Genero, Asuntos Indigenas y Generaciónes) as part of the LPP package in 1995. At this 
time, policy was adjusted to encourage gender equity and women’s participation in the public-
political domain and, specifically, to protect women from domestic violence. These changes in policy 
made visible the situation of women in rural areas. In aid efforts, ‘gender’ became synonymous with 
‘women’, and programmes focussed on educating and bringing in ‘modern’ (ie European) ideas of 
gender equality, predominantly to women. In these policy changes, indigenous women - as the more 
‘indian’ (De la Cadena 1995) - embodied the nation’s ‘obstacle’ towards modernization while also 
being ‘victims’. While ‘ethnicity’ came to be perceived as rooted in the past, ‘gender’ signalled 
modernization in its objective of breaking open and criticising traditional gender roles (Paulson and 
Calla 2000).  
International aid brought an increased number of ‘workshops’ to Tacana women which 
focused on soft skills such as ‘self-esteem’, ‘leadership’ and the revaluing Tacana ‘traditions’, as 
weaving bags out of self-spun cotton, for example. Tacana women used to be infamous for their 
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weaving skills. In their programs Western NGOs inadvertently perpetuate traditional class structures 
as well as traditional ideas of gender-role norms which have become attributed to “Third World 
Women”, synonymous for being poor, oppressed, heterosexual, with many children and 
predominantly ‘abandoned by their husbands’ (Lind 2003; Paulson and Calla 2000; Rivera 1996; 
Dover and Rappaport 1991, 1996). In relation to gender, development predominantly focusses on 
issues which are negative: violence, poverty, illness, etc. Thus, though there is a heavy focus on 
gender role issues, development efforts fail to adequately focus on women’s every day needs and 
initiatives in the pursuit of their goals and the obstacles they encounter. Post-colonial feminism has 
criticized this, pointing out that development does not adequately consider the intersectionality of 
gender, race and class situation, focussing predominantly on indigenous women’s situation as 
women (Radcliff 2013).  
Juanita of Buena Vista stresses how relieved she was when “the situation (around violence 
towards women) finally changed thanks to the new laws”. I was surprised to realize that she knew 
about this policy in the first place, and attributed it to her years of engagement CIMTA. She 
explained 
 
before the law (LPP) and the land reform the father could kill his children. His wife. And 
nothing would happen. It was his right. In Buena Vista when I was young, a girl became 
pregnant, she had no husband. Her father became very angry. And he placed her naked into 
the middle of the plaza. In the sun. In the cepo. The sun was strong! He left her there and 
she died. Things are different now. But before it was very difficult. A father could stamp on 
the belly of his daughter if she became pregnant. 
 
 
Anthropologist Karin Hissink (1961, 1984) similarly observes that, during her research in 
Tumupasa in the 1950s, if a girl were to became pregnant out of wedlock, a father would turn her 
out of the house to let her “wander alone with nowhere to go” (ibid 1984:78).  
While these situations are quoted by Tacana people today as how ‘things used to be’ and 
thus regarded as belonging to ‘Tacana tradition’, they strongly mirror orthodox Christian values as 
would have been introduced in mission life. Today it is not unusual that Tacana girls first become 
pregnant at the age of fifteen, and without being married. In my research I have not come across 
any of them being punished for this. Juanita expresses relief at the fact that gender-based violence 
has been legally prohibited and that men from their comunidades must obey these laws. At the 
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same time, in a similar type of gender-role based punishment, Adela was threatened with the cepo. 
This raises a number of questions. How far must comunidades adhere to national laws? Who has 
the authority to decide where the line is drawn? Who has the authority to decide what is ‘Tacana 
tradition’ and how far this ‘tradition’ must be removed from colonial influences in order for it to be 
‘authentic’ and ‘indigenous’? Various literature has been dedicated to this question of legal 
pluralism131 and its impact on gender relations (Sieder & McNeish 2013; Ubink et al 2009; Van Cott 
2000). While for indigenous politics ‘the recuperation of customary law is part of a long struggle to 
reject a `neo-colonial' Latin America’ (Van Cott 2000:211), the predominant criticism is that legal 
pluralism is not much more than a way for the state to distance itself from the responsibility of 
administering justice in areas where it has little presence and influence. Indeed, this fits well into 
the neoliberal model.  
Rather than provide an answer to Adela’s situation with the cepo, the purpose in discussing 
this situation is among other things to raise awareness of the complexities involved in reviving 
‘cultural traditions’ and the futility of filtering out ‘Tacana’ from ‘non-Tacana’ tradition in order to 
establish ‘indigeneity’. Because the indigenous movement is based around indigeneity, this 
indigeneity must be established and for this guidelines must be spelled out. In an effort to raise the 
participation of women in these processes of ‘re-establishing’ Tacana indigeneity, aid agencies 
encouraged the foundation of Tacana women’s organizations.  
The National Tacana Women’s Organisation, CIMTA 
Ethnic revival movements in the early 1990s sought to include women in public and political 
arenas. For the benefit of women’s well-being, as aligned to general human rights issues, policy 
aimed to alter the gender structure in lowland comunidades. In this context CIMTA as founded 
exclusively for women, as a sub-group to the national Tacana organization, CIPTA. It had been 
observed that women did not participate when men were present. The creation of CIMTA was aimed 
at providing women with their own platform so as to bring forth their specific issues. CIMTA also 
provided NGOs and other aid groups with a point of entry for working with women, which, unlike 
the Club de Madre, was not associated with the church. 
                                                          
131 `Legal pluralism' is usually associated with colonial rule and refers to the existence of different normative 
systems within one country (Van Cott 2000).  
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To my question how the Mothers’ Club and CIMTA differed from one another in Tumupasa, 
long-time Mother’s Club president Maria replied that “CIMTA only allows Tacana people but the 
Mother’s Club is for everyone132”. Among other things, this means that the second generation 
colono women in Tumupasa, who also have children who were born and go to school there, do not 
have the right to resources distributed within the context of CIMTA.  
As congruent with the neoliberal model, national organisations have been mainly pushed 
aside to make room for NGOs from the West which focus on gender-role equality which are called 
upon to work with the state administrations (Alvarez et al 1998). Thus, for example, the significance 
of  Bolivia’s perhaps most radical feminist grass-roots organisation, Mujeres Creando133, has not 
been identified as valuable in understanding cultural specificities pertaining to Bolivia. Apart from 
the fact that Mujeres Creando is an Andean group and thus has a better grasp of the situation of 
Andean women, it is precisely due to the group’s agenda, which evolved in Bolivia’s specific social 
and political situation, that it could prove useful for the international development arena. 
Overall, the new indigenous organizations shifted the power dynamics and structure of 
Tacana socio-political organization. Previous to indigenous politics, authority structure was based 
on the localness of the comunidad (and this included colonos or other ethnic groups), the highest 
authority being the corregidor. Decision-making processes stayed within the comunidad. With the 
establishment of CIMTA (but more significantly CIPTA), the authority-level became over-reaching. 
NGOs which played a principal role in the establishment of indigenous organizations all over Bolivia 
(van Cott 2005; Postero 2006; et al), have had the power to incorporate new institutions into 
comunidades even if they are in contradiction to local people’s interests and way of life.  
Tacana people readily accepted outside collaborations, even if these aimed to radically alter 
their entire socio-political structure. Maria’s father, a respected vecino in the comunidad who held 
that the political arena was not a woman’s place, had always been critical of his two daughters’ 
involvement with political organizations. Considering such strong cultural values, one might 
question how organizations such as CIMTA managed to spring to life in Tumupasa. Adela was 
expelled from her post as corregidora not by a communal decision by the members of her 
comunidad, but by the president of the over-arching Tacana organisation, CIPTA, which was based 
                                                          
132 “Es que CIMTA solo permite puro Tacanas y el Club de Madre es para todas.” 
133 For a summary on the work and philosophy of Mujeres Creando see the summary by Dangl 2007 
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in Tumupasa. Notably, CIMTA, as the representative Tacana women’s organisation, had no say in 
the matter.  
One might discern strategy in allowing these organizations to be established in the first 
place. As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘projects’ were generally welcome, even sought-after, 
in the comunidad. In agreeing to new and even radical institutions, traditional Tacana leaders such 
as Maria’s father probably hoped that once they had access to resources, these could be ‘redirected’ 
and appropriated to more accurately reflect their comunidad’s interests and needs. As Adela’s 
incident proves, organizations such as CIMTA, which seek to change Tacana women’s attitudes to 
favour Western definitions of gender-equality, are not necessarily successful in doing so.   
It has been observed that, overall, policy measures such as the 1995 LPP which encouraged 
the establishment of women’s organizations such as CIMTA, have proven much less successful than 
anticipated as people often lack the social and financial capital to successfully understand and 
administer new laws to their needs (see also Postero 2007). Ironically, organizations promoting 
gender equity policy which have engaged extensively with Tacana organizations have contributed 
to the reaffirmation of the traditional role of women. Postero (ibid) observes in line with Foucault’s 
(1991) theory of governmentality that NGOs working with indigenous groups govern their own 
conduct in accord with the state’s or the dominating class’ expectations without prompting by the 
state apparatus. In 2005, working with CIMTA in the context of international development, I tried 
to encourage Lucilla from Buena Vista to become involved with CIMTA, seeing that she had so much 
time on her hands and an active interest in local politics. She laughed off my suggestion, exclaiming, 
“those are all married women with children! I do not fit there.” CIMTA ‘disciplines’ its affiliates in 
accord with the dominant (white European) class’ rules and with no prompting by any tangible 
authority, thus helping to re-enforce Hale’s concept of the ‘permitted indian’. This situation 
becomes particularly apparent around land ownership. 
Land Distribution and Leaving Indigenous Politics – Some Observations 
Land redistribution and ownership, and how it affects women from the global South, has 
been an issue of comparative studies globally (Radcliffe 2013; Jacobs 2009; Resurreccion 2006). As 
land distribution and titling have been closely linked to indigenous movements, a recent issue has 
been to ascertain in how far land titling affects, and can benefit, women. Jacobs (2009) observed 
that ‘(a)lthough sometimes benefiting materially, many aspects of land reform have been 
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detrimental for gender equity. (…) (Central) aspect relate to granting men titles or permits as heads 
of household’ (ibid:8). This is the case for Tacana women of this study. 
Lucilla, from Buena Vista, is a park-ranger in the Madidi National Park. As part of her work 
she controls the forests, often staying away from the comunidad for weeks on end. One day she 
came to me very angry, “they have harvested my field! They have taken it off me!” Calming down a 
bit she complained about the corregidor of Buena Vista, “they don’t want to give me land because I 
have no children”. Lucilla now in her mid-thirties has neither a husband nor children - an unusual 
situation for a Tacana woman in the comunidades. “They are very machista in my comunidad,” she 
continues,  
“they don’t want to give women who are not married land to work, because the machistas 
– of which there are three who are very outspoken, one is now corregidor – say that women 
cannot and don’t work the land, so why give them land in the first place?! Five hectares are 
allotted to each person, but he says that single women should only get one hectare, because 
they cannot work more anyway!”  
 
In the TCO Tacana each member comunidad decides how land is to be divided among its 
inhabitants. A special division is made between living and land-working space. The amount of field 
allotted to each adult or family is dependent on its size. Key here is the number of hands able to 
work the land. At the monthly comunidad meetings inhabitants say if they would like to work a 
certain section of land, and put in a claim as to how much they would like to ‘receive’ of this 
communal land. As land must lie fallow for a period up to seven years, new petitions for land are 
not unusual. The fact that organization around land allotment is left up to each comunidad, it may 
very well happen that a conservative fraction receives the majority vote on the decision that single 
women are allotted less land than single men, and if to allot them land at all. In reference to the 
regulation on land-distribution in Buena Vista, Juanita on a different occasion, commented to me 
clearly humored: “it seems to be becoming a fashion! Because single women can’t own land in 
Buena Vista, I now know of two who have gotten married for it!”  
Issues around land-allotment and the situation of women also include aspects of social-
class. Lucilla is from an elite family in Buena Vista thus one might at first assume that being in an 
advantageous position, she would not have a problem receiving land. However, being a single 
woman is of issue here. She is a descendant of one of Buena Vista’s original patrónes; her ailing 
grandfather is the former patrón’s nephew and still lives in the comunidad. But it is also for this 
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reason, she tells me, that the comunidad does not want to give her land. There is jealousy and it is 
said that her grandfather owns so much land privately that he can give her a share to work on. “But 
that is his land,” she explains “and not mine!” Her case is influenced by the fact that she does not 
adhere to certain gender conventions, namely that at her age she be married with children with a 
firm base in the comunidad. She explains that the inhabitants of Buena Vista attribute great value 
to those people who have children for they send them to the comunidad’s secondary school and 
contribute to the uphold of the comunidad as a home and living-space. Indirectly Lucilla is being 
penalized for not being married and not having children.  
Ultimately Lucilla left the comunidad in search of a livelihood. She also left the entire realm 
of indigenous politics, which includes Tacana land-tenure and the projects offered here in 
connection. For a while she went to live in Cochabamba and finished a diploma in cocoa 
manufacturing. Later, with the increasing success of the indigenous movement and the 
consolidation of CIPTA, she tried unsuccessfully to become involved here by applying for the position 
of secretary to CIPTA. “They did not want me,” she tells me somewhat bitterly, “the president of 
CIPTA gave the position to his wife”. Working as a park-ranger in the Madidi Park, Lucilla visits her 
sisters and family in Buena Vista when she is on leave, and up until this incident had used these visits 
as opportunities to also look after her own agricultural plots. She believes that only a very limited 
amount of Tacana people benefit from the context of the indigenous movement.  
Silvia from Carmen Florida and a schoolteacher by profession, is another example of a 
Tacana woman who has stepped outside of the realms of indigenous politics to pursue her goals. 
Now in her late 50s, Silvia is a daughter of a well-respected Tacana leader who was “famous in the 
region!” as she likes to stress and who was born in the mission comunidad, San José de 
Uchupiomonas. As with other families in Carmen Florida and other comunidades which are located 
close to Rurrenabaque, Silvia has a second homestead in town. Silvia has made various attempts to 
collaborate with NGOs who work with the TCO and the context of indigenous politics. However, 
Silvia has had most success outside its realms. In 2003 Silvia became involved with the municipality 
first on the Vigilance Committee and then later when she was voted onto the municipal council (see 
chapter 6). Thus, though not officially an ‘indigenous leader’, she is a Tacana leader in other local 
political Bolivian contexts. In her position of council woman she represents her cultural values, thus 
inadvertently perpetuating what to her is a Tacana way of being.  
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She has been successful as a Tacana leader although within her comunidad, Carmen Florida, 
however, Silvia has sharply been criticized for various personality ‘faults’, particularly by the 
conservative faction. Silvia and Lucilla have important aspects in common which Adela does not 
share. They both have second homesteads in the nearby towns, and this situation in turn can be 
attributed to their family’s past socio-economic standing in the comunidad. This has given them the 
resources to leave the comunidad. With this they have the possibility to avoid social pressure in a 
context (the comunidad) which is establishing regulations around how ‘Tacana’ men and women 
should and should not behave. With the revaluation of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘Tacana traditions’, 
conservative gender-role regulation has experienced a sort of revival and this affects different 
women differently. Differences are tied to social class (which in turn is tied to race - see chapter 7). 
Behaviour becomes tied to rewards (eg land) and punishments (eg the cepo). Adela was not able to 
avoid the social pressure in her comunidad. She did not have the resources nor, having five small 
children, was in any position to simply move out of the comunidad.  
It has been observed (Radcliffe 2012) that indigenous leaders may abuse their position to 
undermine and regulate women’s behaviour in the name of ‘tradition’. Not only had Adela been 
confident and outspoken, known for her wit and sharp tongue, but she had for a number of years 
been an active member of CIMTA. Adela ‘knew how to travel’ (sabe viajar), which was an important 
attribute among the TCO comunidades and meant that she felt comfortable in moving outside the 
realms of the rural comunidades; and she was not ‘shy’ (timida) – a traditionally typical attribute of 
Tacana women. In sum, an effective mechanism which regulates behaviour among Tacana people 
and which branches out into different treatments for gender-roles, is social pressure. This, in turn, 
is created by ‘what people say’ about each other. Or, as Tacana people term it, ‘gossip’. 
Gossip: Evading Social Pressures 
A behaviour which is looked upon sternly in Tacana comunidades and in the Tacana way-of-
being, is ‘gossip’ (chisme). This is closely tied to ‘minding one’s own business’. From this the jump to 
being ‘humilde’ (humble), so typical of Tacana people, is not a large one. Gossip and minding one’s 
own business have become linked to specific gender-role behaviour regulation and the maintenance 
of certain gender-role power dynamics. In various Amazonian societies ‘gossip’, omitting the 
negative connotation which the term holds, was traditionally a mechanism of women’s participation 
in comunidad life and attributed to their specific gender role (Peluso 2003; Chernela 1984). This may 
have been similar among Tacana people. With Christianization, however, gossip received a definite 
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negative connotation. Juanita, in the same conversation in which she lauds the ‘new laws’ which 
seek to protect women from domestic violence, explains that “before the new laws”, it was 
prohibited to get involved with other women’s abuse situation: “if your neighbour was beating his 
wife…you had to act like you did not notice anything. You would hear her screaming and your 
husband would say, if you go and get involved (si te metes) you will get the same from me! The wife 
was then beaten just like the children, too.” 
Maria, a vecino’s daughter from Tumupasa, is well-known for her confident air and ability 
for public speaking. For many years now Maria has maintained her positions of authority, moving 
from being leader of the church youth group to being president of the Mothers Club, as well as 
holding the secretariat of Gender (secretario de Genero) within CIPTA and, lastly, becoming that 
organization’s vice-president. However, Maria, too, has a fault - un defecto - as I was told by 
Constantino from Buena Vista. “You see,” Constantino explained to me, “people say that Maria is 
arrogant. She has a problem with being too arrogant, so they did not want her as CIPTA president”.  
In 2006 Maria was elected vice-president of CIPTA. When she told me about this she added 
with pride that “many people wanted me for president. And I almost became president”. Later I 
heard from others that she had not gained the position because many did not like the idea of a 
woman president. Others, like Constantino, said that it was due to her being arrogant. Maria’s 
arrogance might have prevented a Tacana woman in a less privileged position from attaining public 
office at all. One might argue that were she not from a strong vecino family, she might not have 
been able to maintain her positions of authority. Charo, from San José, proves a similar case. 
San José is a central Tacana mission comunidad, and Charo is a member of one of the main 
vecino families within it. She and all her brothers have been corregidores of the comunidad at one 
point or another. It appears to be an open secret, not only in her comunidad but also far beyond 
and into the town of Rurrenabaque, that Charo is romantically involved with women. Same-sex 
relationships are generally frowned upon among the Tacana because, as I was told, “the bible says 
it’s bad”. When I was able to approach Charo on the subject her attitude was carefree. She was “not 
bothered with what people think.” It had taken me a long time to be able to meet Charo for, as 
typical with members of privileged Tacana families, she was often not in her comunidad but rather 
travelling and staying with family who had homesteads in Rurrenabaque and La Paz. Being able to 
move about so freely undoubtedly put her in a position to evade social pressures and the 
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psychological stress of the criticism which being a lesbian would bring with it in a Tacana comunidad. 
Charo is able to ‘not be bothered by what people think’, as she is able to leave them behind for 
periods of time whenever she wants.  
These incidents involving different Tacana women demonstrate how their social position 
within the comunidad affects their ability to pursue their interests and represent their ideas. Social 
class plays a significant role, even if this is no longer tied to a strong economic situation as it was in 
the past. International development has not focussed sufficiently on the situation of women to be 
able to recognize such factors. CIMTA has not adequately aided in providing the necessary spaces 
for Tacana women to inform the indigenous movement of their needs. Instead, development 
perpetuates an out-dated and conservative image of ‘indian women’, which, echoing as it does the 
romantic Enlightenment construct, is successful in acquiring funds. What does this say about the 
indigenous movement and indigeneity on the whole in relation to women?  
Among other things, Adela’s situation clearly demonstrates how the power dynamics within 
the context of indigenous ‘ways-of-being’ have shifted from local comunidad level to an over-
reaching TCO/CIPTA level. Individual indigenous behaviour (whatever this may mean) now becomes 
part of wider-reaching indigenous politics which are directly linked to the nation-state. In reaction 
to the limited possibilities, Tacana women seek out other contexts, leaving the platform of 
indigenous politics behind. However, if and when they see opportunities here, they will just as easily 
‘return’ and as necessary ‘take on’ an ethnic identity as ‘part of the job’.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis contributes to larger, contemporary discussions of the construction of indigenous 
identities in Latin America through a consideration of Tacana people, who are members of a 
particular Amazonian indigenous group. By focussing on Tacana people, I demonstrate how far 
historical and political processes exclude or include indigenous groups; how indigenous people 
themselves have contributed to political processes, and what this reveals about the construction of 
contemporary indigeneity in Latin America more widely.  
This research takes as a theoretical guideline the observation that indigeneity needs to be 
situated in order to have meaning (Canessa 2012, 2007, 2006; Gotkowitz 2011; Greene 2009, 2006; 
Niezen 2009, 2003; De la Cadena & Starn 2007; Yashar 2005; Rappaport 2005; Warren & Jackson 
2002; Ramos 1998 et al). This thesis is therefore careful to show Tacana people within their specific 
historical and political context: the neoliberal, Andean-centred Bolivian state. Among other things, 
this project is a response to the observation that neoliberal states in Latin America have built their 
pro-indigenous politics on a generic ‘non-situated’ indigeneity described as the ‘permitted indian’ 
by Charles Hale (2004), which “names a sociopolitical category, not the characteristics of anyone in 
particular” (2).  
This thesis also contributes to bridging the gap in information as to how Amazonian groups 
contribute to and place themselves in nation-building processes of specifically Andean countries for, 
as has been observed, “central scholarship on Andean nation-states and their attitude and 
incorporation of indigenous peoples has been predominantly focussed on groups which find their 
origin in the Andes,” (Greene 209:28, also 2006). More specifically, it focusses on an Amazonian 
people’s gaze towards the Andes, a position which has shaped their relation to nation-state politics 
historically and at present. Failing to adequately ‘situate’ the different and distinct indigeneities in 
a country results in their misrepresentation, or even renders them altogether invisible. With the 
trend towards multicultural citizenship, so-called ‘Andean’ nations incorporated Amazonian groups 
into their political agenda in a new way. This research also contributes to an increasing body of 
Amazonian literature which has moved beyond constructing South American forest-dwellers as 
members of timeless societies who adapted to their natural surroundings and were corrupted by 
Spanish colonization (Veber 1998; Viveiros de Castro 1996), and instead places such histories in the 
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larger contexts and perspectives which they themselves contributed to shaping. Processes such as 
landscape transformation, trade, migration, ethnogenesis and not least strategies of resistance (eg 
Van Valen 2013; Dudley 2011, 2009; Alexiades 2009; Alexiades & Peluso 2009; Greene 2009; 
Wentzel 2008) are all therefore considered. 
This conclusion briefly lays out the main processes and contexts which impacted on and shaped 
contemporary Tacana indigeneity and which have been central to this thesis. One of my first 
experiences during fieldwork was Tacana people’s angry opposition to President Morales. They 
projected this dissatisfaction onto how they spoke about colonos, who share the president’s ethnic 
and geographical heritage. Thus, one of my first encounters with Tacana people left me with a taste 
of highland-lowland regionalist tensions, which subsequently became a central concern of this 
thesis. For this reason, when hearing of the TINPIS March which began just as my field-work ended, 
I was convinced that it would mark a turning-point in Bolivia’s political direction, and the country’s 
politics of indigeneity. Having heard continual comments from Tacana people, often accompanied 
by a disgruntled shake of the head or even a fist, about “that Evo”, I was convinced that the TIPNIS 
March would make their dissatisfaction more widely visible, as indeed it has. I believed TIPNIS to be 
a manifestation and a coming-together of all the small-scale criticism made of President Morales by 
indigenous peoples, especially those from the Amazon, at municipal and comunidad level. Surely, I 
thought, it would now be understood on a wider political level that indigenous peoples in Bolivia 
could not be treated as a monolithic group, and that the highland-lowland divide between 
indigenous groups was especially prominent, and part of a larger historical issue. Bolivia’s historic 
highland-lowland regionalism would, I presumed, now receive the attention it deserved: the march 
would mark a turning point. Accordingly, I decided to open this thesis with a description of the event 
today popularly dubbed “the TIPNIS” in Bolivia.  
This thesis continues with an examination of the factors on which indigenous identity is 
based in Bolivia, observing that these are built predominantly on Andean philosophies. In order to 
align himself to indigeneity and the indigenous movement, and to declare his country an ‘indigenous 
state’, President Morales has had to establish his ‘having’ indigenous ‘authenticity’. President 
Morales creates ‘authenticity’ through the incorporation of Andean concepts into everyday politics, 
which gives him the authority to align himself to indigeneity and the indigenous movement, and 
subsequently declare his government to have created an indigenous state. Tacana people, however, 
do not feel represented by the Andean concepts adopted by Morales. Understanding Tacana 
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people’s link to the lowlands and specifically to the Amazon helps demonstrate why they are not 
sympathetic to highland indigenous colonos who migrate into their area, and how this lack of 
sympathy in turn reconfirms their affiliation with lowland mestizo people. 
Contemporary indigenous politics has at its essence indigenous solidarity and the 
understanding that indigeneity is a promising tool for achieving rights and resources, and from this 
angle it is difficult to make sense of the hostilities felt by Tacana people towards colonos. The 
unsympathetic relationship of one indigenous group to the next can easily be exclusively attributed 
to inter-indigenous conflict and it might appear that Tacana people have not grasped the positive 
implications of pro-indigenous politics and policies in Bolivia. Such an assumption would suggest 
ignorance, whereas in fact other factors are at play. Tacana people of this study would never see 
their conflictive situation with colonos as one between two indigenous groups, but one between 
cambas (lowlanders) and collas (highlanders).  
To make this clear, this thesis demonstrates that Tacana people do not define themselves 
in terms of their ethnicity, but rather in terms of geography (see also Orlove 1993), exemplified by 
their strong self-identification as camba. This identification reflects both their region of origin 
(Amazon and lowlands) and their typical pattern of settlement, in comunidades. Geographical 
settlements and the nomenclature attributed to them by Spanish colonization also dictated the 
inhabitants’ placement on the state’s socio-racial economic scale: people from the comunidades are 
and always have been, by definition, poor. Tacana are by their own definition ‘humble’ people ‘from 
the comunidades’. They link themselves less to other local (Leco, Tsimané/Moseten) or remote 
(Aymara/Quechua) living indigenous groups, as would be expected from the context of indigenous 
politics, and more to their common history with local mestizos, with whom they share geographical 
and kinship ties. 
Tacana people’s regional identification is based on the relationship they constructed with 
non-indigenous white/mestizo settlers. Their location in the Amazonian piedmont, as opposed to 
the Bolivian plains of Santa Cruz, meant a closer affiliation with white/mestizo people than if they 
had been residing in the eastern plains or the Andes. The white/mestizo cambas lived in 
comunidades together with their indian peons whereas the Cruzeños had minimal contact with the 
indians who worked their haciendas. These differing relationships had a significant impact at the 
time of the Chaco War and the land reform (1953) that would eventually follow. After 1953 people 
from comunidades were by law no longer peons and were legally, if not in practice, on an equal 
207 
 
footing with the former landowners who had to give a share of their land to the indians who worked 
it. Because the construction of race is interlinked with economic status (Albó 2008; Zavaleta Reyles 
2008), and racial affiliation came to be defined by colonial infrastructure and settlement patterns in 
which towns and cities were the place of white people and the rural areas and comunidades the 
place of the indians (Albó 2008; Orlove 1993). Former patrónes who were white/mestizo and who 
remained in the comunidad thus became ‘indian’ in the eyes of the state. This is a situation which 
has not received much attention in the literature. 
This colonial settlement infrastructure has been uncritically adopted today in indigenous 
politics, and comunidades are considered tokens of indigeneity.  Indeed, though the creation of 
racial categories through policy and taxation has been taken up by authors (eg ibid), it has not been 
adequately incorporated into the politics of indigeneity in Bolivia. Instead, national bureaucracies 
reinforce that ethnic affiliations as much more fixed and static than they actually are. The most 
recent demonstration of this was the 2012 Bolivian census which set out to count the different 
ethnic groups in Bolivia. There was a popular outcry when it became clear that the rubric ‘mestizo’ 
was not to be included134.  
Another central concern of this thesis is the context of Tacana comunidades, and the impact 
which the socio-economic class system as based on the model of the mission comunidad has had on 
who Tacana people are today, especially with regard to indigenous politics. The settlement socio-
economic legacy of missionization set up the hierarchical principle that the whiter (through 
mestizaje) and economically stronger a Tacana person was, the more likely it was for him/her to be 
given authority and leadership positions within the comunidad. This system was self-perpetuating. 
Mestizo Tacana authority positions, as the corregidor and the school-teacher (ie the comunidad’s 
élite)  meant constant interaction with the nation-state representatives (church, NGOS, etc) and 
these thus to become indispensable go-betweens for non-élite Tacana. Sharing kinship ties and 
comunidades with white and mestizos is a key aspect in contemporary Tacana identity. It explains 
Tacana people’s strong affiliation with being camba but also their strong role in indigenous politics 
today. It is this context which lays the grounds for their being able to slip into the role of the 
‘permitted indian’. 
                                                          
134 See for example the following newspaper article http://www.kaosenlared.net/america-
latina/item/26232-bolivia-mestizo-cuando-el-censo-se-torna-disenso.html (accessed 20.10.13) 
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Besides introducing new ways of looking at Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism and 
constructions of race, this thesis has also analysed the role played by different actors involved in the 
construction of indigenous identities. This analysis exposes the fact that the process by which 
indigenous rights are achieved is indifferent to indigenous peoples ‘ethnicity’ (whatever this might 
mean); and that indigenous people can, in fact, derive greater benefit from indigenous politics the 
more they move away from their ‘indian-ness’.   
This contention is demonstrated by an analysis of the grounds on which Tacana people 
became involved in the indigenous movement; a process that had less to do with reviving or 
establishing Tacana indigeneity than with finding a tool for attaining resources necessary to achieve 
modernization. Importantly, placing this situation next to the observation that the hegemonic indian 
in Bolivia is Andean, a logic conclusion could be that this would not affect Tacana people negatively, 
for their investment with the politics of ethnicity is purely strategic. Yet, their dissatisfaction with 
the Andean-centric representation of indigeneity is in fact a case in point of a different aspect, 
having less to do with that Tacana cosmologies are missing in national representations than with 
the fact that in the Andean-centric representation they miss a larger, more incorporative Amazonian 
representation. This would include other socio-racial groups, and be geared towards a wider 
Amazonian camba-ness, as represented by the green banner of the lowlands, or beauty contestant 
competitions. Camba-ness transcends ethnic boundaries and Tacana people situate their 
indigeneity within this wider identity. Such becomes represented in local municipalities as that of 
Rurrenabaque which also includes a Tacana heritage as is represented in the surrounding landscape.  
Furthermore, for Tacana people the move to nationalize Andean philosophies reconfirms a 
historical mistrust of the (traditionally mestizo) government in the highlands, which ‘forgot’ them 
during so many centuries of nation-building. Though specific reasons for this mistrust may differ, it 
is shared by both Tacana people and mestizo lowlanders, binding them together and making up part 
of their collective camba identity. From this perspective, the MAS government and President 
Morales are no more or less mestizo or decolonizing than previous governments.  
On a different, though related, note, Tacana people benefit from pro-indigenous policies (eg 
TCOs) although Tacana-ness is not represented at a national level. Tacana-ness may be irrelevant to 
indigenous politics in Bolivia, but is still being reconstructed. This includes the process of performing 
a neat separation from other ethnicities (eg Ese Eja, Leco, Tsimané/Moseten and even 
white/mestizos) in order to clearly distinguish an ‘us’ from ‘them’. As has been demonstrated, this 
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is not consistent with the reality of Tacana people’s history, raising questions as to who else is 
constructing this Tacana indigeneity - one which is, moreover, represented by Tacana indigenous 
leaders on a wider national and international level - and to what end.  
Also central to this thesis has been to demonstrate that the construction of indigenous 
identity in Bolivia is, in many ways, a project which has little to do with how Tacana people see 
themselves. Indigeneity is a national and international project. A multitude of actors participate in 
shaping indigeneity in Bolivia. Even if President Morales has tied himself and the MAS government 
to the indigenous movement, he is still just one actor among many in the political arena of 
indigeneity. Another central actor, to whom he may stand in contradiction, is the community of 
NGOs. NGOs have firmly taken up their role in the system of a neoliberal, decentralized state, and 
wield great influence in sectors over which states alone have traditionally held power. While NGOs 
partly support President Morales in his pro-indigenous policy endeavours, they do not let his politics 
influence their own political course. Significantly, this attitude is not exclusively one towards the 
government of President Morales. It also pertains to indigenous groups. This means that, NGOs will 
construct Tacana indigeneity, with or without Tacana-ness (their indigenous knowledge), or Tacana 
people, as best fits their own agendas.  
NGOs aid indigenous groups in achieving rights and resources such as land and for this have 
modelled their strategies on specific ideas of what these rights entail (eg conservation of the 
environment) and ideas of what and who indigenous people are. This model is reflected in the 
concept of the ‘permitted indian’, and the more contact an indigenous group has had with nation-
state bureaucracies in the past, the easier it will find this role to play. Tacana people are therefore 
good candidates for indigenous politics. Tacana people of the Andean piedmont are more likely to 
be successful in the politics of the indigenous movement than those who have had less contact with 
state bodies and policies. Their political strength in indigenous politics is a situation which not only 
differentiates Tacana people from other Amazonian groups who are from the same or adjacent 
regions such as the Ese Eja and the Tsimané/Moseten. It also differentiates certain Tacana people 
from other Tacana people, such as those who previously might have been labelled ‘Tacanistas’ – 
monolingual Tacana speakers – and who have never been in a position in the comunidad to engage 
with NGOs or other outsiders. These Tacana people are dependent on those often mestizo Tacana 
people who serve as indigenous leaders for resources and involvement in indigenous politics.  
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NGOs shape indigeneity, using the people they are working with to reconfirm their central 
ideas and concepts (eg the necessity for forest conservation). If Tacana people want to benefit from 
what NGOs have to offer them (eg funding for projects) they will have to negotiate the terms. This 
not only reconfirms that Tacana people successfully play the role of the ‘permitted indian’, it also 
means that the community of NGOs has come to identify which indigenous groups fit the type of 
indigenous they need in order to successfully achieve their goals. In Bolivia it is understood that the 
Tacana are one of the strongest and most successful Amazonian groups in the indigenous 
movement. In 2004, CIPTA was working with over twenty NGOs and has a reputation in Bolivia for 
being ‘NGO compatible’. NGOs actively seek to work with CIPTA so they can tick the ‘indigenous 
people’ box which their organization’s philosophy might require of them. However CIPTA, too, has 
realized that NGOs need indigenous groups. I have experienced incidents during which CIPTA’s 
president rather arrogantly rejects collaborations with NGOs. Once, for example, I overheard him 
on the telephone in Tumupasa: “no, we are not interested, no. You have no idea, the last NGO was 
one from Sweden and they offered 30,000 dollars! We have all kinds of NGOs knocking on our door. 
No, no, no. We are not interested.” 
Finally, while some Tacana people successfully fit the role of the ‘permitted indian’, a larger 
portion do not. These latter are not only those who were never part of the élite Tacana population 
in their comunidad, but also those who simply do not conform to aspects of the hegemonic indian 
subject. This subject reconfirms colonial Enlightenment ideals which permeate other aspects of 
social life such as in the regulation of gender-roles. NGO programmes cater to this by constructing 
the Third World Woman as a passive, victimized, poor, single mother, unable to help herself. Though 
the Bolivian government might be angered by the intense involvement of NGOs and their 
domination of arenas which are traditionally the responsibility of national governments, their 
attitude is inconsistent. President Morales was so angered by the support which the TIPNIS Protest 
marchers received from the USA bilateral aid organization, USAID, that he expelled that organization 
from the country.135 He does not, however, question what imported ‘gender-equality programmes’ 
geared towards indigenous women’s empowerment should look like. He could do so, for example, 
by identifying his own country’s women’s movement (eg as represented by Mujers Creando – 
Women Creating) and dictating that foreign NGOs must take their lead.  
                                                          
135 For press coverage on this incident see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22371275 
(accessed 21.10.2013) 
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As this process of identity construction continues more Tacana are becoming involved with 
the platform of the indigenous movement to help expand the definitions of the ‘permitted indian’: 
if not to make it ‘more Tacana’, then to make it more sensitive to different kinds of people and their 
contexts. In this process ethnicity becomes ‘upgraded’, even if Tacana people themselves have 
never emphasized it much in their own identity. Towards the beginning of the late 1990s, the 
traditional Tacana élite, composed predominantly of the offspring of mestizo families, took on 
principal positions in the indigenous movement. However, this is beginning to change as people 
start openly to talk about each other’s blood links (something which usually does not occur in front 
of outsiders). In this context I have heard statements such as “he is not really Tacana, only his mother 
was Tacana!” about powerful indigenous representatives. Even more significant to Tacana people 
of this study is the fact that their heritage (or an edited version of it) is starting to appear on a more 
public level, for example in the tourist industry which has the effect that they become promoted 
regionally. This became apparent to me the last time I visited Rurrenabaque to witness its annual 
festival. New games and competitions had been added. As well as the dance and costumes which 
represent the navigation of the Beni River on balsa-rafts (image 11), there are now events which 
include the use of real balsa-rafts in a competitive race from Carmen Florida to Rurrenabaque on 
the Beni River (see image 1). Other events include competitions such as transporting water taken 
from the Beni River in a ceramic gourd on one’s head  (image 23), pounding rice (image 24) and, not 
least, bow and arrow shooting (image 25). What was most noticeable was that these were all 
competitions in which people who live in comunidades have an obvious advantage. No mestizo who 
has grown up in Rurrenabaque will know how to steer a balsa boat as well as a person from the 
comunidades and no woman who is not from the comunidades will know how to carry water fetched 
from the river on her head.  
An interesting development is taking place. All the analysis and research of this thesis points 
to the fact that indigenous identity continues to be a foreign concept to Tacana people, seen largely 
as one to be assumed at moments of professional performance tied to indigenous politics, much 
like putting on a suit when going to work. Nonetheless, it has also started to enter Tacana people’s 
everyday lives. Councillor Silvia, for example, talks about being able to defend her municipality 
because her Tacana background enables her to walk in the jungle for many hours, transporting ideas 
which evolved in indigenous politics and appropriating them to her context as she sees fit. Indeed, 
she is linking the concept of ‘people from the comunidades’ to the contemporary politics of 
indigeneity, in as much as she is using it on a local political platform to back up her actions. ‘Being 
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humble’ is receiving a new assertive twist. In ways such as these, the indigenous movement can be 
seen to have given Tacana people a surge of collective self-confidence born in no small part from 
their rejection of the new indigenous politics as brought to them from the Andes, and by NGOs. In 
this way Tacana people continue to contribute to nation-state processes from both within (CIPTA, 
CIMTA, CIDOP, etc) and outside (eg Rurrenabaque) the contemporary indigenous politics, bringing 
forth issues important to them. 
 
 
 
Image 23: Carrying water competition as part of Rurre’s annual festival (2010) 
 
 
Image 24: Pounding rice competition as part of Rurre’s annual festival (2010) 
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Image 25: Bow and arrow shooting competition as part of Rurre’s annual festival (2010) 
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Lombardo, Umberto, and Heiko Prümers. 2010. “Pre-Columbian Human Occupation Patterns in 
the Eastern Plains of the Llanos de Moxos, Bolivian Amazonia.” Journal of Archaeological 
Science 37 (8): 1875–85. 
Lopez, Esther. 2012. “Hay Familias Que Tienen Un Poco Más - La Pertenencia a Las Élites Y Su 
Relevancia Respecto Al Liderazgo de Las Mujeres En Las Comunidades Tacanas de La 
Amazonía de Bolivia.” In Género, Complementariedades Y Exclusiones En Mesoamérica Y 
Los Andes, edited by Andrew Canessa and Aída Hernández. 
López, Luis Enrique, and Pablo Regalsky, ed. 2005. Movimientos indígenas y Estado en Bolivia. La 
Paz, Bolivia: PROEIB Andes : CENDA : Plural Editores. 
Los Tiempos Digital. 2014. “Datos oficiales del censo: Bolivia tiene 10.027.254 habitantes.” Los 
Tiempos, July 31. 
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20130731/datos-oficiales-del-
censo-bolivia-tiene-10027254_222736_480505.html. 
Lowrey, Kathleen. 2006. “Bolivia Multiétnico Y Pluricultural, Ten Years Later.” Latin American and 
Caribbean Ethnic Studies 1 (1): 63–84. 
Lucero, José Antonio. 2006. “Representing ‘Real Indians’: The Challenges of Indigenous 
Authenticity and Strategic Constructivism in Ecuador and Bolivia.” Latin American 
Research Review 41 (2): 31–56. 
235 
 
———. 2008. Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes. 
Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Machicao Gámez, César Augusto. 1990. Historia de Apolo y de la Provincia Franz Tamayo. La Paz, 
Bolivia: Prefectura del Departamento de La Paz, Dirección de Cultura. 
Machicao Gámez, César Augusto, and Stift Wilhering. 2002. Las misiones de Apolobamba y la 
congregación cisterciense. La Paz: Artes Gráficas. 
Maclean, Kate. 2014. “Chachawarmi: Rhetorics and Lived Realities.” Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 33 (1): 76–90. 
Madrid, Raúl L. 2012. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mallén, Patricia Rey. 2013. “Changing Demographics May Spell Trouble For Bolivia’s Evo Morales.” 
International Business Times, August 7. 
Mallon, Florencia E. 1995. Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
———. 2011. Decolonizing Native Histories: Collaboration, Knowledge, and Language in the 
Americas. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Malloy, James M. 1970. Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
Mannheim, Bruce. 1991. The Language of the Inka Since the European Invasion. Austin: University 
of Texas Press. 
Mansilla, H. C. F. 2003. El carácter conservador de la nación boliviana. Santa Cruz de la Sierra: 
Editorial El País. 
Markham, Clements R. 1883. The Basins of the Amaru-Mayu and the Beni. London: Royal 
Geographical Society. 
Martínez Cobo, José R. 1987. Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations. New York: United Nations. 
Martínez Montaño, José A, and Centro de Planificación Territorial Indígena (Bolivia). 2000. “Atlas, 
territorios indígenas en Bolivia: situación de las Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO’s) y 
proceso de titulación”. La Paz, Bolivia: Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, 
Centro de Planificación. 
Martínez Novo, Carmen. 2006. Who Defines Indigenous?: Identities, Development, Intellectuals, 
and the State in Northern Mexico. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
Mathews, Edward Davis. 1879. Up the Amazon and Madeira Rivers, through Bolivia and Peru. 
London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington. 
236 
 
Maybury-Lewis, David. 2002. The Politics of Ethnicity: Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States. 
Boston: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. 
McIntosh, Ian, Marcus Colchester, John Bowen, and Dan Rosengren. 2002. “Comment.” 
Anthropology Today 18 (3): 23–25. 
McNeish, John-Andrew. 2008. “Beyond the Permitted Indian? Bolivia and Guatemala in an Age of 
Neoliberal Developmentalism - CMI Publications.” Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic 
Studies 3 (1): 33–59. 
Medeiros, Carmen. 2001. “Civilizing the Popular? The Law of Popular Participation and the Design 
of a New Civil Society in 1990s Bolivia.” Critique of Anthropology 21 (4): 401–25. 
Mendonca Cunha, Clayton, and Rodrigo Santaella Goncalves. 2010. “The National Development 
Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’s Bolivia: Accomplishments and 
Limitations.” Latin American Perspectives 37 (4): 177–96. 
Métraux, Alfred. 1942. The Native Tribes of Eastern Bolivia and Western Matto Grosso. 
Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 
———. 1948. “Tribes of the Eastern Slopes of the Bolivian Andes.” In Handbook of South American 
Indians, edited by Julian Steward, 3:465–506. Washington, DCs: Smithsonian Institution 
Press. 
Milanich, Nara. 2011. “Women, Gender, and Family in Latin America, 1820-2000.” In A Companion 
to Latin American History, edited by Thomas Holloway, 461–79. 
Mintz, Sidney W., and Eric R. Wolf. 1950. “An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (Compadrazgo).” 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 6 (4): 341–68. 
Molina Argandoña, Wilder, Navia T, Verónica, Lero V, and Ascencio. 2009. Uso e incidencia de los 
derechos del pueblo chimane: voces del chetiye. Trinidad: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 
Ministerio de la Presidencia, Componente de Transversalización de Derechos de los 
Pueblos Indígenas : Programa de Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia. 
Molina Argandoña, Wilder, and Wigberto Soleto Selum. 2002. Sociedad local y municipios en el 
Beni. La Paz: Programa de Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia. 
Molina, Wilder. 2008. Sociedades y territorios culturales en la región amazónica de Bolivia. La Paz, 
Bolivia: Fundación UNIR Bolivia. 
Molina, Wilder, Cynthia Vargas Melgar, and Pablo Soruco Claure. 2008. Estado, Identidades 
Territoriales y Autonomías en la Región Amazónica de Bolivia. La Paz, Bolivia: FUNDACION 
PIEB. 
Molina, Wilder, Cynthia Vargas, Amparo Rodríguez, Ana María Tineo, and Pablo Soruco. 2008. 
Identidades Regionales de Bolivia, Amazonia Sociedades Y Territorios Culturales En La 
Región Amazónica de Bolivia. La Paz, Bolivia: UNIR. 
237 
 
Molyneux, Maxine. 2001. Women’s Movements in International Perspective: Latin America and 
beyond. New York: Palgrave. 
Molyneux, Maxine, Sian Lazar, and Intermediate Technology Development Group. 2003. Doing the 
Rights Thing: Rights-Based Development and Latin American NGOs. London: ITDG Pub. 
Molyneux, Maxine, Shahra Razavi, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, and 
Oxford University Press. 2002. Gender Justice, Development, and Rights. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Monasterios, Karin. 2007. “Condiciones de Posibilidad Del Feminismo En Contextos de 
Colonialismo Interno Y de Lucha Por La Descolonización.” In Reinventando La Nación En 
Bolivia: Movimientos Sociales, Estado Y Poscolonialidad. La Paz: Plural editores. 
Monasterios, Karin, Pablo Stefanoni, and Hervé do Alto. 2007. Reinventando la nación en Bolivia: 
movimientos sociales, Estado y poscolonialidad. La Paz: Plural editores. 
Montaño Aragon, Mario. 1987. Guía etnográfica linguística de Bolivia. La Paz: Ed. Don Bosco. 
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conhecimento se eu não posso dividi-lo?” = “Was nützt alles Wissen, wenn man es nicht 
teilen kann?”: Gedenkschrift für Erwin Heinrich Frank, edited by Birgit Krekeler, Eva, 
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